Tenability Analysis of Television Fires in a Sprinkler Protected Compartment by Shelley, Jonathan Paul
 
Tenability Analysis of Television 



















A project submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of  
Master of Engineering in Fire Engineering 
 
Department of Civil Engineering 
University of Canterbury 
Private Bag 4800 
Christchurch, New Zealand 
 




Unwanted smoke detector activation is an increasing problem in New Zealand, 
particularly in multi-storey apartment buildings.  Many of these building are designed 
for the accommodation of tertiary students, and will generally have very small living 
areas combined with a kitchenette.  The deemed to satisfy provisions of the building 
code require smoke detection in the means of escape within a household unit.  In most 
multi-storey apartment buildings there is only one way out of the apartment and this is 
usually through the living area, therefore smoke detection must be included in this 
area.  The small size of this space however means that cooking fumes are a frequent 
source of unwanted smoke detector activation. 
 
One proposed solution to this problem is to remove the smoke detection from the 
living area, and rely on a fast response residential sprinkler system to provide 
sufficient early warning in the event of fire.  The purpose of this study was to evaluate 
whether the warning provided by a fast response residential sprinkler system would be 
adequate to allow occupants to safely escape from an apartment in the event of a fire.  
The scenario selected for the evaluation involved a television fire in the living room, 
with the occupant asleep in an adjacent bedroom and the connecting door between the 
two rooms closed.  Previous live fire demonstrations by the New Zealand Fire Service 
indicated that burning televisions can produce significant quantities of smoke at 
relatively low heat release rates.  It was considered that the low heat release rate 
would challenge the response capability of the sprinkler head, and that the large 
quantity of smoke would present a serious threat to the occupant attempting to escape 
through the living area. 
 
The performance of the sprinkler system was assessed against that of an optical smoke 
detector and an ionisation smoke detector.  These smoke detectors represent the level 
of safety required by the deemed to satisfy provisions of the building code.  At the 
same time the performance of alternative detection systems including CO and heat 
was also be explored, along with the reaction time of smoke detectors in the spaces 
adjoining the living room (since the proposal is only to remove smoke detection from 
the living area). 
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The evaluation was conducted in a full scale gypsum plasterboard lined compartment 
measuring 8 m x 4 m x 2.4 m high.  A 1.2 m2 lobby was used to represent an 
adjoining room and a standard hollow core door connected the two spaces.  The 
compartment was fitted with two pendent mounted fast response residential sprinkler 
heads, and the televisions were located in one corner of the compartment.  The 
television sets were selected at random from electrical servicing stores that had 
deemed them irreparable.  A series of 21 tests was conducted during the evaluation, 
using a tea light candle against the outside of the television casing as the ignition 
source.  Gas analysis for CO, CO2, O2, HCN and HCl was carried out during the tests, 
along with measurements of visual obscuration, compartment temperature and mass 
loss of the fuel.  The response times of each detection system was also recorded. 
 
Tenability conditions within the compartment were determined using fractional 
effective dose (FED) calculations, and these were assessed against the alert times 
provided by the various detection systems to produce an available escape time.  
Visual obscuration measurements were used to estimate occupant movement speed 
through the compartment to provide a required escape time.  This was compared to 
the available escape time provided by each detection system to determine whether the 
occupant could safely escape from the apartment.  The results showed that the 
sprinkler system did not respond well to the television fires.  On a number of 
occasions the sprinkler system did not operate at all and the TV set burned out 
completely.  When the sprinkler system was used to provide warning, the required 
escape time exceeded the available escape time in 5 out of the 21 cases.  In another 6 
cases the margin provided by the available escape time was less than two minutes.  
The study therefore concluded that the fast response residential sprinkler system did 
not provide a sufficient level of safety to allow an occupant to escape from the 
apartment under this fire scenario.  The results revealed that all the other detection 
systems provided available escapes that exceeded the required escape times, although 
the margins were generally less than 3 minutes in the case of the thermal detector and 
the two lobby detectors.  Of all the systems evaluated, only the CO detector achieved 
an equivalent level of safety to the smoke detectors in the compartment and could 
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Chapter 1    Introduction 1
1. Introduction 
1.1. Background 
Over the past decade there has been a distinct change in the nature of residential 
construction in this country.  Traditionally as a nation, New Zealand has deemed the 
residential dwelling to be the exclusive domain of the stand-alone house or block of 
low rise flats.  Lately however the rapid influx of international students to the major 
centres has seen a dramatic increase in the number of high rise apartment buildings.  
New Zealand has aggressively marketed itself overseas, particularly in Asia, as an 
ideal country for young people to study English as a second language in a safe and 
inexpensive environment.  This marketing strategy has led to an explosion of English 
language schools located within the central business district (CBD) of Auckland, and 
to a lesser extent Christchurch and Wellington.   
 
The natural inclination of the international students to live in close proximity to their 
place of study, coupled with an affinity for inner city living unfamiliar to most New 
Zealanders, has led to a corresponding boom in high rise apartment development.  The 
price and scarcity of land in the CBD area along with the drive to provide cost 
effective accommodation has seen both the building footprint and apartment floor area 
drastically reduced in comparison to traditional residential accommodation.  This 
design philosophy has been possible due in part to the lifestyle expectations of the 
inner city dwellers who tend not to spend excessive amounts of time in their 
apartments, choosing instead to dine out and socialise in communal areas rather than 
in their homes.  This attitude is certainly facilitated by the expectations of the foreign 
student market, the majority of who are accustomed to living in small apartments in 
densely populated cities.   
 
While the multi-storey apartment market has been driven primarily by the need to 
accommodate international students, the idea of inner city living has taken on an 
appeal to many New Zealanders as well.  For some the incentive is to avoid a long 
commute from their city workplace, while others do not have the time or inclination 
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to maintain a house and land.  Many are attracted by the promise of a vibrant urban 
lifestyle, and some simply cannot afford to own a free standing house within the 
surrounding suburbs.  Whatever the reason, multi-storey apartment living is now a 
genuine dwelling option for a substantial segment of the population.  Those that take 
this option have chosen to trade off living space in favour of the advantages apartment 
living offers.   
 
While the changing face of urban accommodation has arguably enhanced the inner 
city environment, it has also brought with it certain life safety issues that have not 
previously been encountered in any depth in this country.  The drive to provide a large 
number of inexpensive apartments within a small building footprint has resulted in 
some less than desirable outcomes from a fire safety perspective.  The first 
consequence of this design philosophy is that there is only one way out of the 
apartment (see Figure 1.1.1).  This immediately restricts the options available to an 
occupant attempting to escape in the event of a fire occurring within the apartment.   
A reduction in the number of egress routes therefore necessitates an increase in the 
available time to escape.  This requires the presence of an early warning system to 
ensure that the only available escape route is not compromised by fire or smoke 
before an occupant can safely evacuate the apartment.  This fact has been recognised 
by building regulators, who have mandated the use of early warning in escape routes 
in the deemed to satisfy provisions of the building code [1].   
 
One of the most common and effective forms of early warning in the event of fire is 
smoke detection.  However the premium placed on floor space means that hallways 
within apartments are avoided, and so the escape route is invariably through the living 
area, which proves problematic with regard to smoke detection.  The standard 
apartment design incorporates the kitchen into the living area, and the small size of 
this living area makes it difficult to position a smoke detector in a location that will 
not be effected by cooking fumes.  This problem is frequently exacerbated by 
inadequate ventilation in the apartment, and the cooking area in particular.  As part of 
cost reduction measures, kitchen range hoods in multi-storey apartments are most 
commonly recirculating types, as this means that expensive ducting can be avoided.  
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Unfortunately the filtering system on these range hoods is generally incapable of 
preventing cooking fumes from activating a smoke detector located in the living area. 
The net result is a high incidence of unwanted smoke detector activation caused by 
normal cooking activities.  As a consequence, apartment occupants naturally develop 
an air of complacency regarding fire alarm activation, which is a potentially serious 
problem in the event of a genuine emergency.  If smoke detector activation within an 
apartment generates a building wide evacuation, all the occupants of the building will 




Typical multi-storey apartment building Typical 2 bedroom apartment floor plan 
 
Figure 1.1.1: Examples of inner city multi-storey apartment buildings 
 
Another common response to the frequent unwanted alarms is for the occupants to 
tamper with the smoke detector head.  As the majority of systems in modern multi-
storey apartment buildings are analogue addressable, removing the detector head will 
generate a fault in the system and identify the apartment in question.  Occupants have 
instead resorted to covering up the detector heads in the living areas, for example by 
taping a plastic bag over them.  While this will stop the unwanted alarms, it also 
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renders the early warning in the escape route ineffective.  A final consequence of 
unwanted alarms in buildings with a Fire Service connected smoke detection system 
is the charges incurred for the call out of the Fire Service and the alarm agent.  Call 
out fees for alarm agent attendance to unwanted activations can become so great that 
the building owner or body corporate refuse to continuing paying, in which case the 
alarm agent will cease attending, and fire alarm system may remain out of action. 
 
A number of solutions have been offered to this problem of unwanted smoke detector 
activations.  These include making the detectors in the apartments local sounding 
only.  This will prevent a building wide evacuation, and the call out of the Fire 
Service and alarm agent.  Providing hush buttons in an easily accessible position to 
temporarily mute the sounder is another possible method of mitigating the effects of 
an unwanted activation.  Unfortunately neither of these options will reduce the 
number of unwanted activations.  Improving the quality of the ventilation within the 
apartment, and the quality of the smoke detection system, will help reduce the number 
of unwanted activations, however both these solutions come with significant cost 
implications. 
 
There is another solution that has been proposed, and this option forms the basis for 
the analysis contained in this report.  The majority of multi-storey apartment buildings 
are required to have sprinkler protection as part of the fire safety provisions.  In recent 
years the use of fast response residential sprinkler systems has become commonplace.  
Fast response residential sprinkler heads, as the name suggests, are designed to 
activate more rapidly than conventional sprinkler heads, thereby providing a greater 
degree of protection to high risk spaces, such as those containing sleeping 
occupancies.   
 
The solution therefore proposes to remove smoke detection from the living area in the 
apartment and rely on the fast response residential sprinkler system to provide 
adequate early warning in the event of fire.  The supposition is that a fast response 
residential sprinkler head will react in time to prevent the escape route from becoming 
compromised to the extent that the occupants are unable to safely evacuate. 
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This proposal has a number of advantages.  Since sprinkler heads are activated by heat 
rather than smoke, it would virtually eliminate the incidence of unwanted alarms 
caused by cooking, or any other normal household activities.  As the sprinkler system 
is required in the majority of apartment buildings anyway, there would be significant 
cost savings by not having to provide a smoke detection system within the living areas 
of the apartments.  If the concept of removing smoke detection is extended to the 
entire apartment, including the bedroom/s, even greater initial cost reductions could 
be made, and additional savings would result from avoiding the ongoing maintenance 
regime required by the smoke detection system.  This is a particular problem in 
buildings with individually owned apartments where gaining access to carry out 
scheduled servicing is often difficult. 
 
The obvious benefits make this option particularly attractive, however there are a 
number of issues that must be examined before its validity can be ascertained.  The 
most fundamental question is whether a sprinkler system can in fact provide the same 
level of protection as a smoke detection system.  This is not an easy question to 
answer at face value.  For a start smoke detectors and sprinklers are designed to 
perform different roles, and consequently operate in different ways.  A smoke detector 
is designed to detect a small quantity of combustion product in the atmosphere, 
whereas a sprinkler operates in response to the heat produced by a fire.  So while a 
smoke detector is capable of detecting the presence of a fire at a very early stage, 
often before flaming combustion occurs, a sprinkler requires the presence of a fairly 
well established fire before sufficient heat is generated to activate the head.  An initial 
assumption is therefore that a smoke detector will activate before a sprinkler under 
normal circumstances.  On the other hand the operation of a sprinkler head will not 
only sound the alarm, it will also control the development of the fire and prevent it 
from spreading.  In many instances it will extinguish the fire completely. 
 
So when comparing the two systems, one must assess whether earlier warning on its 
own is more beneficial than delayed warning coupled with fire control.  Certainly in 
terms of reducing the threat of fire to the rest of the building’s occupants, preventing 
the fire from spreading is the best option.  However since the proposal relates to the 
removal of smoke detection required under the building code, the assessment criteria 
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needs to be in terms of the functional role of the smoke detector, i.e. to ensure the 
occupants have sufficient time to evacuate the apartment safely.  The issues that need 
to be addressed when making this assessment include the time difference between 
smoke detector activation and sprinkler activation, the tenability within the escape 
route at the time of activation (for both the smoke detection and sprinkler operation), 
and the effect of sprinkler activation on the tenability conditions within the escape 
route.   Since a sprinkler head, unlike a smoke detector, is reliant on heat to operate, 
an obvious area on which to focus the assessment would be a smouldering fire, or a 
flaming fire that produces little heat. 
 
During live fire demonstrations conducted by the New Zealand Fire Service at Long 
Bay, Auckland in February 2003, it was observed that fires involving burning 
television sets and computer monitors produced significant quantities of heavy smoke 
before generating sufficient heat to operate a fast response residential sprinkler 
system.  The demonstrations appeared to indicate that the safety of any occupants 
within the building would have been in jeopardy prior to sprinkler activation.  As the 
fires were designed for demonstration purposes rather than to gather experimental 
data, these observations were not substantiated.  Nevertheless, it was considered that 
this scenario would prove particularly challenging for a sprinkler system tasked with 
providing early warning as well as fire control. 
 
1.2. Objective 
The aim of this study was to evaluate whether the warning provided by a fast response 
residential sprinkler system would be adequate to allow occupants to safely escape 
from the apartment in the event of a fire in the living room.  A television fire was 
selected for the evaluation as previous live fire demonstrations by the New Zealand 
Fire Service had indicated that burning televisions can produce significant quantities 
of smoke at relatively low heat release rates.  It was considered that the low heat 
release rate would challenge the response capability of the sprinkler head, and that the 
large quantity of smoke would present a serious threat to the occupant attempting to 
escape through the living area. 
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The performance of the sprinkler system would be assessed against that of an optical 
and an ionisation detector, as these smoke detectors represent the level of safety 
required by the deemed to satisfy provisions of the building code [1].  At the same 
time the performance of alternative detection systems including carbon 
monoxide (CO) and heat would also be explored, along with the reaction time of 




The scenario assumed for the analysis is that an occupant is asleep in a bedroom, and 
a fire has developed in a television set in the living room of the apartment.  The 
occupant must be alerted to the fire by the fire safety system in the apartment, and 
must evacuate the apartment safely via the living room (i.e. through the enclosure of 
fire origin).  Four different fire safety systems were evaluated in the tests.  They 
represent the potential ways in which warning of fire could be achieved within the 
apartment. 
 
1. Smoke detection installed in the living room – this is a prescriptive requirement 
under the building code when the living room forms part of the escape route. 
 
2. Smoke detection installed in space adjacent to the living room – this represents the 
smoke detectors that would normally be installed in the bedroom/s of the 
apartment and could provide the first indication of fire if smoke detectors have 
been removed from the living room. 
 
3. Fast response residential sprinkler system in living room – this is considered a 
mandatory requirement for most multi-storey residential buildings whether or not 
smoke detection is present in the living room or elsewhere within the apartment 
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4. Alternative fire detection systems - this includes carbon monoxide (CO) and 
thermal detectors.  These alternatives might not be as sensitive to unwanted alarms 
as traditional smoke detection. 
 
The methodology for conducting the analysis was as follows: 
 
1. Construct a full-scale residential sized compartment that represents the living 
space of the apartment. 
 
2. Fit out the compartment with the four fire safety systems, along with a method of 
measuring their performance. 
 
3. Install instrumentation within the compartment to measure tenability conditions 
during the tests. 
 
4. Carry out a series of tests involving television fires within the compartment. 
 
5. Compare the performance of the four fire safety systems in terms of the ability of 
each system to detect the presence of the fire in the compartment. 
 
6. Measure the tenability conditions within the compartment over then duration of 
the fire for each test. 
 
7. Using the information on tenability conditions, assess whether the occupant would 
be capable of safely escaping through the compartment subsequent to warning 
being provided by each of the four fire safety systems. 
 
8. Determine whether replacing smoke detection with fast response residential 
sprinklers affected the ability of occupants to safely evacuate the apartment in the 
event of fire 
 
It is important to note that this analysis is only concerned with the ability of each fire 
safety system to detect the presence of fire.  It assumes that an effective method of 
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alerting the occupant/s will follow automatically once the fire has been detected.  It 
should also be noted that the analysis does not take into account issues such as 
variations in the reliability of the different fire safety systems. 
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2. Literature Review 
2.1. Toxicity 
It has long been recognised that exposure to toxic combustion products presents as 
much of a risk in a fire as exposure to heat and flames, if not more.  The impact of 
smoke and toxic fumes on fire victims appears to be on the increase.  According to the 
U.K. Home Office, approximately half of all fatal casualties, and a third of all non-
fatal casualties of dwelling fires were reported as “being overcome by smoke and 
toxic gases” [2].  In his chapter on the toxicology assessment of combustion 
products [3] in the Society of Fire Protection Engineers Handbook of Fire Protection 
Engineering (commonly referred to as the SFPE Handbook) Purser states that 
although there was some reduction in the overall number of fire deaths in the United 
Kingdom during the 1990s, smoke deaths were running at approximately four times 
the levels recorded during the 1950s.  Injuries in the United Kingdom from smoke and 
toxic fumes have also increased six fold.  In the United States smoke inhalation 
accounted for nearly three-fourths of fire related deaths in 1992, up from less than 
three-fifths in 1979 [4]. 
 
Combustion toxicology is an extremely complex field of study. The decomposition 
and burning of even a single and relatively simple organic polymer may produce 
literally hundreds of different airborne chemicals in the atmosphere with the types and 
concentrations changing throughout the fire [5].  This view is reinforced in Purser’s 
chapter in the SFPE Handbook, which states that the atmospheres of thermal 
decomposition products, even for single materials, contained large numbers of 
potentially toxic products. The chemical composition of the products could vary 
considerably depending on the different conditions of temperature and oxygen supply 
under which they were decomposed.  In other words, smoke toxicity is not a 
fundamental property of the material being burned, and it could be argued that the 
results of material toxicity tests could be irrelevant to real life fires [6].  Nevertheless, 
studies have consistently identified a relatively small number of key substances as 
being critical to toxicity assessments.   
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Purser cites the results of chemical studies of large-scale and small-scale experimental 
fires and animal exposures to the thermal decomposition products of a wide range of 
materials in identifying that toxicity is dominated either by an asphyxiant gas (carbon 
monoxide or hydrogen cyanide) or by irritants (such as hydrogen chloride and 
acrolein).  An asphyxiant is a toxicant causing hypoxia (a decrease in the oxygen 
supplied to or utilised by body tissue), resulting in central nervous system depression 
with loss of consciousness and ultimately death [7].  In contrast to the direct effects of 
asphyxiant toxicants, the effects of exposure to irritants are much more complex.  
Consequently it is difficult to relate irritant concentrations quantitatively to their 
impact on ability to escape safely.  Most fire effluent irritants produce signs and 
symptoms of both sensory/upper respiratory tract and pulmonary irritation [7]. 
 
Of the various asphyxiant and irritant combustion products, Purser considers carbon 
monoxide to present the greatest toxic hazard.  Further publications support Purser’s 
view that carbon monoxide (CO) is the dominant toxic fire product.  Babrauskas 
states that carbon monoxide accounts for roughly half of the fire toxicity problem [8].  
While CO is not greatly toxic in comparison to other substances, it is considered the 
primary agent due to its copious generation by all fires.  In a paper on evaluating toxic 
hazard, Hartzell [9] also considers CO to be the major threat in most fire atmospheres, 
for the same reasons as Babrauskas. 
 
CO derives its toxicity from its ability to bind up to 300 times more strongly to 
haemoglobin in the blood than oxygen can [10].  This results in an accumulation of 
the adduct, carboxyhaemoglobin (COHb), in the bloodstream and in a consequent 
reduction in the oxygen-carrying capacity of the blood.  Hydrogen cyanide (HCN) is a 
very rapidly acting toxicant that is approximately 20 times more toxic than carbon 
monoxide [9].  It does not combine appreciably with haemoglobin, but does bind with 
the enzyme oxidase in body cells.  The result is inhibition of the utilisation of oxygen 
by the cells (cytotoxic hypoxia). 
 
In the late 1970s research was carried out by Berl and Halpin of John Hopkins 
University into carbon monoxide poisoning in fires [11].  The study was based on an 
analysis of 463 fire deaths in Maryland and found that 48 percent of fatalities could be 
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attributed to CO alone, with another 26 percent attributed to significant carbon 
monoxide in combination with one or more other toxins or other factors.  30 percent 
COHb was used as a figure to indicate significant carbon monoxide contribution to 
death and 50 percent COHb as sufficient to cause death due to carbon monoxide 
alone.  The research also indicated that no deaths could be attributed solely to 
toxicants other than carbon monoxide, and that at most only one-fourth of the deaths 
involved other toxicants, even as contributing factors. 
 
Harland and Anderson from the University of Glasgow studied 227 fire deaths from 
1976 to 1981 in the Glasgow area and found that 54 percent of the deaths were 
assumed to be from carbon monoxide poisoning [10].  The threshold for fatal carbon 
monoxide poisoning was assumed to be 50 percent COHb.  The study also found that 
of the cases in which cyanide measurements were available, 24 percent were in the 
range likely to produce significant toxic effects, however only 5 percent had 
potentially fatal cyanide concentrations.  Significant but non-fatal toxic effects from 
cyanide were considered to occur in the region of 50µmol/l, whereas 100 µmol/l was 
assumed to be the threshold for serious risk to life. 
 
A retrospective analysis of records kept by the New Jersey State Medical Examiners 
Office is reported in a paper by Nelson [12].  This study looked at 433 fire fatalities 
from 1985 to 1987.  COHb levels averaged 45 percent, and exceeded 50 percent in 
195 cases.  Blood cyanide data (taken from 364 victims) averaged 1.0 mg/l, and 
exceeded 3 mg/l in 31 cases – a value taken by some to be lethal.  However in these 
latter cases the mean COHb level was 62.5 percent, also a lethal level.  Only 8 of the 
31 victims had COHb levels at less than 50 percent.  It is worth noting that in his 
study, Nelson references a 1991 paper by Yoshida et al, published in Forensic Science 
International, in which an analysis of Japanese data found that cases of fatal HCN 
poisoning are rare. 
 
Apart from the asphyxiant gases, the other major toxic component of smoke is the 
irritant gases.  According to Purser the physiological effects of exposure to irritant 
combustion products such as hydrogen chloride result in varying degrees of 
incapacitation which may also lead to death or permanent injury.  Some of the effects 
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include impaired vision resulting from the painful effects of irritant smoke products 
on the eyes, respiratory tract pain and breathing difficulties or even respiratory tract 
injury resulting from the inhalation of irritant smoke.  In extreme cases this can lead 
to collapse within a few minutes from asphyxia due to laryngeal spasm and/or 
bronchoconstriction.  Lung inflammation may also occur, usually after some hours, 
which can also lead to varying degrees of respiratory distress.     
 
The effects of irritants produced in fires are considerably harder to quantify than those 
of the asphyxiant gases.  For a start it is more difficult to conduct post mortem 
assessments of irritant levels within the body, since they do not directly effect the 
central nervous system.  Even if the exposure level is known, accurately assessing the 
effects is still difficult.  For example, Hartzell [13] explains that although eye and 
upper respiratory tract irritation are certainly painful, it is unclear whether or not such 
effects would be incapacitating in a physiological sense.  According to Purser [3] 
there are two distinct ways in which irritants produce incapacitation.  One is pain 
caused by sensory irritation, which effects the eyes and upper respiratory tract and to a 
lesser extent the lungs, and the other is acute pulmonary irritant response.  This 
consists of edema and inflammation that may lead to death 6 to 24 hours after 
exposure. 
 
While Purser believes that the pain caused by sensory irritation can in itself prove 
incapacitating, he admits that the severity appears to depend largely on the type of 
smoke.  He states that fire victim reports indicate that smoke from a well ventilated 
fire burning cellulosic materials is irritating but not incapacitating, whereas smoke 
from burning plastics (e.g. from a car fire) was found to cause severe effects when 
only a small amount was inhaled.  Purser concludes that it is likely that irritant smoke 
products do have some severe effects on the escape capability of fire victims, but it is 
difficult at present to predict accurately the likely degree of incapacitation.   
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2.2. Tenability Analysis 
The following discussion on tenability analysis is closely based on the content of 
Purser’s chapter on toxicity assessment contained in the SFPE Handbook [3].  The 
intention is to provide an overview of Purser’s work as it pertains to this study.  For 
more comprehensive coverage on the topic of tenability analysis, Purser’s chapter 
should be consulted directly.  
 
Purser regards the major considerations when conducting a hazard assessment based 
on tenability limits to be: 
 
1. The time when partially incapacitating effects are likely to occur which may delay 
escape. 
 
2. The time when incapacitating effects are likely to occur which might prevent 
escape, compared with the time required for escape. 
 
3. Whether exposure is likely to result in permanent injury or death. 
 
It is important to make some estimate of the effects that are likely to delay escape, 
which in turn may prevent occupants from escaping during the time available before 
conditions becoming so bad that they are no longer capable of escaping.  The event 
most likely to delay an escape attempt is exposure to optically dense and irritant 
smoke, which tends to be the first hazard confronting fire victims.  If conditions are 
severe enough, a moment may be reached when incapacitation is predicted to be 
sufficiently bad as to prevent escape entirely.  For some forms of incapacitation, such 
as when asphyxia leads to a rapid change from near normality to loss of 
consciousness, this moment is relatively easy to define.  For other effects a defining 
moment is less easily characterised; for example when smoke becomes so irritant that 
pain and breathing difficulties lead to a cessation of effective escape attempts.  
Nevertheless it is considered important to attempt some estimate of the moment when 
conditions become so severe in terms of these hazards that effective escape attempts 
are likely to cease, and when occupants are likely to suffer severe incapacitation, 
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injury or death.  Time to incapacitation (of one degree or another) is in reality more 
important than time to death because most fires are potentially lethal due to CO or 
heat if the victim is exposed to these for sufficient time.  Therefore the two major 
determinants as to whether a victim escapes are the point at which incapacitation by 
toxic products is reached, and how these products affect escape capabilities during the 
window of time available between being alerted to the fire and the development of 
lethal conditions. 
 
The majority of work done on calculating tenability limits in humans is based on 
animal experiments.  The most common animals used in these tests are rodents, 
although primates have also been used in some tests.  The standard method for 
assessing the toxicity of materials using animal experiments is the LC50.  The LC50 is 
described as the concentration of combustion products expressed in terms of mg of 
material per litre of air causing the deaths of 50 percent of animals exposed.  The 
degree of toxicity is determined by the concentration of toxic product in the target 
organ of the body, and the time period for which a toxic concentration is maintained.  
In general it is not feasible to measure the amount of toxic product accumulated in the 
subject (i.e. carboxyhemoglobin in the blood for CO poisoning), and so the 
concentration of toxic product in the smoke is used to predict toxic effects. It should 
be noted that as this is an indirect method of estimating exposure, some degree of 
error or uncertainty will be involved.  Relating concentration of a toxic product in the 
smoke to concentration within the body of the subject means that other factors such as 
respiration rate and particle size of aerosols play an important part in determining the 
ultimate degree of toxicity.  Respiration affects the rate of uptake of the toxic product, 
and this can be estimated by measuring the volume of air breathed by the animal per 
minute (the respiratory minute volume, or RMV).  Variations in RMV can have 
dramatic effects on toxicity.   
 
The primary parameters however remain the concentration of the toxicant, and the 
duration of exposure, which together enable a rudimentary estimation of the dose.  
Thus the product of concentration and time (Ct product) gives an estimate of the dose 
available to the animal.  It follows therefore that the LC50 is also a time dependant 
value.  In general safety evaluations of chemicals for acute exposure, a standard single 
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4 hour exposure time is used to determine the concentration of toxic material causing 
the death of 50 percent of the animals during exposure or within 14 days after 
exposure.  This is known as the 4-hr LC50.  In practice the effects of exposure to 
higher concentrations for shorter periods, or lower concentrations for a longer time 
may be required.  One way of achieving this is by conducting more LC50 experiments 
of varying exposure durations.  However Haber’s rule states that the toxicity depends 
upon the dose accumulated, and that the product of time and concentration is a 
constant, such that 
 
   tCW ×=         (2.2.1)  
where 
 
W =  a constant dose, specific for any given effect 
 
As mentioned before, inhalation toxicology is often expressed in terms of Ct product.  
In the case of the LC50 the effect is death of 50 percent of the animals, and so 
 
   50tLCW ⋅=       (2.2.2) 
 
W is expressed in mg⋅min/litre (i.e. the product of the concentration and the duration 
of the exposure causing lethality).  Equation 2.2.2 implies a linear uptake of the toxic 
substances with time, and this holds true for many substances where the primary 
target organ is the lung (e.g. lung irritant gases).  Unfortunately this simple principle 
does have exceptions. In particular, volatile substances such as carbon monoxide are 
both taken up and off gassed via the lungs.  In this case the rate of uptake depends on 
the difference between the concentration inhaled and that in the body, giving an 
exponential uptake so that 
 
( )tkeCW −−= 1      (2.2.3) 
 
In situations where the concentration C in the atmosphere is high with respect to the 
concentration in the body required to cause incapacitation or death, this exponential 
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relationship approaches the linear Haber’s rule.  For short exposures to high CO 
concentrations, uptake is approximately linear.  Results from exposure experiments 
using primates indicated that the subjects became unconscious when exposed to 
approximately 27000 ppm⋅min of CO at concentrations between 1000 and 8000 ppm.  
Therefore in such situations it is possible to use a linear model for CO uptake without 
incurring significant error.   
 
For the other main asphyiant gas in smoke, hydrogen cyanide, although accumulation 
of a dose is one factor, the most important determinant of toxicity appears to be the 
rate of uptake, which in turn depends upon the concentration.  Incapacitation occurs 
rapidly (after 2 min) at the high concentration of 180 ppm (Ct product 400 ppm ·min), 
but at lower the concentration of 100 ppm, incapacitation occurs only after 
approximately 20 minutes, requiring a much higher Ct product dose (2000 ppm ·min). 
 
Some toxic effects however are not dependant on a dose acquired over a period of 
time at all, but are purely concentration related.  The irritant effects of smoke products 
on the eyes and upper respiratory tract (sensory irritation) occur immediately upon 
exposure, with severity depending upon the exposure concentration.  According to 
Purser, increasing exposure time may even lessen the effects, as the subject adapts to 
the painful stimulus even though the dose is increasing.  Other cases where 
concentration is an important determinant of toxicity as well as duration of exposure 
are the asphyxiant effects of hypoxic hypoxia (lack of oxygen) and hypercapnia (high 
carbon dioxide concentrations).  If a subject is suddenly exposed to a low oxygen 
concentration, a finite time is required for the air in the lungs and gases in the blood to 
equilibrate to the new conditions.  In this respect in might be argued that a “dose” of 
hypoxia is in fact acquired over a period of time.  Once equilibrium has been 
established however, usually within a few minutes, the severity of the effects depends 
upon the oxygen concentration and does not then change appreciably with time.  This 
also applies to high carbon dioxide (CO2) concentrations.  Equilibrium is established 
within a few minutes and concentration related effects then determine the pattern of 
toxicity.  It is important to note that CO2 is not toxic at concentrations of up to 
5 percent, however it does stimulate breathing.  At 3 percent CO2 the RMV is 
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approximately doubled, and at 5 percent tripled.  This hyperventilation can increase 
the rate at which other toxic gases such as CO are taken up. 
 
In attempting to predict what will happen to a subject exposed to a smoke atmosphere 
containing all these products it is therefore important to allow for these different 
concentration/time/effect relationships.  In order to determine when a victim of fire 
exposure reaches a tenability limit (i.e. an incapacitating or lethal dose) it is first 
necessary to determine how much of a toxic dose the subject has received.  This can 
be achieved by integrating the area under the fire profile curve for the toxicant under 
consideration.  When the integral is equal to the toxic dose, the victim can be assumed 
to have received a dose capable of producing that toxic effect.  A practical method for 
making this calculation is the concept of the Fractional Effective Dose (FED).  The Ct 
product doses for small periods of time during the fire are divided by the Ct product 
dose causing the toxic effect.  These fractional effective doses are then summed 
during the exposure until the fraction reaches unity, when the toxic effect is predicted 
to occur.  The FED is therefore expressed in the following equation:  
 
 
dose received at time (t) 





For substances obeying Haber’s rule the denominator of the equation is a constant for 
any particular toxic effect.  For substances deviating from Haber’s rule the 
denominator for each time segment during the fire is the Ct product dose at which 
incapacitation or death would occur at the actual concentration calculated for that time 
segment.  The denominator is usually presented in the form of equations giving the 
required Ct product doses predicted for humans, which have been derived for each 
toxic gas.  Depending on the toxic effect sought, the fractional dose can also be 
expressed as the fractional incapacitating dose (FID) or the fractional lethal dose 
(FLD). 
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In a fire, exposure will not be confined to any one toxicant, but rather will involve 
exposure to a variety of substances at varying concentrations.  Thus the interaction 
between the individual substances is an important consideration in the tenability 
assessment.  Purser proposes that the interactions should be quantified in the 
incapacitation model as follows: 
 
1. CO and HCN are directly additive (1:1) on a fractional dose basis (the evidence 
suggests that while they are additive, the additive interaction may actually be less 
than unity). 
 
2. The rates of uptake of CO and HCN and their fractional doses are increased in 
proportion to any increase in ventilation (RMV) caused by carbon dioxide. 
 
3. The fractional doses of CO and HCN, adapted for carbon dioxide, are additive 
with the fractional dose of low-oxygen hypoxia. 
 
4. Asphyxia by carbon dioxide is independent of that induced by CO, HCN, and 
hypoxia. 
 
5. Irritancy is independent of asphyxia, but uptake of irritants is increased by carbon 
dioxide. 
 
For sensory irritation (a toxic effect that depends upon the immediate concentration of 
an irritant to which the subject is exposed, rather than a dose) – the concept of a 
fractional irritant concentration (FIC) has been developed, where 
   
 
concentration of irritant to which subject is 
exposed at time (t) FIC   = 
concentration of irritant required to cause 
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Much of the background material associated with setting tenability criteria for the 
effects of optically dense irritant smoke is contained in the human behaviour part of 
this chapter (Section 2.4).  A number of attempts have been made to quantify the 
threshold at which the nature of the smoke (regardless of its asphyxiant, irritant or 
thermal properties) presents a serious impedance to the ability of occupant to escape.  
This assessment is based on the degree of visibility afforded by the smoke, although it 
does attempt to consider the effects of irritation on visibility, such as reduced visual 
attenuation [14].  The light extinction coefficient (Cs), otherwise referred to as optical 
density (OD), is the most commonly used measure of smoke obscuration.  The 
relationship between visibility and the light extinction coefficient is complex, and 
depends on a number of parameters, such as the reflectance and/or contrast of the 
object being viewed.  More information on this subject is contained in Jin’s chapter of 
the SFPE Handbook [14].   
 
Most studies recognise that occupant familiarity with the means of escape does play a 
part in determining the tenability threshold as well, i.e. the more familiar the occupant 
with the escape route, the greater the degree of visual obscuration required to impede 
escape.  Jin [14] suggests a tenability limit of extinction coefficient 0.15/m 
(OD/m = 0.06) for subjects familiar with an escape route, or 0.5/m (OD/m = 0.2) for 
subjects unfamiliar with the escape route.  Purser cites a paper by Rasbash in Fire 
International that suggests a 10 m visibility limit (equivalent to OD/m = 0.08), and 
another publication by Babrauskas (Technical Note 1103, National Bureau of 
Standards, 1979), suggesting a tenability limit of extinction coefficient 1.2/m 
(OD/m=0.5) in the context of domestic fires. 
 
Purser states that in order to assess the visual obscuration of smoke, a concept of 
fractional effective concentration (FEC) has been developed, whereby the smoke 
concentration is expressed as a fraction of the smoke concentration considered to 
significantly affect escape efficiency.  If the total FECsmoke reached unity, then it is 
predicted that the level of visual obscuration would be sufficient to seriously affect 
escape attempts.   
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Purser provides the following equations for calculating FECsmoke. 
 
FECsmoke  =  [OD/m]/0.2 for small enclosures   (2.2.6) 
 
FECsmoke = [OD/m]/0.08 for large enclosures  (2.2.7) 
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2.3. Television Fires 
It is apparent from inspecting a modern television set that the plastic casing makes up 
the majority of the fuel load.  The internal componentry does contain combustible 
material, but its contribution is minimal by mass.  The majority of the television’s 
mass is concentrated in the cathode ray tube, which is made of glass, and is 
incombustible.  Observations made at the New Zealand Fire Service live fire 
demonstrations in Long Bay, Auckland also indicate that the plastic casing provided 
the majority of the combustible material in the set.  The following section contains a 




Plastic is the cabinet material of choice in televisions, and has been since at least 
1972, according to production data supplied by manufacturers [15].  By 1976 around 
56 percent of colour television sets sold in the United States were reported to have 
been made primarily with plastic cabinet material, and half of the remaining sets 
included a combination of plastic with some other material.  This allowed for an 
interesting comparison with television sets that still had wooden or metal casings.  
According to Harwood [15] a consistent hierarchy was observed in TV fires: plastic 
cabinets were at highest fire risk, metal or wood at lowest risk, and combination 
models somewhere in between.  If it is assumed that similar internal componentry was 
used, then this indicates that the casing material plays the most important role in the 
development of television set fires.  Harwood points out that the absolute risk of 
television set fires appears to be low.  The highest fire rate observed in 1970 colour 
models in the US was 54 per million over a two-year period, or about 27 fires per 
million sets per year. 
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2.3.2. Troitzsch 
A study carried out by Troitzsch [16] at the State Materials Testing Establishment 
MFPA in Leipzig, Germany, on the ignition and post-ignition behaviour of TV sets 
has shown that housings and backplates made of plastics only meeting low fire safety 
levels will dramatically contribute to the development of a fire.  Troitzsch conducted a 
comprehensive fire testing programme, including tests in a fully furnished room.  His 
study found that TV sets used in the USA and Japan complying with the UL 94 V 
[17] fire safety levels did not lead to fire propagation, whereas television sets of 
European origin with low UL 94 HB fire safety levels readily ignited when exposed to 
the lowest intensity ignition source.  It should be noted that television sets for the New 
Zealand market are required to comply with AS/NZS 60065:2003 [18] which requires 
the TV casing to meet the HB classification. 
 
In the UL 94 horizontal burning (HB) test, the flame travelling between two marks on 
a horizontal test specimen may not burn faster than 38 mm/min for specimens having 
a thickness of between 3-13 mm.  A V-0 classification means that a vertical test 
specimen may not sustain combustion after being contacted with the flame of a gas 
burner.  V-1 and V-2 tests are less stringent and allow for extended afterflame or 
afterglow times, and in the case of V-2, some flaming droplets.     
 
In his paper Troitzsch referenced the Fire Statistics United Kingdom 1993, published 
by the Home Office.  This indicated that in 1993 electrical appliances caused 5,764 
fires in the UK, which is around 14 percent of all household fires.  441 of these fires 
were caused by television sets.  Troitzsch also reports that the Swedish Electrical 
Equipment Control Office SEMKO indicated that 150 to 250 television fires take 
place every year in Sweden. 
 
Troitzsch studied old and new TV sets from Europe, USA and Japan.  Part of this 
study involved an elemental analysis of the backplate plastics to identify the plastics 
themselves and the nature of the flame retardant systems used.  The results showed 
that all TV set backplates consisted of polystyrene (mostly high impact grades).  The 
flame retardancy of the plastic casings was established using the UL 94 classification.  
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The tests revealed that TV backplates made of flame retarded plastics usually met the 
high requirements of the vertical flame spread tests (UL 94 V), while the non-flame 
retarded plastics only met the lower horizontal test (UL 94 HB) requirements.   
 
Tests with an external ignition source of growing intensity showed that flame retarded 
UL 94 V plastics generally do not burn, whereas non-flame retarded HB-rated plastics 
readily ignite when exposed to the lowest energy source typical of a short-circuit or 
accidental contact with an open flame.  Troitzsch concluded that new TV sets 
purchased in Germany can in most cases be ignited by the lowest energy ignition 
source.  TV sets bought in Japan and the United States on the other hand have high to 
very high fire safety levels. 
 
2.3.3. Babrauskas 
Babrauskas carried out a study into the hazards presented by both fire retarded (FR) 
and non-fire retarded (NFR) plastics [19].  The primary goal was to determine 
whether fire retardancy (achieved by introducing highly effective halogenated flame 
retardants such as bromine into the plastic matrix [20]) effect a trade-off between 
decreased burning and increased emission of toxic gas species.  It could then be 
determined whether there was a net safety benefit from the use of fire retardants.  The 
research included a smoke toxicity assessment of polystyrene television casings. 
Babrauskas found that in small scale tests the peak heat release rate (HRR) of the FR 
casing was only 35 percent of the value for the NFR specimen (340 kW/m2 compared 
to 970 kW/m2 at an incident flux of 20 kwm2) and it released only about half as much 
heat in total as the NFR casing (46 MJ/m2 compared to 87 MJ/m2 at a 30 kW/m2 flux).  
The effective heat of combustion of the fire retardant casing ranged between 10 MJ/kg 
and 12 MJ/kg (for 30 kW and 100 kW irradiance respectively), while the NFR casing 
was approximately 30 MJ/kg.  It is interesting to note that the smoke yield per unit 
mass loss of the FR specimen was about twice that of the NFR one.   
 
Two FR sets and one NFR set were tested as whole units in the furniture calorimeter 
(using an empty casing sealed at the front with a galvanised steel cover).  The FR 
casings showed a peak HRR of 175-180 kW, whereas the NFR casing peaked at 
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515 kW.  The total heat generated by the two FR cases was 40 MJ, compared to 
83 MJ for the NFR case.  The average heat of combustion was 20 MJ/kg for the FR 
cases and 23 MJ/kg for the NFR casing.  This differs from small scale tests in this 
study and others discussed here which have determined the effective heat of 
combustion of fire retarded high impact polystyrene to be 10-12 MJ/kg and the 
effective heat of combustion of non-fire retardant high impact polystyrene (HIPS) to 
be approximately 2.5 times this value.  CO production in the FR sets was up 
compared to the NFR casing, with values of 0.26 kg/kg and 0.48 kg/kg (burned 
material) compared to 0.12 kg/kg.  CO2 on the other hand was less in the FR casings, 
at 0.72 kg/kg and 0.72 kg/kg compared to 1.39 kg/kg in the NFR set.  The FR casing 
was not capable of sustained combustion under the ignition criteria used during the 
testing procedures.  Although analysing equipment was in place, HCN and HCl 
concentrations did not register.  In a separate set of tests [21] Babraukas recorded a 
peak HRR of 570 kW for NFR polystyrene TV casings, and 220 kW for FR 
polystyrene casings.  
 
Small scale toxicity tests using the N-Gas model and animal exposure experiments 
found that neither the fire retarded nor un-retarded materials were considered 
extremely toxic.  However the tests did indicate that hydrogen bromide (HBr) may 
contribute in a small way to the toxic effects produced from burning the fire-retarded 
casing.  Babrauskas concluded that the fire retardant additives did decrease the overall 
fire hazard in the television sets tested. 
 
2.3.4. Hoffman 
A set of ten full scale burn tests of television sets were carried out by Hoffmann et al 
in the United States [22].  Background information contained in the report estimated 
that there were 940 fires a year in the US attributable to television sets.  This is out of 
an average of 364,540 residential fires, making TV sets responsible for 0.25 percent 
of these fires.  The report goes on to estimate that as of 2003 there were 2.4 fires per 
million TV sets per year in the United States.  In comparison, the study cites 1979 
statistics that show there were 34.4 fires per million colour TV sets with HB rated 
cabinets, and only 4.6 fires per million colour TV sets with V-0 rated casings.  The 
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study concluded that television sets made of V-0 rated plastics (for the US market) 
will not ignite and propagate a flame under the test conditions whereas TV sets 
manufactured using HB rated plastics (for the European market) will ignite and 
propagate a flame under the same test conditions.  An analysis of the composition of 
the plastic casing of a V-0 rated television determined that it was polystyrene based 
with flame retardants which contained bromine and antimony.  Analysis of the 
European TV set revealed that the casing was primarily polystyrene.  Cone 
calorimetry tests of the V-0 casing gave a peak HRR of 224 kW/m2, and an effective 
heat of combustion of 11 MJ/kg, at an incident flux of 20 kW/m2 and 10 MJ/kg at an 
incident flux of 40 kW/m2.  This is consistent with the findings in the Babrauskas 
study discussed earlier.  Oxygen consumption calorimetry during a room scale test 
revealed that the HB rated European television set had a peak HRR of 455 kW, and 
the V-0 constructed US television sets had an average peak HRR of 302 kW 
(including the ignition source).  It should be noted that the peak HRR of the V-0 rated 
set included the ignition source, as self-sustained combustion was not achievable. 
 
2.3.5. De Poortere 
A study by De Poortere et al [20] raised concerns about the increasing number of TV 
fires in countries such as the UK, Sweden and the Netherlands.  The study linked this 
trend to the international standard IEC 65 [23], which requires that TV enclosure 
materials only meet the UL 94 HB classification.  De Poortere then made comparisons 
with fire statistics in the US.  The study estimated that the number of TV fires in 
Europe was 100 per million TV sets per year due to internal ignition sources, at least 
an order of magnitude higher than in the United States.  This may be explained by the 
fact that US regulations require televisions to comply with UL 1410 [20], which 
specifies V-0 materials for TV enclosures.  The relaxation of fire retardancy 
requirements in Europe has resulted from legislative changes aimed at restricting the 
use of certain halogenated flame retardants.  The study noted numerous other research 
however showing that brominated flame retardants can be safely used by society to 
provide necessary protection from fires.  Other points of note from this research 
include an estimate that a modern TV can contribute approximately 165 MJ to a fire.  
This is equivalent to 5 litres of petrol.  The second point of interest is the finding that 
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in Germany, 30-40 percent of fires did not spread beyond the television set.  Finally, 
the report also noted that approximately one third of television fires originated from 




A further study on TV set fires by Blomqvist et al [25] concentrated on organic 
species such polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons (PAH) and polychlorinated 
dibenzodioxins/furans, more commonly referred to as dioxins.  The emission of 
organic species is not of major concern for people during a fire (but may be a post-fire 
hazard), however the research did include some observations pertinent to this study.  
Detailed chemical analysis was conducted on the high impact polystyrene enclosure 
of both a European HB rated set, and a US V-0 rated set.  The enclosure material of 
the US TV contained decabromodiphenylether (deca-BDE) and antimony oxide 
(Sb2O3) as flame retardant whereas the enclosure material of the European TV 
contained no flame retardant additives.  In full-scale tests the NFR European TV set 
was ignited by a match sized ignition source and burnt with a maximum HRR of 
approximately 240 kW until essentially no combustion material remained.  The US 
TV set with FR enclosure material did not sustain combustion once the ignition 
source was removed.  An external ignition source of 30 kW in contact with the TV for 
the duration of the test was needed in order to achieve combustion.    The maximum 
HRR in this experiment was approximately 100 kW excluding heat released from the 
burner.  The results for the full scale tests revealed CO yields of 0.068 g/g and 
0.104 g/g (burned material) for the European and US sets respectively.  With regard to 
CO2 the yields were 3.28 g/g and 1.48 g/g respectively, while hydrogen chloride 
(HCl) yields were approximately 0.006 g/g and 0.015 g/g.  The study concluded that 
the presence of a flame retardant additive had a marked effect on the combustion 
products.  The yields of all the products of incomplete combustion measured, 
including CO, volatile organic compounds (VOC) and PAH, were significantly higher 
for the TV set with a fire retarded enclosure.  It must be emphasised however that the 
comparison is tenuous given the difference in fire scenarios created by the need for 
continuous use of the 30 kW burner during the FR casing test.  It was noted that this 
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would not normally represent a typical residential fire scenario involving a television 
set, although it could be argued that the burner might represent another more 
combustible appliance located in close proximity to the TV set. 
 
2.3.7. Fire Research Station 
An extensive UK study [26] on television fires was commissioned by the Consumer 
Affairs Directorate, and carried out at the Fire Research Station (FRS).  This study 
found that of an average 55,000 fire incidents in UK homes over the fire years 1994 – 
1998, electrical sources accounted for 58 percent of the incidents.  Television sets 
accounted for 2 percent of overall fire incidents in homes from electrical sources, 
which was the lowest of the key electrical sources analysed.  On average over this 
period there were about 16.4 fires per million TV sets in the UK.  The study also 
found that TVs account for 4 percent of all fatalities caused by fires from an electrical 
source.  A fatality occurs in 4.8 out of every 1000 TV related fire incidents attended 
by brigades.  This represents an average of 0.09 deaths per million TVs each year over 
the five year period.  The ratio of fatalities in TV incidents in the UK is significantly 
lower than for other electrical sources such as electric blankets and space heaters, 
though this may be due to increased intimacy of the victim with the source in these 
cases, particularly with respect to electric blanket fires.  The study also identified the 
risk of a non-fatal injury from a TV fire as averaging 4.7 per million sets over the five 
year period.  It was not possible however to determine the seriousness of these 
injuries, and given the increasing trend in the UK to refer anyone involved in a fire for 
a medical check up whether obviously injured or not, the data could be significantly 
overstating the risk of serious injury. 
 
The report went on to say that the available data indicates around 20 percent of TV 
fire incidents are caused by external sources and suggested that the proportion may be 
higher still (possibly up to 40 percent).  The research concluded that while HB rated 
TV enclosures (as required by the European standard IEC 65) appear to give an 
adequate level of protection from the risk of fire started by an internal fire source, TV 
sets manufactured to this standard could be easily ignited by a low energy external 
ignition source such as a nightlight (tea light candle).  It should be noted that this 
Chapter 2    Literature Review 30
conclusion is at odds with other studies discussed in this section which found HB 
rated enclosures could be ignited from an internal ignition source such as a low power 
short circuit.  The study found that once ignited, all TV sets (HB and V-0) burn 
fiercely and give off toxic smoke.  Also of interest was the finding that there was a 60 
percent probably that the fire would spread from the television set to ignite other 
objects.  This is a very similar percentage to that found in the De Poortere study [20]. 
 
Calorimeter tests involving televisions purchased in both the UK and US were carried 
out at the FRS as part of this study.  While the two UK sets could be ignited with a 
nightlight (double wicked with two matches), the two similar American sets could not 
be ignited in this manner.  A third US set was tested using a 30 kW burner to sustain 
combustion.  The tests found that this American set had a peak HRR of 177 kW, 
compared to the 230 - 248 kW for the British sets.  Smoke production was less overall 
in the American set, 4234 m3, compared to 4494 m3 and 4566 m3 in the British sets, 
but peaked at a higher rate.  This is in contrast to the Babrauskas study [8], which 
found smoke yields to be approximately double in the FR American sets compared to 
the NFR European sets.  Peak CO production for the UK sets was recorded as 0.036 - 
0.038 percent, as opposed to 0.086 percent for the US set.  Peak CO2 production for 
the UK sets was 0.545 percent and 0.526 percent, whereas for the American sets it 
was only 0.277 percent.  As with the other studies discussed previously, the different 
ignition methods used during the tests need to be considered when assessing these 
results.  Nevertheless, one of the conclusions of the calorimetry tests was that the 




A study by TUKES [27] found that fires originating from a television set make up 
approximately 12 percent of all electrical fires in Finland.  This translates into some 
200 fires annually.  Expressed as a proportion of television sets in Finnish homes, the 
incidence of TV fires is approximately one out of every 17,000.  As a comparison, the 
frequency of electrical fires caused by cookers, sauna stoves or central vacuum 
cleaners in Finland is on average double the frequency of that for television sets.   
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According to fire experiments conducted at the VTT Technical Research Centre of 
Finland, TV fires produce a fairly high amount of thermal power, in the order of 250 -
300 kW [26].  This study goes on to say that of all home appliances, only refrigeration 
equipment and dishwashers burn with a greater intensity.  The research also found 
that smoke release in TV fires is three times greater than in fires involving 
refrigeration equipment.  According to this Finnish study, having once ignited the fire 
progressed rapidly.  The elapsed time from ignition to full strength was only 1 - 2 
minutes.  This was at odds with observations made during the Fire Service live fire 
demonstrations conducted at Long Bay, Auckland, in February 2003.  This may 
indicate differences in the materials used in the TV casings, or possibly different 
ignition methods. 
 
The Finnish study recorded temperatures of 200 - 250°C when television sets were 
burning alone in a small room.  In larger sitting rooms the temperature remained at 
100 - 150°C.  It was not clear from the literature where within the room these 
temperature readings were taken.  The study concluded by stating that experiments 
with TV sets in which fire retardants were used have shown that such sets did not 
achieve self-sustained flaming combustion.  Once external flame employed in the 
experiment was removed, smoke release ceased of its own accord.  European 
standards require that fire retardant materials be used in parts of TV sets that are 
particularly sensitive to fire.  The casing however, is not considered such a part.  
According to the study, a TV set casing that meets European minimum standards may 
easily be ignited by a low-power short circuit or open flame. 
 
2.3.9. Comparison of Findings 
The following graphs summarise the heat release rate findings of the studies covered 
in this section, along with the statistical data on the occurrence of TV fires.  Not 
surprisingly, the graphs reveal that not only is the fire size likely to be more 
substantial with an unretarded television casing, but the chance of fire occurring is 
also significantly increased. 
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Figure 2.3.2: Comparison of fire incidents in FR and NFR TV sets 
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2.4. Human Behaviour in Smoke 
Human behaviour in smoke is particularly relevant to this study because it determines 
in large part the time required for an occupant to escape from the apartment.  The 
decision making processes of the occupant may be affected by psychological factors 
such as fear or panic, or physiological factors such as sensory and respiratory distress.  
The reduction in visibility caused by smoke will also affect the movement speed of 
the occupant.  
 
Keating [28] interviewed 100 participants of single dwelling residential fires and 
reported no instances of panic behaviour and instead found primarily altruistic, 
helpful behavioural responses.  According to Bryan [29], the principal variables 
influencing an occupant’s decision to move through smoke appear to be recollection 
of the location of the exit, and ability to estimate the travel distance required.  
Secondary variables are the perception of the severity of the smoke (determined by 
observation of the appearance of the smoke), the smoke density, and the presence or 
absence of heat with smoke.  Bryan noted that occupant behaviour varies extensively 
in the presence of smoke.  Some occupants have been known to move through smoke 
for extended distances (over 20 m) under conditions of extremely limited visibility 
(less than 4 m), at personal risk in order to achieve evacuation.  On other occasions 
occupants have been forced to turn back by smoke and not complete the evacuation. 
 
In a study of participants in fires in the US [30], Bryan found that 107 of the 584 
participants did not leave the fire incident building voluntarily.  Of these, over 11 
percent could not because they were either blocked by smoke or overcome by smoke.  
A further 5.6 percent were either blocked by fire or afraid of fire spread.  However 
322 persons who did evacuate reported that they moved through smoke in the process.  
Information from Bryan’s study is compared to data collected in a British study of by 
Wood [31].  60 percent of the population of the British study (1316 persons), and 62.7 
percent of the US study reported that they moved through smoke.  Occupants reported 
their movement through smoke in relatively high smoke-density conditions, with 
visibility below 4 m (Cs = 0.5 1/m) for 64 percent of the British population and for 
47.6 percent of the United States population.  Bryan and Wood also looked at the 
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visibility distance at the time the participants were forced to turn back.  The results 
indicated that very few participants turned back while the visibility exceeded 10 m 
(Cs = 0.2 1/m).  91 percent of the British population who turned back, and 74.6 
percent of the US population, initiated their behaviour at visibility distances of less 
than 4 m.  The information from both these studies was derived in most part from 
residential property fires housing occupants familiar with the means of egress.  It 
should also be noted that the data on visibility is a subjective assessment on the part of 
the occupant interviewed, based on observations of normal objects and backlit exit 
signs made during the evacuation. 
 
In Proulx’s chapter in the SFPE Handbook on the movement of people [32], she notes 
that the movement of people through smoke is a reoccurring event in actual fires.  She 
goes on to say that although it seems well known by the public that it is smoke that 
kills people in fires, occupants are still prepared to move through smoke to reach 
safety.  The public knowledge that smoke kills does not mean that they are a good 
judge of the potential lethal effect of smoke.  Victims are reporting that they made it 
through smoke because they moved very fast, or were breathing through a cloth or 
holding their breath to protect themselves.  Proulx suggests that a motivation for 
moving through smoke in high-rise buildings is the strong desire of occupants to 
reach ground level.   
 
Proulx refers to a series of tests in Norway by Jensen involving 80 subjects, which 
found that under smoke optical density of 1.09 and 1.58 1/m, movement speed was 
around 0.2 to 0.4 ms-1.  This is considered to be the limiting speed of movement in 
smoke, regardless of what egress information is available to the occupant.  Those who 
have survived catastrophic fires moved on average only 10 m in heavy smoke.  At a 
speed of 0.2 ms-1, this equates to an exposure time of 50 seconds.  In another paper 
[33]  Proulx studied occupant response to a fire in a high-rise apartment building.  Of 
114 occupants who attempted to escape, 84 percent reported moving through smoke.  
45 percent of those moving through smoke indicated that they could see “nothing at 
all” or “little” while 30 percent said they could see 12-15 m down the corridor.  54 
percent of those who attempted to escape were successful, while the remaining 46 
percent were turned back by smoke conditions in the corridors and stairs.  
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Following a series of experiments involving human participants, Jin [14] noted that 
visibility in fire smoke depends on its irritating nature as well as the optical density of 
the smoke.  When highly irritating smoke from smouldering wood cribs was used, the 
experiments revealed a sharp drop in the walking speed of the subjects as the density 
of irritant smoke increased, with speeds of around 0.3 ms-1 estimated in smoke where 
the extinction coefficient (Cs) exceeded 0.5 1/m.  In tests using non-irritating smoke 
produced by burning kerosene, subjects walking speed reduced to 0.5 ms-1 when the 
extinction coefficient reached 1.0 1/m.  Normal walking speed in good visibility is 
approximately 1.2 ms-1.  In the case of the irritant smoke participants could not keep 
their teary eyes open, indicating that visual acuity plays a part along with optical 
density in determining visibility.   
 
Jin also evaluated both the psychological and physiological responses of test subjects 
to increasing smoke density in a small room.  He concluded that people unfamiliar 
with the room experienced unease at an extinction coefficient of 0.15 1/m.  Most 
subjects reported that the drop in visibility was the dominant factor causing their 
unease.  People familiar with the environment tended not to experience significant 
adverse emotional responses until the smoke density reached 0.35-0.55 1/m.  In this 
case it was the physiological effects of irritation and suffocation that gave rise to the 
unease, rather than the reduction in visibility.  Jin concluded that people who know 
the inside geometry of a building on fire need a visibility of 4 metres (Cs = 0.5 1/m) 
for safe escape while those who do not need a visibility of 13 metres (Cs = 0.15 1/m).  
In the case of an apartment fire, it is reasonable to expect the occupant to be familiar 
with the environment, so the first case is of more interest. 
 
In the SFPE Handbook, Jin [14] refers to another study he did involving a group of 
subjects (14 males and 17 females) travelling individually down a 10.5 m corridor 
exposed to smoke from smouldering wood chips.  During the tests the smoke 
extinction coefficient Cs was equal to 0.92 ± 0.21 1/m.  The subjects were exposed to 
increasing heat from radiant heaters at the end of the corridor, giving an average air 
temperature of 82°C and a maximum heat flux of 2.4 kW/m2 at a height of 1.5 m at 
the end of the corridor.  At five points along the corridor the subjects were required to 
perform mental arithmetic calculations.  The results of the tests showed that both 
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walking speeds and mental arithmetic capability decreased with the increase in smoke 
density and increase in radiant heat exposure.  In tests where the smoke density was 
greatest (i.e. Cs = 1.13 1/m), 14 of the 31 subjects turned back before reaching the end 
of the corridor.  Of these 14, 8 were male and 6 female.  It is not apparent from the 
literature whether the subjects were familiar with the corridor prior to the tests, or 
whether they had knowledge of the length of the corridor before they entered it. 
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3. Fire Safety Systems 
3.1. Smoke and Fire Detection inside the Compartment 
In order to evaluate the implications of removing smoke detection and relying instead 
on fast response residential sprinklers to enable occupants to safely evacuate the 
apartment in the event of fire, it is first necessary to gauge the level of protection that 
smoke detection actually affords.  This is also an opportunity to assess the 
performance of alternative forms of fire detection.  In this analysis four different types 
of detectors were evaluated: 
 
• Ionisation 
• Optical (Photoelectric) 
• Carbon Monoxide 
• Thermal 
 
Ionisation and photoelectric smoke detectors comprise the majority of smoke 
detectors currently in use.  Ionisation detectors respond better to faster developing, 
clean burning fires, whereas optical detectors tend to perform better in smouldering 
fires [34].  Of the two, ionisation detectors are more prevalent in New Zealand at 
present.   
 
Carbon monoxide detectors are a relatively new technology, and as the name 
suggests, detect the presence of CO rather than smoke particulates.  It is therefore 
possible that CO detectors are less sensitive to the cooking fumes that generate so 
many unwanted alarms with more traditional smoke detection systems. CO detection 
has been included in the experiments to evaluate its performance against the standard 
methods of smoke detection.   
 
A thermal detector responds to heat from the fire, rather than smoke particulates and 
is therefore unaffected by cooking fumes.  Although both thermal detectors and 
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sprinkler heads are activated by heat, a thermal detector will normally have a lower 
response time index (RTI) than a sprinkler head, and should therefore respond to heat 
from the fire more rapidly than the sprinkler.  So while it is not expected that a 
thermal detector will be as responsive as smoke or CO detectors, it has been included 
in the experiments to determine if its lower RTI gives it a significant advantage over 
the sprinkler system in terms of early warning. 
 
3.2. Smoke Detection in Adjacent Space 
In its basic form, the proposal to remove the smoke detection relates only to the living 
area of the apartment.  It has been assumed that distance, along with the natural 
barrier formed by the door lintels, will prevent cooking fumes from causing unwanted 
activations by smoke detectors situated in adjacent spaces.   
 
In small apartments, the only adjacent spaces of any consequence are likely to be the 
bedrooms, which generally open directly off the living space.  It is therefore 
reasonable to assume that in the event of a fire in an apartment where smoke detection 
has been removed from the living area, the first warning occupants receive will be 
from a smoke detector activating in a bedroom.   
 
To evaluate this possibility, the performance of smoke detectors in a space directly 
adjacent to the fire compartment was examined during some of the experiments.  In 
every case the connecting door between the two spaces was closed.  Two types of 
smoke detectors were used in the adjacent space: 
 
• Ionisation 
• Optical (Photoelectric) 
 
These two detectors are identical to the ones of the same type mounted inside the 
compartment.  The object of the exercise was to monitor their response to smoke 
entering the adjacent space through the gap around the closed door connecting the two 
spaces (see Figure 5.2.1 and Figure 5.2.2).  The activation time of the smoke detectors 
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in the adjacent space can then be compared to that of the detectors in the 
compartment, as well as the activation time of the sprinkler system. 
 
3.3. Sprinkler System 
The basis of the proposal to remove smoke detection from the living area of the 
apartment is reliant on the reaction time of the fast response residential sprinkler head.  
The operating mechanism of the fast response residential sprinkler head is similar to 
the majority of modern conventional heads.  The thermally responsive liquid inside a 
frangible glass bulb is heated through a process of convention from the hot fire gases 
following past the head, and to a lesser extent by radiation from the fire itself.  As the 
liquid is heated, it expands until a point is reached where the glass bulb shatters, 
allowing water to flow out of the sprinkler head.  Residential sprinkler heads are 
designed to discharge water in a wide spray pattern to ensure coverage of the walls of 
the room, against which the majority of furniture is usually located, along with 
curtains and other potentially flammable wall hangings. 
 
A fast response residential sprinkler head differs from a conventional sprinkler head 
because the frangible bulb is significantly smaller.  Where the bulb in a conventional 
sprinkler head is normally around 5 mm in diameter, the bulb in a fast response 
residential sprinkler head is 3 mm in diameter or less.  This means that there is less 
thermal mass within the bulb, and a greater surface area to mass ratio.  Therefore for 
gas at a given temperature flowing past the sprinkler head at a given velocity, the 
liquid inside the bulb of the fast response residential sprinkler head will heat up more 
rapidly than the liquid inside the bulb of a conventional sprinkler head.  In other 
words, under the same fire conditions, a fast response residential sprinkler head will 
activate sooner than a conventional sprinkler head.  
 
The responsiveness of a sprinkler head is denoted by its response time index (RTI).  
The smaller the RTI, the fast the sprinkler head responds.  The RTI of a fast response 
residential sprinkler head is between 28 m½s½ and 50 m½s½, while the RTI of a 
conventional sprinkler is approximately 100 m½s½ to 350 m½s½ [35].  One of the 
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primary goals of this research was to determine if the reduced RTI of the fast response 
residential sprinkler head allowed it to operate soon enough to provide a sufficient 
level of safety to the occupant/s of the apartment. 
 
A second objective of the research was to determine what effect sprinkler activation 
had on tenability within the compartment.  If sprinkler activation was to fulfil the role 
of both warning device and fire control, then the act of suppressing the fire must not 
jeopardise the occupants escape attempt.  The convection driven buoyancy of smoke 
in the fire plume means that it would naturally tend to form a layer at ceiling level, 
which would descend in a fairly uniform manner as the fire progressed.  This would 
leave a relatively clear layer of air beneath the smoke, affording occupants an 
opportunity to escape safely.  Activation of the sprinkler system would cool the upper 
smoke layer, causing it to descend into the previously clear layer beneath (commonly 
known as downdrag).  This would not only affect visibility, but would also bring any 
toxic combustion products such as carbon monoxide down into the lower level of the 
room.  If occupants attempted to evacuate through the living space after sprinkler 
activation, this could affect their ability to safely escape. 
 
It should be recognised that sprinkler activation will at least suppress fire 
development, if not extinguish it completely.  This in turn should reduce the amount 
of toxic combustion products being given off by the fire, making the environment less 
hazardous.  However it is possible for partial suppression to lead to inefficient 
combustion which could increase the production of carbon monoxide.  This scenario 
is particularly relevant in the event of the fire being shielded from the sprinkler spray 
by an item of furniture or fixture within the room for example.  Another factor that 
should be considered when evaluating the implications of sprinkler activation is the 
possibility that the water spray will dilute or wash out toxic combustion products.  
This is certainly a distinct possibility with regard to solid particulates, which can be 
absorbed by the spray droplets and removed from the atmosphere within the room.  
For these reasons an attempt was made to analyse the tenability conditions within the 
compartment following sprinkler activation, as well as prior to activation.
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4. Tenability Criteria 
4.1. Fractional Effective Dose (Asphyxiant) 
As indicated by a variety of sources [3,8,9,12], the combustion products that have the 
greatest impact on tenability during a fire are carbon monoxide (CO) and hydrogen 
cyanide (HCN).  As there was no method available to take continuous measurements 
of HCN, the tenability assessment had to focus on carbon monoxide.  The presence of 
HCN is normally associated with the combustion of substances containing organically 
bound nitrogen [37].  The majority of television casings are likely to be made of high 
impact polystyrene (HIPS) [16,19,25], and previous studies have not revealed high 
concentrations of HCN generated by burning polystyrene TV sets [19,20].  It was 
therefore considered reasonable to ignore the contribution of HCN in the primary 
tenability analysis.  Nevertheless, any assessment of the results of this analysis should 
recognise that the presence of HCN would adversely affect tenability. For this reason 
grab samples of HCN were taken at discrete intervals during some of the experiments 
to gauge whether HCN might have had been a factor in this particular fire scenario.   
 
Tenability conditions were determined using Pursor’s fractional effective dose (FED) 
method [3].  Purser gives the following equation for calculating the FED for 
asphyxiant fire gases: 
 
  ( ) IoirrIcnIcoIN FVCOFLDFFF +×++= 2    (4.1.1) 
where 
 
FIN = fraction of an incapacitating dose of all asphyxiant gases 
FIco = fraction of an incapacitating dose of CO 
FIcn = fraction of an incapacitating dose of HCN 
FLDirr = fraction of an irritant dose contributing to hypoxia 
VCO2 = multiplication factor for CO2-induced hyperventilation 
FIo = fraction of an incapacitating dose of low-oxygen hypoxia 
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In order to use Equation 4.1.1 the experiments had to measure the concentrations of 
carbon dioxide (CO2) and oxygen (O2) in the compartment, along with the 
concentrations of any irritant gases that would contribute to hypoxia by affecting 
airway and lung function.   
 
As already stated, HCN concentrations were not going to form part of the analysis.  
With regard to irritant gases, it appeared that hydrogen chloride (HCl) would be the 
most common [3,25].  However HCl is generally evolved during the combustion of 
polyvinyl chlorides [37] and is not likely to result in significant quantities from the 
combustion of high impact polystyrene [19,20].  Therefore the concentration of 
irritant gases was not included in the FED analysis.  Nevertheless, as with HCN the 
presence of HCl was gauged by taking grab samples at discrete intervals during some 
of the experiments. 
 
This resulted in the use of a simplified FED calculation which looked at the 
concentration of CO, and took into account CO2 induced hyperventilation and the 
effects of low oxygen hypoxia.  The modified equation is as follows: 
 
  IoIcoIN FVCOFF +×= 2      (4.1.2) 
 
The methods for calculating the individual FED components are as follows: 
 




=      (4.1.3) 
where 
 
K = 8.2925 x 10-4 for 25 l/min RMV (light activity) 
t = exposure time (min) 
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=      (4.1.5) 
where 
 
tIo = time to incapacitation due to oxygen depletion 
 
  ( )[ ]2%9.2054.013.8exp OtIo −−=     (4.1.6) 
 
When calculating the fraction of an incapacitating dose of CO, a light activity rate has 
been assumed.  The expectation is that the occupant/s will have been alerted to the fire 
and will be attempting to escape from the apartment.  However under these 
circumstances it is likely that the occupant/s will be in a highly agitated state, with a 
corresponding increase in cardiovascular activity.  Therefore it should be noted that 
actual values may exceed the respiratory minute volume (RMV) and 
carboxyhemoglobin (COHb) concentration for light activity. 
 
Incapacitation as a result of asphyxiant gases is predicted to occur when FIN in 
Equation 4.1.2 reaches unity.  However in order to allow for differences in sensitivity 
and to protect susceptible human subpopulations, Purser recommends that a factor of 
0.1 FED be used to allow for safe escape of nearly all exposed individuals.  It should 
be noted that this is a qualitative assessment and that different values are 
recommended in other literature, such as 0.3 as suggested in ISO/TS 13571 [7].  For 
the analysis contained in this report, Pursor’s tenability threshold for FED 
(asphyxiants) of 0.1 has been used as it represents a more conservative value. 
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4.2. Fractional Effective Concentration (Smoke) 
One of the major factors that will affect the ability of an occupant to escape 
successfully from the apartment will be the degree of visual obscuration caused by the 
smoke.  It can be argued that because the occupant is familiar with the apartment 
layout, and the distances are not great, smoke obscuration would not absolutely 
prevent them from making an escape.   
 
It is difficult to say with any certainty however how individuals would react when 
unexpectedly confronted by heavy smoke, even in their own home - or perhaps 
particularly in their own home.  At the very least smoke obscuration would increase 
the amount of time it would take an occupant to navigate through the apartment, 
which in turn would increase the dose of asphyxiant gases they were exposed to.   
 
It is important to also realise that loss of visibility due to smoke is not the same as 
simply being unable to see.  In the case of smoke, loss of visibility is usually 
accompanied by irritation of the eyes and respiratory system, seriously affecting an 
occupant’s ability to tolerate the environment.  If the occupant is unable to escape the 
environment within a certain time, they may be forced to abandon the attempt.  This is 
regardless of any effects caused by exposure to heat or asphyxiant gases. 
 
The effects of visual obscuration are difficult to quantify due to the subjectiveness of 
any test method.  Nevertheless a value of 1.0 using Purser’s FECsmoke equation has 
been used to determine the threshold at which the level of visual obscuration will 
seriously affect escape attempts (see Equation 4.2.2).  For the purposes of this 
analysis the FECsmoke threshold is used to in conjunction with the occupant alert time 
provided by the various fire safety systems.  This information will aid in determining 
whether the available escape time prior to exceeding the FED threshold is adequate.   
 
While exposure to the asphyxiant gases is assessed as a dose, i.e. both the 
concentration of gases and the duration of exposure are taken into account, the 
tenability threshold for visual obscuration from smoke is a function of the 
concentration alone.   
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The tenability limit is considered to have been exceeded immediately upon the 
concentration reaching a certain level, regardless of the duration of exposure.  In the 
case of smoke obscuration, Purser [3] defines the tenability limit as time-to-escape 
efficiency impairment, or loss of tolerability.  
 
Visual obscuration is frequently expressed in terms of optical density per metre 













1       (4.2.1) 
where 
 
Du = optical density per metre 
l = light path length (m) 
Io = intensity of the incident light 
I = intensity of the light through smoke 
 
Purser provides a method for calculating the fractional effective concentration for 
smoke in small enclosures by using the following equation: 
 
[ ] 2.0mODFECsmoke =      (4.2.2) 
 
Purser states that if the total FECsmoke reaches unity, then it is predicted that the level 
of visual obscuration would be sufficient to seriously affect escape attempts.  Unlike 
FED (asphyxiants), no safety factor has been applied to this value during analysis of 
these experiments. 
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4.3. Temperature 
As the compartment in which the experiments were conducted was sprinkler 
protected, the effect of heat on the ability of the occupant/s to escape safely was not 
considered critical.  The assumption being that the fast response residential sprinkler 
would operate prior to compartment temperatures exceeding safe limits.  Nevertheless 
temperatures within the compartment were recorded as a matter of course, and so an 
assessment of tenability limits due to heat is possible.   
 
Purser [3] sets the tenability limit for exposure of skin to radiant heat as 
approximately 2.5 kW/m2, below which exposure can be tolerated for at least several 
minutes.  For situations where occupants are required to pass under a hot smoke layer 
in order to escape, Purser states that this heat flux corresponds approximately to a hot 
layer temperature of 200°C. 
 
While Purser indicates that the tenability limits with regard to skin pain and burns are 
normally lower than for thermal burns to the respiratory tract, he does state that 
thermal burns to the respiratory tract may occur upon inhalation of air above only 
60°C when saturated with water vapour.  This may occur when water is used for fire 
extinguishment, as in the case of sprinkler activation, however information on the 
concentration of water vapour in the compartment atmosphere was not recorded 
during these experiments. 
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4.4. Heat Release Rate 
Although not directly required as part of the tenability analysis, an attempt has been 
made to determine the heat release rate (HRR) of the fires.  The HRR provides useful 
information on the behaviour of the fire, and may provide some insights into the fire 
behaviour that most influences tenability in this particular scenario.   
 
Karlsson and Quintiere [38] provide a method for determining the heat release rate for 
a particular material based on the mass loss rate of the fuel, using the following 
equation: 
 
chmQ ∆= &&       (4.4.1) 
where 
 
Q&  = heat release rate (kW) 
m&  = fuel mass loss rate (kg/s) 
ch∆  = effective heat of combustion (kJ/kg) 
 
The mass loss has been recorded as a function of time from each burning television 
set, providing a mass loss rate.  The majority of the fuel load in a burning TV set 
comprises the plastic housing.  Previous studies [16,19,25] indicate that the most 
common backing case material for televisions is high impact polystyrene.  
Babrauskas [19] gives an effective heat of combustion for non-fire retardant 
polystyrene TV casings of 30 MJ/kg, based on cone calorimetry tests at an incident 
flux of 30 kW/m2.  This is that value that has been used to determine the heat release 
rate in these experiments. 
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5.  Experimental Set Up 
5.1. Location 
The venue for the tests was a large shed with a concrete floor, timber framing and 
corrugated iron cladding on both the walls and the roof.  The shed was approximately 
8 metres wide by 18 metres deep. The walls were 3.6 metres high and the apex of the 
exposed roof truss was at 5.2 metres.  A 3 metre wide by 2.8 metre high sliding door 
was provided in the front face of the shed.  The shed was supplied with electricity and 
a reticulated water supply. 
 
5.2. Compartment Construction 
A test compartment to conduct the experiments in was constructed inside the shed.  
The compartment was modelled on specifications contained in UL 1626 ‘Standard for 
Safety for Residential Sprinklers for Fire-Protection Service’ [39].  The compartment 
dimensions are those used in the residential sprinkler system performance test for 
approval under the UL Standard (see Appendix B for floor plan of the UL 1626 
compartment).  Constructing the compartment to this specification allows for the 
possibility of work carried out in this analysis to be compared in a meaningful way 
with any other data obtained using a UL 1626 compartment.  It should however be 
noted that not all the requirements of the UL 1626 compartment were met, such as the 
number and position of doors.   
 
The compartment was 8 m long by 4 m wide with a stud height of 2.4 m.  The floor 
area of the compartment was 32 m2, and the volume 77 m3.  This means the 
compartment is dimensionally comparable to the living and kitchen space found in a 
typical multi-storey apartment building.  If anything its proportions are slightly over 
generous.    
 
Chapter 5    Experimental Set Up 50 
The walls were constructed of 2.4 m high by 1.2 m wide modular 100 x 50 mm timber 
framed sections, pre-lined with sheets of standard 10 mm gypsum plasterboard.      
The ceiling was also lined with gypsum plasterboard over 75 x 50 mm strapping on 
200 x 50 mm ceiling joists.   
 
A standard 1980 x 810 mm hollow core door set was fitted to one side of the front end 
of the compartment.  Four 910 x 460 mm observation windows of standard 4 mm 
glass were positioned around the compartment.  Two were positioned at floor level 
and two at a soffit height of 1200 mm.  The compartment was raised on blocks 50 mm 
off the concrete shed floor to allow for water drainage. This 50 mm gap was sealed 
with removable strips of gypsum plasterboard.  All vertical measurements contained 
in this report ignore this additional 50 mm. 
 
An additional 1200 mm wide sheet of gypsum plasterboard was fixed to each wall 
abutting the corner where the fires were to be set to give added fire resistance.  Joints 
between gypsum plasterboard sheets on the walls and ceiling were sealed with 
masking tape.  Joints in the wall and ceiling linings in close proximity to the position 
of the fire were sealed with fire resistant mastic sealant beneath the masking tape.  
Mastic sealant was also used in the joints surrounding the door to ensure unrealistic 
smoke migration to the adjacent space was minimised.  The walls and ceiling of the 
compartment were then given a single coat of white acrylic semi-gloss paint to 
provide a degree of water resistance. 
 
It should be noted that while every effort was made to accurately represent conditions 
typical of an actual residential apartment, certain differences that might affect fire 
behaviour within the apartment remained.  For example there was no insulation in 
either the walls or ceiling, nor was there any facing or lining on the outside of the 
timber framing.  This means that heat loss through the compartment boundaries would 
be greater than that expected in a real apartment.   
 
The ratio of window area to external wall area was also considerably lower than what 
might normally be found in the living area of an apartment.  Windows typically 
comprise 30 percent of external wall area in a living space.  Even with the 
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conservative assumption that only a single end wall of the compartment formed an 
external wall, the four observation windows represent little more than 17 percent of 
this area.   
 
The window positions are also unrealistic.  A normal window has a soffit height of 
2 m.  This means that the glass would be exposed to the descending hot gas layer a lot 
sooner than occurs in the test compartment.  This in turn means greater heat loss 
through the glazing could be expected in a real apartment, and possibly even some 
cracking of the glass due to heat, altering the ventilation conditions.  This final 
scenario is unlikely to occur however in a fire controlled by fast response sprinklers.    
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Figure 5.2.1: Test compartment floor plan 
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                                                         Longitudinal Section A – A’ 
 
      
 
                                         Cross Section B – B’ 
 
Figure 5.2.2: Test compartment sectional details 
 
5.3.  Adjacent Lobby Construction 
During some of the experiments a small lobby was erected around the outside of the 
door to the compartment.  This lobby was intended to represent an adjacent space to 
the living area within the apartment, most likely a bedroom. The purpose was to 
measure smoke detector response in a space adjacent to the compartment in which the 
fire occurred.   
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The lobby was constructed of two 1.2 m long by 2.4 m high timber framed modular 
sections lined with gypsum plasterboard sheets.  These sections were attached to the 
outside wall of the compartment, 1.0 m apart, on either side of the door to the 
compartment (see Figure 5.2.1 and Figure 5.2.2).   
 
A sheet of gypsum plasterboard was fitted across the ends of the sections to form a 
1.2 m2 enclosure outside the door to the compartment.  The lower portion of this sheet 
was removable to provide access to the lobby.  Another piece of gypsum plasterboard 
formed the ceiling to the enclosure.  Joints between sheets of gypsum plasterboard 
were sealed with masking tape.  Since no water was expected to enter the lobby, it 
was left unpainted.  The lobby had a volume of approximately 2.9 m3. 
 
It should be noted that the configuration of the lobby represents a best possible case 
scenario with respect to the expected activation time of the smoke detectors in this 
space.  For a start the detectors are located within 600 mm of the door to the fire 
compartment, and the small area of the lobby meant that smoke entering that entered 
would have little opportunity to dilute.  It is therefore reasonable to expect that smoke 
detection in a real adjacent space, i.e. a bedroom, would not activate any sooner than 
the detectors in this evaluation, and it is possible that activation could be significantly 
slower. 
 
It should also be noted that while every effort was made to ensure the compartment 
and door construction was of the same quality as would be found in a real apartment, 
constraints inherent in assembling a modular test compartment meant this standard 
may not have always been achieved.  In particular it is likely that the door did not fit 
to the frame as tightly as might be expected of a standard domestic door set.  
Therefore more smoke may have passed between the two spaces than would occur in 
reality, leading to earlier activation of the lobby smoke detectors.  
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5.4. Smoke and Fire Detectors 
The four different types of smoke and fire detectors within the compartment, and the 
two smoke detectors in the adjacent space, were all mounted on the ceiling, as close as 
possible to the centre of their respective spaces (see Figure 5.2.1).  The location of the 
detectors complies with the requirements of NZS 4512:2003 ‘Fire Detection and 
Alarm Systems in Buildings’ [34].   
 
The detectors were manufactured by Apollo Fire Detectors (see Appendix C for 
technical specifications).  As they were analogue addressable, their response to the 
fires could be recorded as a continuous output.  The detectors were wired to an 
interface box connected to a laptop computer.  Proprietary software controlled the 
detectors using communications protocol specified by Apollo and logged the analogue 
output value from each detector at an interval that ranged between 1 and 2 seconds.  
The output from this software was in a form that could be imported to a spreadsheet 
for processing. 
 
An analogue output value of 55 has been set by the manufacturer as the activation 
threshold for all the detectors.  A count of 55 corresponds to the EN54 alarm 
sensitivity level [40].  With respect to the thermal detector, the analogue count has 
been calibrated to correspond to the environmental temperature in degrees Celsius, i.e. 
a count of 55 equates to a temperature of 55°C.  The RTI of the thermal detector was 
approximately 17 m½s½  [41], compared to an expected RTI for a fast response 
residential sprinkler head of about 36 m½s½ [42]. 
 
The supply of detector heads for this evaluation was limited, requiring heads to be 
reused.  Although the detector heads were cleaned at the end of each test, some 
reduction in performance would inevitably result from repeated exposure to high 
concentrations of combustion products during successive tests.  It should also be 
noted that compartment gas temperatures at the ceiling often exceeded the detectors 
maximum temperature.  These problems were essentially restricted to the detector 
heads in the test compartment.  The two detectors mounted in the adjacent lobby were 
subjected to significantly less smoke and heat, and for a shorter duration.   
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At the end of each test, dust covers were placed over the lobby detector heads to 






Compartment detectors  Lobby detectors (covered) 
 
Figure 5.4.1: Smoke and fire detector locations 
 
It should be noted that a series of detectors manufactured by Tyco Fire and Building 
Products were also installed in the compartment.  Although the Tyco detectors were 
analogue addressable, no method was available to log their response as a continuous 
output.  This meant that it would be difficult to assess whether a detector had 
developed a fault due to repeated exposure to the test compartment environment.  For 
this reason these detectors are not included in the analysis. 
 
5.5.   Sprinkler System 
The sprinkler system installed in the compartment for the experiments used Series 
LFII residential pendent sprinklers manufactured by Tyco Fire and Building Products 
(see Appendix C for technical specifications).  The sprinkler heads had a nominal 
operating temperature of 68°C.  The heads are tested to the Factory Mutual ‘Approval 
Standard for Automatic Sprinklers for Fire Protection’ [43] which requires the actual 
activation temperature to be within ± 3.5% of the nominal activation temperature.  
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The sprinklers were positioned in accordance with NZS 4541:2003 ‘Automatic Fire 
Sprinkler Systems’ [44].  Two heads were located symmetrically in the ceiling of the 
compartment in line with the longitudinal axis, and 4 metres apart (see Figure 5.2.1).  
The heads were mounted within standard escutcheon plates, and the centre point of 
the frangible bulb projected approximately 18 mm below the ceiling.  The yoke arms 
were positioned at right angles to the longitudinal axis of the compartment.  The 
sprinkler heads were plumbed into the domestic water supply of the test facility using 






Figure 5.5.1: Tyco Series LFII (TY 2234) Residential Pendent Sprinkler 
 
When tested at the head, a flow rate of 41.5 l/min at a running pressure of 77 kPa was 
recorded.  This test was conducted using a pressure gauge fitted to a Viking M-4 
sprinkler head discharging into a graduated collection vessel.  The minimum 
performance requirement for a Viking M-4 head covering 4.3 metres is 49.2 l/min at 
63 kPa [45], so the sprinkler system as installed failed to meet the required flow rate 
by 7.7 l/min.  The minimum performance requirement for a Series LFII head at a 
maximum spacing of 4.3 metres is 49.2 l/min at 48 kPa [46]. 
 
Given the similarities between the M-4 head tested and the Series LFII head used in 
the experiments, it is reasonable to expect that the actual flow rate of the Series LFII 
head would have been close to that measured from the Viking head.  This means that 
the suppression capability of the sprinkler head would not be a good as that of a 
system that met the manufacturer’s specifications.  
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While this will not affect any assessment of the tenability conditions prior to, and at, 
sprinkler activation time, it may have an impact on tenability measurements recorded 
subsequent to sprinkler activation.  During the experiments, sprinkler activation time 
was recorded on a stopwatch using the distinctive sound of the sprinkler head 
operating as the indicator.  No actual discharge density measurements were made 
during tests.  New sprinkler heads were used for each test, regardless of whether the 
heads had activated in the previous test or not. 
 
5.6. Gas Analysis 
5.6.1. Sampling Methods 
During the series of experiments, gas samples were drawn from the test compartment 
at two different heights, 800 mm above floor level, and 1600 mm above floor level.  
800 mm above floor level corresponded to the height at which a person’s head might 
be when attempting to crawl through a smoke logged room.  It could also represent 
the head height of a person asleep in a bed.  1600 mm above floor level represents the 
approximate head height of a person standing upright.  It should be noted that samples 
were taken from only one height in any given test. 
 
Carbon monoxide and oxygen were both sampled using the same system.  Gas was 
drawn out of the test compartment under negative pressure through a length of ¼ inch 
flexible PFA tubing and passed through a filter to remove solid particulates, followed 
by a drying chamber filled with blue indicating silica gel crystals to remove any 
moisture.  Another length of tubing connected the filter/drying chamber assembly to 
an electric air pump.   
 
From the pump a controlled 3 way valve allowed either the sample gas or calibration 
gases to be directed to the analysers under positive pressure.  Tubing running from the 
3 way valve to the analysers was split at an open tee junction taking the sample gas to 
both the CO analyser and the O2 analyser (see Figure 5.6.1).  The delay time from the 
sample being drawn from the compartment until registering on the analyser output 
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was 3 seconds.  This time lag has been allowed for when processing the analyser 
outputs. 
 
The carbon dioxide analyser used during these experiments had a built in filter and 
pump system.  A 5 metre length of ¼ inch tubing drew sample gas from the test 
compartment into a particulate filter and moisture chamber mounted on the rear of the 
analyser.  The delay time from a sample being drawn from the compartment until 
registering on the analyser output was approximately 9.5 seconds.  A 10 second time 
lag has therefore been allowed for when processing the analyser outputs. 
 
Grab samples of hydrogen cyanide and hydrogen chloride were obtained by inserting 
the tip of the sampling tube into a hole in the compartment wall and manually 
drawing the sample into the tube using the sampling pump provided (see Appendix C 
for technical specifications).  The hole in the wall was sealed with masking tape 
between sampling.  
 
 
Figure 5.6.1: Schematic diagram of gas sampling system 
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5.6.2. Carbon Monoxide 
Carbon monoxide was measured using a non-dispersive infrared (NDIR) gas analyser.  
A highly selective infrared detector unit receives low energy infrared radiation from a 
hot wire source within the analyser.  The detector unit is filled with a pure sample of 
carbon monoxide and therefore can respond only to energy in that region of the 
infrared spectrum corresponding to the unique absorption band of carbon monoxide.   
 
When the gas to be measured enters the analyser it passes through a cell in the path 
between the radiation source and the detector.  The sampled gas absorbs some of the 
radiation, according to the concentration of CO present, and thus reduces the level of 
energy reaching the detector.  This change in energy is amplified to provide the 
analyser with an output signal corresponding to a concentration of carbon monoxide 
within the sampled gas. 
 
The CO analyser used in these experiments was manufactured by the Analytical 
Development Company (see Appendix C for technical specifications).  It measured 
the concentration of CO in the range of 0 - 10% with an accuracy of ± 1%.  The 
sampling rate was set at 0.8 l/min.  The linear output signal was 0 - 10 volts.   
 
The CO analyser was connected to a data logger via a terminal block that reduced the 
maximum output signal from 10 volts to 2.5 volts (see Appendix C for technical 
specifications).  The data logger was attached to a desktop PC and the output recorded 
at 1 second intervals on PicoLog software.  This software allowed the recorded data to 
be imported into a spreadsheet for processing. 
 
The CO analyser was calibrated before each test.  The zero gas was instrument grade 
nitrogen, and the span gas 8.5% CO in instrument grade nitrogen.  The span gas 
composition was certified to Beta Standard (prepared by volumetric or weighing 
methods).  To maintain stability, the analyser was left running continuously during the 
testing period.   
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5.6.3. Oxygen 
Oxygen was measured with an analyser containing a paramagnetic transducer.  Para-
magnetism is the property of oxygen that distinguishes it from most other common 
gases.  The transducer incorporates an optical system that contains a mirror attached 
to a suspension mechanism.  This mechanism responds to the concentration of oxygen 
surrounding it, reflecting light from a light emitting diode onto a split photocell.  As 
the oxygen concentration changes, the light received by each side of the photocell 
(and therefore its differential output) also changes.  Supporting circuitry converts the 
differential output into a signal proportional to the oxygen concentration. 
 
The O2 analyser used during these experiments was manufactured by Servomex (see 
Appendix C for technical specifications).  It measured the concentration of oxygen in 
the range of 0 - 100%, with an accuracy of ± 0.02% O2 or 1% fsd, whichever is the 
greater number.  The maximum sampling rate was 250 ml per minute.  The linear 
output signal ranged from 0 - 10 volts. 
 
The O2 analyser was connected to a data logger via a terminal block that reduced the 
maximum output signal from 10 volts to 2.5 volts.  The data logger was attached to a 
desktop PC and the output recorded at 1 second intervals on PicoLog software.  This 
software allowed the recorded data to be imported into a spreadsheet for processing. 
 
The O2 analyser was calibrated before each test.  The zero gas was instrument grade 
nitrogen, and the span gas was standard dry air (i.e. 20.96% O2).  To maintain 
stability, the analyser was left running continuously during the testing regime. 
 
5.6.4. Carbon Dioxide 
Carbon dioxide was measured using a non-dispersive infrared (NDIR) gas analyser. 
This analyser operates in the same manner as the CO analyser, except that the detector 
unit is filled with a pure sample of CO2 rather than CO, and therefore responds only to 
energy in that region of the infrared spectrum corresponding to the absorption band of 
carbon dioxide. 
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CO2 was measured during the experiments using a portable multi gas analyser 
manufactured by Autodiagnostics Limited (see Appendix C for technical 
specifications).  Although the analyser was capable of being connected to a data 
logger to record the output, compatible software could not be obtained at the time of 
the research.   
 
Fortunately the analyser had an LCD display on the front of the unit, and so a digital 
video camera was used to record the output from the display in real time during each 
test.  The data was then transcribed from the video footage into a spreadsheet at 10 
second intervals. 
 
The CO2 analyser performs zero checks at 30 minute intervals using air drawn in 
through the rear of the unit, and if necessary will self calibrate.  Alert messages are 
displayed for the user if any calibration or operation fault is detected.  In order to 
reduce the possibility of contaminated air affecting the calibration, sampled gas was 
exhausted from the analyser some distance from the rear of the unit via a length of 
tubing.  For this reason the analyser was also located some distance from the CO and 
O2 analysers.  The analyser calibration had been set using Beta Standard span gas 
containing 10% CO2.  The analyser was considered sufficiently stable that a span gas 
calibration was only required periodically [47].  The analyser was not calibrated with 
a span gas during the testing. 
 
5.6.5. Hydrogen Cyanide and Hydrogen Chloride 
Discrete grab samples of HCN and HCl were taken using detector tubes and a manual 
sampling pump manufactured by Gastec (see Appendix C for technical 
specifications).  A tube containing a detecting reagent that is sensitive to the target 
substance is fitted to the end of the manual sampling pump.  The gas sample is then 
drawn through the tube over a prescribed time interval.  The reagent will change 
colour in response to the presence of the target substance.  The tube has graduated 
markings printed on the outside, and the extent of colour change of the reagent can be 
used to determine the concentration of the target substance in the sample. 
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The hydrogen cyanide detection tubes (No. 12M) were used with a 1 minute sampling 
time.  This provided a measurement range of 50 to 800 ppm, with a relative standard 
deviation of 10% for 50 to 200 ppm, and 5% for 200 to 800 ppm.  The hydrogen 
chloride detection tubes (No. 14M) had a measuring range of 20 to 500 ppm.  The 
relative standard deviation was 10% for 20 to 100 ppm, and 5% for 100 to 500 ppm.  
 
5.7. Visual Obscuration 
As with the gas sampling, visual obscuration measurements were taken at two heights, 
800 mm and 1600 mm above floor level.  Again as per the gas sampling, 
measurements were taken at only one height during each test.  To enable comparison 
of results, the visual obscuration measurements were always taken at the same height 
as the gas sampling in any given test.   
 
Visual obscuration was measured using a laser transmitter that generated a red laser 
beam at a wavelength of 650 nm.  The beam was received by a planar photodiode 
operating in photovoltaic mode. The diode produced a linear voltage output in 
response to irradiance from the laser.  The diode had a spectral sensitivity range of 
400 - 700 nm, with maximum sensitivity at a wavelength of 550 nm.  The signal 
output range was 0 - 9 volts. 
 
The photodiode receiver was connected to a data logger via a terminal block that 
reduced the maximum output signal from 10 volts to 2.5 volts.  The data logger was 
attached to a desktop PC and the output recorded at 1 second intervals on PicoLog 
software.  This software allowed the recorded data to be imported into a spreadsheet 
for processing. 
 
The both the laser transmitter and photodiode receiver were housed in separate metal 
boxes with a small penetration in each to allow the laser beam to pass through.  To 
further protect the instruments and integrity of the output, a small piece of gypsum 
plasterboard was placed over each of the two boxes, extending approximately 200 mm 
in front of each in an attempt to prevent spray from the sprinkler entering the units.   
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The two units were fixed firmly to a rigid support member such that the laser 
transmitter and receiving diode were exactly 1.0 metres apart horizontally.  The boxes 
were located half way along the compartment, 430 mm out from the wall (see  
Figure 5.2.1 and Figure 5.2.2).  This placed them in close proximity to the gas 
sampling points.  
 
5.8. Temperature 
Compartment temperature was measured using 1.5 mm solder tipped, fibreglass 
insulated Type K thermocouple wire.  A vertical loom containing 8 thermocouples 
was located in the centre of the compartment (see Figure 5.2.1).  The thermocouples 
were spaced 300 mm apart, with the top most thermocouple positioned 150 mm below 
the ceiling and the bottom most thermocouple 150 mm above floor level.  Positioning 
the thermocouples in the centre of the compartment gave an average temperature 
profile within the room.  It did not provide information on the temperature in close 
proximity to the fire, or at the sprinkler heads. 
 
The thermocouples were connected to an 8 channel thermocouple data logger (see 
Appendix C for technical specifications).  The thermocouple logger was attached to a 
desktop PC and the output recorded at 1 second intervals on PicoLog software.  This 
software allowed the recorded data to be imported into a spreadsheet for processing. 
 
5.9. Mass Loss 
Mass lost from the burning television sets was measured using a set of electronic 
scales and indicator unit manufactured by Mettler Toledo (see Appendix C for 
technical specifications). The scales had a range of 0 - 150 kg, with an increment of 
0.005 kg.  A laptop computer connected to the indicator unit recorded the output, in 
kilograms, using HyperTerminal software.  The data output rate averaged 13.84 weigh 
values per second.  The HyperTerminal software allowed the data to be imported to a 
spreadsheet for processing. 
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The scales were placed inside a series of shallow aluminium boxes to protect them 
from damage (see Figure 5.9.1).  Two layers of gypsum plasterboard were placed 
between the television set and the top of the aluminium box, and another layer 






Figure 5.9.1: Fuel load and mass loss measurement configuration 
 
5.10. Video Footage 
A digital video camera was located 800 mm above floor level behind one of the 
observation windows facing the corner of the compartment in which the television 
sets were positioned (see Figure 5.2.1).  The camera was fitted with a 30° wide angle 
lens, and provided a visual and audio record of fire development during each of the 
tests. 
 
5.11. Fuel Load 
Television sets manufactured for the New Zealand market are required to comply with 
AS/NZS 60065:2003 [18], in which the safety requirements for audio visual 
equipment and similar electronic devices are detailed.  This standard is based on the 
European standard IEC 65 (EN 60065) which means that television casings must meet 
the HB rating in accordance with UL 94.   
100 
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The television sets used as the fuel load in these tests were acquired from electrical 
appliance repair outlets.  These were sets that had been brought in to the store for 
repair, but upon examination were found to be irreparable. Acquiring sets in this 
manner meant that all the televisions had been used, and were of varying age and 
condition.   
 
No attempt was made to place any selection criteria on the sets, other than that the 
televisions had to be intact, and preferably of the same size.  As it turned out, it was 
not possible to obtain a sufficient number of identically sized sets, and so the 
televisions used in the tests ranged from 20 inch to 29 inch.   
 
The sets were gathered at random from a number of repair shops over the months 
preceding the experiments.  In all 22 fully intact television sets were obtained.  
Although not substantiated statistically, it is reasonable to assume that the televisions 
used for these tests were representative of those typically found in New Zealand 
homes.   
 
It is important to note that the selection included three pairs of virtually identical sets.  
Tests 4 and 16 involved the same Philips model, Tests 8 and 20 involved the same 
Sony model, and Tests 14 and 18 involved the same Transonic model.  This may have 
implications for any statistical analysis drawn from the results of the tests.   
 
All the television sets used in the tests had plastic outer casings.  Often the material 
surrounding the front of the sets differed from that enclosing the rear portion.  It has 
been assumed that this is for aesthetic reasons since the rear section of the set is not 
readily visible, and therefore not required to have a high quality finish.  From 
information provided in previous studies [16,19,25] it has been assumed that the outer 
casing is made of high impact polystyrene. The television sets used are described in 
Table 5.11.1. 
 
It should be noted that another 29 inch Philips television was also tested, however the 
internal circuitry in this set had been completely removed.  Even though it is 
recognised that the majority of the fuel load is comprised of the plastic casing, for the 
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sake of consistency this set was not included in the analysis.  Manufacturing 
information for all sets is included in Appendix D. 
 
The television sets were placed in the rear corner of the compartment opposite the 
door (see Figure 5.2.1).  It should be noted that in the UL 1626 residential sprinkler 
test compartment, the fuel load is placed diagonally opposite the opposing door (see 
Appendix B).  The decision to place the fuel load in line with the door was made to 
facilitate manual extinguishment operations after each test.  The person entering the 
compartment to carry out firefighting could use the side wall to way find, and would 
not risk damaging the thermocouple tree or visual obscuration measurement devices 
in the process. 
 
The television sets where placed on top of 2 sheets of 10 mm gypsum plasterboard 
over a series of aluminium trays housing the electronic scales.  The trays containing 
the scales were in turn sitting on 100 x 50 mm timber cribbing to provide a stable 
elevated platform (see Figure 5.9.1).  This placed the base of the television sets at a 
height of 500 mm above the floor level.  The height and corner location of the 
television sets provided a realistic approximation of what might be found in a typical 
apartment living space. 
 
It is important to note that this fuel configuration represents a worst case scenario in 
that the TV set is the only combustible item in the vicinity.  It can be argued that in a 
realistic living room, it would expected that video tapes, curtains and even the 
entertainment cabinet in/on which the TV is located might accelerate the fire growth 
rate and produce a faster response from the sprinkler system.  Nevertheless, studies 
suggest that between 30 - 40 percent of television fires do not spread beyond the TV 
set [20,26], so isolating on a non-combustible stand does not represent an unrealistic 
scenario. 
 
Burning the television set in isolation also has the advantage of reducing the number 
of variables.  The complex geometry of a television set and combination of 
construction materials will make heat release analysis difficult enough without 
introducing any other fuel packages. 
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Table 5.11.1: Description of television sets used during tests 
 
Test No. Make Model Size 
0 Philips 25GR6771/79R 25 inch 
1 Mitsubishi CT-25AM2 25 inch 
2 Panasonic CN218RVQ 21 inch 
3 Sony VX/15 21 inch 
4 Philips 20CT636/79R 20 inch 
5 Toshiba 2132DB 21 inch 
6 Panasonic TC-20L32 20 inch 
7 Sanyo C25ZG51 25 inch 
8 Sony KV-T25SF11 25 inch 
9 Goldstar CF-20A74 20 inch 
10 Philips 21GR1369/79R 21 inch 
11 Toshiba 207R9A 20 inch 
12 Sony KV-2153 SN 21 inch 
13 Mitsubishi CT-2148NZM 21 inch 
14 Transonic CTV-5144 20 inch 
15 Sanyo CZP2141TXA-00 21 inch 
16 Philips 20GR1250/79R 20 inch 
17 Sanyo C29ZK80TX-51 29 inch 
18 Transonic CTV-5144 20 inch 
19 Samsung CB-681 3WT 25 inch 
20 Sony KV-T25SF81 25 inch 
21 Transonic GT-8828 29 inch 
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5.12. Ignition Method 
The aim of these experiments was to analyse the tenability conditions arising from a 
television fire within the compartment.  The exact method by which the television set 
was ignited was not critical to the outcome of the research.  The two potential ignition 
sources for a television set are internal, and external.  Internal ignition could be 
expected from an electrical fault within the componentry of the set, most likely 
associated with the power supply.   
 
External ignition could come from a number of sources, but is most likely to result 
from an open flame impinging on the television casing.  Previous studies have 
indicated that the between 20 - 40 percent of television fires result from an external 
ignition source [20,26].  In order to make the ignition process as simple and consistent 
as possible, a tea light candle was used to provide an external ignition source during 




Double wicked tea light candle  Typical location at rear of TV casing 
using single wicked tea light candle 
 
Figure 5.12.1: Ignition sources and location 
 
Variations in both the physical shape, and the ignition properties, of the outer casings 
of the television sets meant that it was not possible to use a single ignition method 
during the tests.  Instead a sequential ignition process was adopted until self-
sustaining combustion of the outer casing was achieved.   
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This sequential process recognised the fact that the material comprising the front part 
of the casing was frequently easier to ignite than the material encasing the rear part of 
the television.  The ignition process followed during these tests is outlined in Table 
5.12.1.  An example of a double wicked tea light candle is shown in Figure 5.12.1 
along with a typical location for the ignition source at the rear of the TV set. 
 
Where possible, initial ignition was attempted in each test using Method 1.  This 
provided a heat release of approximately 30 W [16].  If self-sustaining combustion 
was not evident within the prescribed duration, the next method was implemented 
until all four methods had been attempted.  If ignition had not occurred after the 
prescribed duration for Method 4, the test was terminated.   
 
 
Table 5.12.1: Sequential ignition process for television fires 
 
Method Description Duration 
1 
Tea light candle placed at base level under overhanging 
portion of outer casing at left rear corner of television, 
when facing screen 
10 min 
2 
Single match stick placed horizontally across top surface 
of the candle positioned as per Method 1 to provide 
increased surface area for flame (double wick effect) 
10 min 
3 
Tea light candle placed at base level under overhanging 
portion of outer casing at left front corner of television, 
when facing screen 
10 min 
4 
Single match stick placed horizontally across top surface 
of the candle positioned as per Method 2 to provide 
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Although not central to the research objective, the sequential ignition process did 
provide some insight into the inherent ease of ignition of each set, including 
differences between the front and rear casings.  While all the sets were expected to 
perform to the HB rating, there was still a degree of variation in the ignition properties 
of the different sets.  Out of interest this information is included in the results.  It 
should be noted that the shape of individual sets meant that it was not always possible 
to follow the sequence, or position the candle exactly as detailed for a particular 
method. Where this occurs, it has also been noted in the results. 
 
For the purposes of establishing a timeline, each test was considered to have 
commenced (i.e. t = 0) at the start of the successful ignition method.  This 
methodology may have resulted in minor changes to ambient conditions from 
previous ignition attempts, particularly with regard to smoke and fire detector counts.  
Where noticeable changes were observed, the compartment was aired before 
restarting the test using the next ignition method in the sequence. 
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6. Data Processing 
While some of the data recorded during the tests could be used directly in the 
analysis, such as smoke and fire detector counts and thermocouple temperatures, other 
data had to be processed first. 
 
6.1. Carbon Monoxide and Oxygen 
The output from both the CO and O2 analysers expressed the gas concentrations (in 
percentage volume) as a voltage.  In order to carry out FED calculations, this 
information had to be converted back into concentrations and expressed as a 
percentage for O2, and parts per million (ppm) for CO (see Equations 4.1.3 and 4.1.5).   
 
Since the voltage output formed a linear relationship with the measured gas 
concentration, converting the output signal into a concentration was relatively simple.  
Once the voltage at two known gas concentrations was found, a process of linear 
interpolation or extrapolation could be used to determine the concentration for any 
given voltage.   
 
The calibration process provided a known concentration of 0% for both gases, and 
8.5 % and 20.96 % for CO and O2 respectively.  Since the concentrations of each gas 
during the tests are not expected to exceed these span gas concentrations, the 
conversion will be interpolative rather than extrapolative.  This reduces the error 
margin since any measurement error associated with the analyser will not be 
amplified by extrapolating the results.   
 
During the calibration procedure the output signal from each analyser was recorded 
for 120 seconds.  This reading was averaged, and the resulting value used in the 
interpolation process.  The percentage volume of CO was multiplied by 10,000 to 
convert it to parts per million. 
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6.2.  Carbon Dioxide 
The FED calculation required the concentration of CO2 as a volume percentage (see 
Equation 4.1.4).  While the analyser provided the CO2 concentration directly as a 
percentage on the output display screen, the information could only be captured on 
video tape.  This data was subsequently transferred to a spreadsheet in 10 second 
intervals.   
 
However the data from the other two gases was recorded at 1 second intervals, and 
therefore this time step was adopted in the FED calculations.  To make the CO2 data 
compatible it was converted into 1 second time steps by using the value from each 10 
second reading in the following nine 1 second intervals.  This method was considered 
valid as the concentration of CO2 did not alter dramatically over each 10 second 
interval, and therefore a more complicated interpolation method was not deemed 
necessary. 
 
6.3. Visual Obscuration 
The photovoltaic receiver measuring visual obscuration expressed the level of 
irradiance received from the laser transmitter as a voltage.  As with the CO and O2 
analysers, the relationship of measurement to output signal was linear.  In order to 
calculate optical density per metre, the intensity of incident light and the intensity of 
light through the smoke are required (see Equation 4.2.1).  Since the equation 
expresses these two values as a ratio, the output can be used as a voltage.  The output 
signal from the photovoltaic receiver was recorded for a period of 120 seconds prior 
to each test commencing.  The average recorded value over this 120 second interval 
was used as the intensity of incident light Io.  This process was repeated for each test, 
because minor variations in alignment between transmitter and receiver altered the 
voltage reading.  As both the transmitter and receiver were removed regularly for 
cleaning, achieving identical ambient readings from test to test was not possible.   
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It should be noted that variations in the ambient readings would alter the error margin 
from test to test.  However the results revealed that the rate of change in OD/m at the 
time the tenability threshold was exceeded was generally so great that any variation in 
accuracy would be of minor consequence.  The intensity of light through the smoke I, 
was given by the voltage output from the receiver for every time step during the test. 
 
6.4. Mass Loss   
This was the data that needed the most processing to arrive at a useful result.  Mass 
loss information was required in order to calculate the heat release rate of the fire 
during each test (see Equation 4.4.1).  Although the output from the scales was 
expressed in kilograms as required in the calculation, the scales recorded the mass at a 
rate of 13.84 outputs per second.  This figure was determined empirically by logging 
data from the scales over a defined time period and counting the number of outputs 
recorded.   
 
The high data capture rate created a lot of ‘noise’ when the resulting heat release rate 
was expressed graphically.  In order to smooth the graph a moving average for each 
time step of mass data had to be taken.  This process was made difficult because the 
sensitivity of the scales was restricted to 0.005 kg and change in mass over short time 
periods throughout each test was often smaller than this value.  Therefore to get a 
useful value, the moving average was taken over a 20 second time period. 
 
Once the moving average of the mass for each time step had been determined, the 
mass loss rate could be calculated.  In a further attempt to smooth out the graph, the 
mass loss rate was calculated over 5 second intervals.  This value was then divided by 
5 to give an approximation of the mass loss rate m&  in kilograms per second, as 
required by the HRR equation. 
 
It is important to note that the intermediate data needed further manipulation to 
account for sudden changes in mass not associated with mass loss in the combustion 
process.  For example there were occasions when melting plastic from the television 
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casing ran off the edge of the weighing assembly, and other occasions when pieces of 
the television fell off as the set burned.  This is doubly problematic in that the pieces 
which fell off the weighing assembly may have continued to burn, contributing to the 
overall HRR in a manner that could not be measured.  As a result the mass loss data 
used to estimate the HRR is not a completely accurate record of the mass lost to 
burning during each test, but rather represents a best approximation. 
 
Once a suitable mass loss rate m&  was found, it was multiplied by the effective heat of 
combustion to provide the heat release rate.  An effective heat of combustion of 30 
MJ/kg was assumed for the non-fire retarded high impact polystyrene television set 
enclosures.  This figure was based on information provided by Babraskas [19] but 
once again, because there are likely to be variations between each set tested, this 
represents a best approximation only.  Care must therefore be taken when assessing 
the HRR results based on this methodology.
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7. Results 
22 television sets were used during these experiments (see Table 5.11.1).  Test 0 was 
used as a trial run with a non-standard ignition method and therefore has not been 
included in the results.  When a test resulted in the activation of a sprinkler head, the 
sprinkler was left on for 1 to 2 minutes before being shut off to prevent flooding of 
the facility.   
 
Where possible data was captured for a further 2 minutes after the sprinkler was shut 
off, however since shutting off the sprinkler affected conditions within the 
compartment, this information has not been used in the results.  Graphs contained in 
the main body of this report show a run time up until sprinkler shut off, whereas 
graphs contained in the appendices show the full range of data, with the sprinkler shut 
off time marked on the graph.   
 
While the ultimate decision as to whether an occupant could escape safely from the 
apartment is determined by the FED for asphyxiant gases, the assessment relied on the 
results of the fire safety system and other tenability measurements as well.  Therefore 
the results and discussion will focus on these other measurements first, and culminate 
in an analysis of the ability to evacuate based on the FED.  
 
7.1. Ignition Method 
Although the main focus of this research was on the consequences of a television fire 
in the apartment, information on the ignitability of the sets provides some insight into 
the probability of this type of fire occurring in the first place.  The information on the 
ignition methods used for each test is contained in Table 7.1.3.  In each of the tests the 
television set was successfully ignited, with the exception of Test 19.  This implies 
that the sets used were not fire retardant, in that they did not meet the V-0 rating under 
UL 94.  This is consistent with the requirements of AS/NZS 60065:2003, which only 
requires television sets manufactured for the New Zealand market to meet the HB 
rating under UL 94, rather than the more stringent V-0 classification. 
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Despite the fact that the majority of the casings did not appear to contain any fire 
retardant additives (i.e. bromine), variations in the material properties of each set 
meant that they did not display a uniform ease of ignition.  Figure 7.1.1 shows the 
results of the tests by ignition method.  With this information it is possible to assign 
an ignition characteristic to each set.  If a set is ignited using Method 1, then its 
ignitability can be considered to be ‘very easy’.  If on the other hand Method 4 is 
required to achieve ignition, then it can be considered ‘hard’.  This characterisation 
assumes that the front part of the TV enclosure will be no harder to ignite than the rear 


































Figure 7.1.1: Comparison of ignition methods 
 
Assessing Methods 2 and 3 is somewhat harder, however Method 3 is considered 
more onerous on the basis that if the rear casing cannot be ignited, then the set will 
not be as susceptible to an internal ignition source.  The front part of the casing would 
also present a smaller target area for an external ignition source, although it might be 
argued that the majority of external ignition sources, e.g. candles, would be 
concentrated at the front of the set.  It should be noted that this assessment is strictly 
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qualitative and only serves to give a broad indication of the ignition properties of each 
set.   
 
Employing these subjective criteria on the test results reveals that 38 percent of the 
sets were easy to ignite, a further 47 percent easy/moderate, and only 10 percent of the 
televisions were truly difficult to ignite.  5 percent, represented by a single set, could 
not be ignited using the test methodology. 
 
 
Table 7.1.1: Ignition characteristics of test sets 
 
Method Number Percentage Ignitability 
1 8 38      Very easy 
2 3 14      Easy 
3 7 33      Moderate 
4 2 10      Hard 
5 1 5      Very hard 
 
 
It should be noted however that the test sample included 3 pairs of the same model 
television, and is therefore not necessarily statistically valid.  It should be recognised 
however that as there was no statistical methodology employed in the collection of the 
televisions in the first place, removing the identical sets would not produce a more 
representative statistical model for televisions used in New Zealand.  Nevertheless, 
removing the identical sets will allow an unbiased analysis of the different sets used in 
the sample.  Tests 4 and 16 used the same model of TV set, as did Tests 8 and 20, and 
Tests 14 and 18.   
 
Interestingly, the ignition results in Table 7.1.3 reveal that in only one of these three 
cases was the same ignition method successful (Tests 14 and 18).  This implies that 
either the uncertainty associated with achieving sustained combustion by each ignition 
Chapter 7    Results 80 
method was greater than the time period allowed for that method, or that there may be 
some variation in the manufacturing process between different batches of the same set 
model effecting ignitability.  To be conservative, where variation occurs, the lower 
numbered ignition method has been assigned to the set.  The ignition results for the 18 
sets used in this adjusted analysis are contained below in Table 7.1.2.      
 
 
Table 7.1.2: Ignition characteristics of different model test sets 
 
Method Number Percentage Ignitability 
1 7 39      Very easy 
2 2 11      Easy 
3 7 39      Moderate 
4 1 5.5      Hard 
5 1 5.5      Very hard 
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Table 7.1.3: Sequential ignition procedure results 
 
Test Method 1 Method 2 Method 3 Method 4 Comments 
1      
2      
3      
4      
5      
6      
7 - -   Not possible to locate candle at rear of casing 
8      
9      
10      
11 - -   Not possible to locate candle at rear of casing 
12      
13      
14     Candle set towards the front of rear casing 
15     Candle set towards the front of rear casing 
16      
17      
18     Candle set towards the front of rear casing 
19     Television could not be ignited 
20      
21     Candle set towards the front of rear casing 
- : Not attempted 
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7.2. General Observations 
In most of the tests the plastic casing took some time to achieve sustained 
combustion, however once self-sustaining combustion occurred the fire generally 
progressed in a steady manner.  The smoke given off in the initial stages following 
sustained combustion was typically light grey or white in colour.  As the fire grew, 
the smoke became thicker and changed to a dark grey colour. 
 
A clearly defined smoke layer formed at the ceiling of the compartment and 
descended in a fairly uniform manner (see Figure 7.2.1).  Stringy ‘polymers’ of up to 
50 mm in length were observed in the smoke layer.  These soot strands, presumably 
polystyrene, were heavier than the other solid particulates and dropped out of the 
smoke layer to settle on the floor of the compartment. 
 
In most cases the plastic TV enclosure in the vicinity of the pilot flame began to melt 
almost immediately, with flaming drops falling onto the gypsum support platform.  
Once the fire was well established, melting plastic formed a pool fire at the base of the 
set and contributed to the speed of fire development.  On occasion the pool of melted 
plastic would run off the side of the support platform.  This would result in a mass 
loss measurement not associated with burning fuel.  On other occasions pieces of the 
television set would fall to the ground, causing abrupt changes in mass measurement.  
If these fallen pieces continued to burn on the ground, then the actual heat release rate 
would be greater than that shown by the mass loss data.   
 
At intervals during the fire parts of the internal electronic circuitry exploded with a 
loud popping noise.  This noise may have been sufficient to attract the attention of an 
occupant asleep in an adjoining bedroom.  Since the cathode ray tube in a television 
set is vacuum sealed, most tubes imploded at some point in the fire.  In one case 
(Test 13), the tube exploded violently, showering the compartment with glass. 
 
The determining factor in whether the fire would result in sprinkler activation or not 
appeared to be the time at which the descending smoke layer reached the base of the 
television set.  Visual observations indicated that the descending smoke layer had a 
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vitiating effect on the fire, with the resulting reduction in oxygen supply limiting the 
heat release rate.  Therefore if the sprinkler had not activated before the smoke layer 
enveloped the burning TV, it was likely that the television would be unable to 
produce sufficient heat to activate the sprinkler during the remainder of the test.  The 
general availability of oxygen within the compartment (other than the effect created 
by the descending smoke layer) did not appear to a limiting factor on fire 
development. 
 
If the sprinkler did not activate, then the smoke layer would eventually reach ground 
level and the inside of the compartment would be reduced to complete blackness.  In 
these conditions, the fire was not visible from the observation window 4 m away.  
Post fire investigation showed that this was not caused by excessive carbonaceous 
deposits on the inside of the windowpane.  By the end of the tests in which the 





    Burning TV set and smoke layer  Screen shields rear casing from   
sprinkler discharge 
 
Figure 7.2.1: Smoke layering and sprinkler shielding 
 
In the tests where the sprinkler did operate, the thermal balance in the compartment 
was immediately disrupted, resulting in a rapid loss of visibility as the smoke was 
dragged down into the lower parts of the compartment (see Figure 7.4.2).  The inside 
of the compartment was generally blacked out completely within 10 to 20 seconds of 
sprinkler activation.  The level of smoke obscuration did not noticeably change during 
the 1 - 2 minute sprinkler discharge period.   
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It should be noted that the 1 - 2 minutes of sprinkler discharge never completely 
extinguished the fire, which generally started to grow again as soon as the sprinkler 
was shut off.  Part of the explanation for this could be that the sprinkler system was 
operating at a flow rate below the minimum specified by the manufacturer.  However 
another significant contributing factor was that the non-combustible screen of the TV 
formed a very effective shield that prevented a large portion of the discharge spray 
from reaching the burning plastic case behind it. 
 
When the door to the compartment was opened, large quantities of heavy, dark smoke 
immediately discharged through the doorway (see Figure 7.2.2).  This occurred 
irrespective of whether the sprinkler had operated.  Had the door been connected to 
another space, such as a bedroom, this adjoining room would have rapidly filled with 
smoke.  An occupant exiting the bedroom would have very limited time in which to 




   Smoke generation at end of test     Soot deposits on sprinkler head      
(Test 20) 
 
Figure 7.2.2: Smoke and soot generation during tests 
 
A significant quantity of sooty deposits accumulated on the inside surfaces of the 
compartment during each test, particularly during the longer tests and those in which 
the sprinkler did not activate.  Figure 7.2.2 shows the carbonaceous material that had 
built up on the sprinkler head closest to the fire (Sprinkler 1) in Test 20 by the end of 
the test.  It is worth noting that this particulate deposit may have contributed to the 
sprinkler not activating by forming an insulating layer around the heat sensitive glass 
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bulb.  At the very least the quantity of soot within the compartment is indicative of the 
sensory and respiratory irritation that might be expected from this environment.  
 
7.3.  Fire Safety Systems 
The response of the various analogue smoke and fire detectors was recorded 
continuously over the duration of each test.  The activation time of the sprinkler 
system was also recorded for each test.  Graphs for each test are contained in 




























Figure 7.3.1: Fire safety system response (Test 4 - Compartment) 
 
The primary objective of the research is to compare the ability of each system to 
provide warning of fire.  As such the actual activation time is more important than the 
responsiveness of the system.  Activation times for each system in each test are 
contained in  Table 7.3.1.  This information is perhaps better presented in the bar 
graphs contained in Figure 7.3.2 and Figure 7.3.3.  The data is displayed on two 
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graphs for visual clarity.  This separation is also convenient because no detection data 
was available for Tests 10 - 12, and lobby detection was not installed until Test 13.   
 
Although the timeline would traditionally follow the horizontal axis, in this case it has 
been located on the vertical axis to allow the use of larger bars.  It should be noted 
that where the bars for a particular system extend over the maximum time, this 
indicates that the system did not activate during the relevant test.  Missing bars 
indicate that the detector was not functioning during a particular test, apart from Test 
19 where the set could not be ignited.  In all the tests except one where the sprinkler 
activated, only the sprinkler closest to the fire (Sprinkler 1) operated.  The exception 








































































Figure 7.3.3: Fire safety system activation times (Tests 13 – 21) 
 
The data contained in  Table 7.3.1 allowed the performance of each detection system 
to be compared to every other detection system over all the tests.  For each test the 
differences in activation times between each system were entered into the analysis 
program @RISK [48].  The ‘BestFit’ function in @RISK was used to fit a probability 
distribution to the difference in activation times between each system.  This in turn 
allowed the response of any two systems to be compared using not only the mean 
difference in activation time, but also the standard deviation (SD) and degree of 
skewness.  Skewness measures the degree of asymmetry in a distribution.  A negative 
skew number means the distribution has more values to the left of the peak, while a 
positive skew means the distribution has more values to the right.  The BestFit 
distribution curve and associated data for each comparison are contained in Appendix 
F, and the results of the comparison between the compartment ionisation detector and 
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Figure 7.3.4: Distribution of differences in activation times between ionisation 
detector and sprinkler system 
 
The results of each comparison are summarised in Table 7.3.2.  It should be noted that 
the number of samples in each comparison varied (from 6 to 17) and this will affect 
the level of certainty associated with each fit.  Distribution information for the 
comparisons between the two lobby detectors and the sprinkler system has not been 
included as there were only four data points in each of these comparisons.  This 
provided insufficient information for BestFit to construct a distribution.  The small 
sample sizes of the remaining data sets meant that the fit was not particularly strong in 
any case, and consequently it is difficult to draw any conclusions from comparing the 
different distributions.  Therefore this information is best restricted to nothing more 
than providing an indication of the nature of the difference in activation times 
between each system.  
  
There was considerable variation in the response between the two compartment 
smoke detectors, with a range of 372 seconds.  The ionisation detector was on average 
faster to respond than the optical detector, with a mean response time difference of 
54 seconds.  The results show that the CO detector response was on average slower 
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than either of the smoke detectors, although not significantly (less than 90 seconds in 
either case).  The results also show that the mean thermal detector response was 
significantly slower than either of the two smoke detectors (over 7 minutes slower 
than the optical detector, and nearly 9 minutes slower than the ionisation detector).  
As expected, the mean delay in sprinkler activation compared to the smoke detectors 
was large.  The average delay between ionisation detector activation and sprinkler 
activation was 10 minutes, and the average delay between the optical detector and the 
sprinkler was 8 minutes.   
 
Both of the lobby smoke detectors performed better than the thermal detector in the 
compartment and, in general, better than the sprinkler system.  The lobby ionisation 
detector activated on average 180 seconds earlier than the thermal detector, and the 
lobby optical detector activated on average 100 seconds earlier.  In comparison to the 
sprinkler activation times the delay was much less significant, at under a minute for 
both lobby detectors.  In Test 18 the sprinkler activated at the same time as the lobby 
optical detector, and 3 seconds quicker than the lobby ionisation detector.  In Test 21 
neither of the lobby detectors operated, even after the sprinkler activated.  The mean 
difference in activation time between the thermal detector in the compartment and the 
sprinkler system was 100 seconds.  In Test 16 the thermal detector activated at the 
same time as the sprinkler.   
 
It should be remembered when making comparisons with the sprinkler systems that in 
five cases the sprinkler did not operate at all.  So while the difference in response 
between the sprinkler and thermal detector does not appear great, the thermal detector 
still activated in all 5 tests where the sprinkler failed to do so.  In this respect the 
thermal detector provided significant advantage over the sprinkler in regard to 
providing warning of the fire, if not necessarily early warning.  It is also worth noting 
that in Test 21, neither of the lobby detectors activated prior to the sprinkler operating. 
 
It is important to note that the detectors were reused over multiple tests, and were 
therefore susceptible to contamination.  Although the heads were removed and 
cleaned between each test, contamination from previous tests may have had an effect 
on detector response.  For example the results of Test 14 show that the sprinkler 
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operated before the optical detector in the compartment reached the activation 
threshold.  However inspection of the graph in Figure 7.3.5 showing the detector 
response does not reveal any overt problems with the performance of the optical 






























Figure 7.3.5: Fire safety system response (Test 14 – Compartment) 
 
Graphs of the analogue detector outputs for each test are shown graphically in 
Appendix E, and may provide some assistance when assessing the reliability of a 
particular detector activation time.  Any conclusions drawn from the results of this 
report however should allow for the possibility of contamination from previous tests 
effecting detector performance.  No attempt has been made to remove potentially 
flawed results because as the objective of the study is to make a comparative 
evaluation of available escape time based on alert times provided by smoke detectors 
and sprinklers, any delays in smoke detector activation only provide an increased 
level of conservatism to the comparison.   
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It is worth noting that compartment ionisation detector was replaced with a new head 
at the start of Test 11 (even though no data was recorded for Tests 10 - 12), and the 
compartment optical detector was replaced at the start of Test 18 with a slightly used 
head.  On occasion the analogue reading from a particular detector dropped out, either 
as a result of problems with the detector, or with the logging system.  Where these 
situations have occurred, they are indicated by ‘?’ in Table 7.3.1.  
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 Table 7.3.1: Fire safety system response times (in seconds) 
 
 Compartment Lobby  
Test Ion Optical CO Thermal Ion Optical Sprinkler 
1 510 412 565 907 - - 995 
2 420 439 1012 3170 - - 3315 
3 309 313 344 411 - - 437 
4 164 174 159 247 - - 261 
5 495 676 494 1006 - - DNA 
6 424 421 440 734 - - 798 
7 357 335 331 662 - - 1333 
8 189 193 227 879 - - DNA 
9 ? 388 429 463 - - 477 
10 - - - - - - 434 
11 - - - - - - 1112 
12 - - - - - - 217 
13 264 538 293 765 713 689 794 
14 357 590 390 543 503 493 569 
15 317 348 372 649 517 526 DNA 
16 375 387 ? 518 489 490 518 
17 158 125 175 874 448 580 DNA 
18 ? 317 412 ? 531 528 528 
19 - - - - - - - 
20 221 215 276 966 570 516 DNA 
21 171 378 301 406 DNA DNA 427 
DNA : Did Not Activate    ? : Problem with output     - : No measurement made 
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Table 7.3.2: Activation time differences between fire safety systems (in seconds) 
 
Comparison No. Min. Max. Range Mean SD Skew 
Opt vs Ion 15 -98 274 372 54 111 0.879 
CO vs Ion 14 -26 592 618 73 154 3.015 
Thermal vs Ion 15 83 2750 2667 534 651 2.835 
Lobby Ion vs Ion 6 114 449 335 258 128 0.328 
Lobby Opt vs Ion 6 115 425 310 267 137 0.149 
Sprinkler vs Ion 10 97 2895 3140 610 845 2.233 
CO vs Opt 16 -245 573 818 22 183 1.457 
Thermal vs Opt 17 -47 2731 2778 433 643 2.865 
Lobby Ion vs Opt 7 -87 355 442 179 147 -0.605 
Lobby Opt vs Opt 7 -97 455 552 186 171 -0.083 
Sprinkler vs Opt 12 -21 2876 2897 480 806 2.439 
Thermal vs CO 15 34 2158 2124 458 522 2.424 
Lobby Ion vs CO 6 113 420 37 227 123 0.501 
Lobby Opt vs CO 6 103 405 302 236 136 0.379 
Sprinkler vs CO 11 48 2303 2255 478 666 2.095 
Lobby Ion vs Thermal 6 -426 -29 397 -179 183 -0.603 
Lobby Opt vs Thermal 6 -450 -25 425 -100 167 -0.860 
Sprinkler vs Thermal 11 0 671 671 100 194 2.620 
Lobby Opt vs Lobby Ion 7 -54 132 186 7 59 1.482 
Sprinkler vs Lobby Ion 4 -3 81 84 43 - - 
Sprinkler vs Lobby Opt 4 0 105 105 52 - - 
- : Distribution fit not possible due to small sample size 
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7.4. Visual Obscuration 
One important factor that should be considered in these tests is the impact sprinkler 
discharge itself will have on visual obscuration, regardless of whether smoke is 
present in the compartment.  It is unlikely that visual obscuration resulting from 
sprinkler discharge alone would significantly impede an occupant from evacuating the 
apartment, but it will effect the FECsmoke value.  This could result in the FECsmoke 
threshold being exceeded prematurely.  It was therefore considered important to 
assess the contribution of sprinkler spray to the overall FECsmoke. 
 
No measurements were made during these tests, however visual obscuaration 
measurements for sprinkler discharge have been carried out in work by Spearpoint et 
al [49].  In this previous work a maximum visual obscuration reading of 
approximately 0.09 OD/m for a ‘sprinkler only’ discharge was recorded.  Two 
sprinkler heads were discharging in the compartment, and the recording was made 
directly under one of the heads.  The measurement was taken at a height of 0.66 m 
above floor level.  The model of sprinkler used was a ZX-RES manufactured by 
Reliable, with a flow rate of 82 l/min.  
 
The value of 0.09 OD/m has therefore been used to approximate the effect of sprinkler 
discharge on the FECsmoke during this analysis.  From Equation 4.2.1 optical density 
(D) can be defined as: 
 







ID o10log      (7.4.1) 
 
This means that the optical density for sprinkler discharge can be subtracted from the 
total optical density using the following log law: 
 







ABA 101010 logloglog    (7.4.2) 
where 















































Io  total can be found directly from the 
visual obscuration measurements made during the tests. 
 
This adjustment to allow for the effect of sprinkler discharge has been made for each 
test, except in the cases where the FECsmoke reached its maximum limit prior to 
sprinkler activation.  Visual obscuration measurements were taken in 12 tests where 
ignition was successful.  9 of the tests involved measurements taken at 800 mm above 


















Figure 7.4.1: FECsmoke (Test 18 – 800 mm sampling height) 
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A full set of graphs showing the FECsmoke results for each test is contained in 
Appendix G.  In every case the FECsmoke threshold was exceeded during the test.  A 
typical FECsmoke result is shown above in Figure 7.4.1.  
 
From Figure 7.4.1 it can be seen that the level of obscuration was low for the majority 
of the fire.  This was typical of all the tests since the smoke formed a hot buoyant 
layer that collected at the ceiling and descended slowly in a fairly uniform manner, 
thus keeping the lower part of the compartment clear.   
 
Once the sprinkler activated however the FECsmoke rose rapidly, in this example 
exceeding the threshold in 29 seconds.  This is because the sprinkler activation 
disrupted the thermal layering within the compartment, both cooling and dragging the 
smoke down into the lower part of the compartment.  Of the tests where visual 
obscuration measurements were made, 9 involved sprinkler activation.  In 5 of these 9 
tests the FECsmoke threshold was exceeded following sprinkler activation.  The delay 
time ranged from 3 seconds to 29 seconds.   
 
If an occupant were reliant on sprinkler activation to provide warning of fire in these 
fire scenarios, they would be confronted with extremely limited visibility when 
attempting to escape through the living room.  Figure 7.4.2 contains a sequence of 
frames taken from the video of footage of a test showing the disruption of the thermal 
layer and subsequent loss of visibility following sprinkler activation. 
Of the 4 remaining tests where the threshold was exceeded prior to sprinkler 
activation, two had sampling heights of 1600 mm.  This meant that the descending 
smoke layer reached the measuring devices earlier.  Given that the FECsmoke threshold 
only exceeded sprinkler activation by 55 seconds and 86 seconds in these tests, it is 
unlikely that visibility at the 800 mm height would have been compromised prior to 
sprinkler activation. 
 
The two tests measured at 800 mm where the FECsmoke threshold was exceeded prior 
to sprinkler activation (Tests 11 and 13) were fairly slow fires, as indicated by their 
sprinkler activation times of 1112 and 794 seconds respectively.  This allowed the 
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smoke layer to descend well into the lower part of the room before sufficient heat 

















 15 secs after sprinkler activation  20 secs after sprinkler activation 
 
Figure 7.4.2: Visual obscuration following sprinkler activation (Test 3) 
 
In the final 3 tests sprinkler activation did not occur.  If an occupant were reliant on 
sprinkler activation as a means of warning in these scenarios, then the smoke layer 
would descend below 800 mm without them even being aware of the presence of a 
fire.  As an example of this scenario, the FECsmoke results for Test 20 are shown 
inFigure 7.4.3.  A summary of the FECsmoke threshold versus sprinkler activation time 
for each test is provided in Table 7.4.1. 
 















Figure 7.4.3: FECsmoke (Test 20 – 800 mm sampling height) 
 
The tests indicate that sprinkler activation has a significant impact on visual 
obscuration within the apartment under this type of fire scenario.  This in itself is 
cause for concern when proposing to rely on sprinkler activation as the fire detection 
system.  The situation is not improved by the fact that in the tests where the sprinkler 
did not appear to have an effect on visibility, the FECsmoke threshold was still 
exceeded.  It should be noted however that the sprinkler system was only run for a 
maximum period of 2 minutes in any of the tests.  It is not known what affect the 
sprinkler discharge would have had on the visual obscuration in the compartment after 
this time.  Nevertheless it is reasonable to assume that had the sprinkler activation 
been the alerting mechanism, the 2 minutes following activation would cover the time 
during which an occupant would most likely be attempting to escape. 
 
When considering the visibility at different sampling heights in determining egress 
time, cognisance should be taken of the realistic movement speed at that height, 
regardless of smoke conditions.  For example, good visibility at 1600 mm will allow 
an occupant to travel at normal walking speed, however if the occupant is required to 
crouch, or crawl, to remain under the smoke layer, i.e. at the 800 mm sampling height, 
then their movement speed will be significantly slower. 
Chapter 7    Results 99
Table 7.4.1: FECsmoke threshold versus sprinkler activation time 
 






(secs) First event 
9 800 477 487 10 Sprinkler 
10 800 434 463 29 Sprinkler 
11 800 1112 611 501 FECsmoke 
12 800 217 220 3 Sprinkler 
13 800 794 645 149 FECsmoke 
14 1600 569 483 86 FECsmoke 
15 1600 DNA 442 N/A N/A 
16 1600 518 463 55 FECsmoke 
17 800 DNA 330 N/A N/A 
18 800 528 539 11 Sprinkler 
19 800 - - - - 
20 800 DNA 505 N/A N/A 
21 800 427 446 19 Sprinkler 
DNA : Did Not Activate    - : No measurements taken due to TV failing to ignite 
 
7.5. Temperature 
In a sprinkler controlled fire scenario, temperature is not likely to be a significant 
factor in determining tenability within the compartment.  Nevertheless it was still 
considered pertinent to examine the temperature profiles during each test.  Graphs 
showing the thermocouples temperatures for every test are included in Appendix H.  
A typical time temperature graph is show below in Figure 7.5.1. 
 





























Figure 7.5.1: Time temperature curve (Test 14) 
 
The graph shows a clear rise in temperature until a short time after sprinkler 
operation, at which point the temperature drops away steadily.  The temperatures in 
the upper sections of the compartment experience the sharpest rise, and reach the 
greatest values.  This is to be expected due to the thermal layering that occurs in the 
compartment, with the hot buoyant smoke hot concentrated in the upper part of the 
compartment. 
 
The graph shows that the maximum gas temperature 150 mm below the ceiling 
(106°C) exceeds the nominal sprinkler activation temperature of 68°C.  There are a 
number of reasons for this, including the much smaller RTI of the thermocouple wire 
and conduction from the sprinkler bulb to the metal housing and water pipe.  Another 
factor could be conduction through the uninsulated ceiling of the compartment, 
resulting in lower temperatures in the boundary layer (where the sprinkler head is 
located) than at the thermocouple 150 mm below the ceiling. 
 
While the maximum temperature never approached the 200°C suggested by Purser as 
a hot upper layer tenability threshold, the tests do indicate that caution must be 
employed when equating sprinkler activation times to gas temperatures.  It should be 
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noted that the thermocouple tree is located in the centre of the room, and so the 
activated sprinkler head is approximately 2 metres closer to the fire, and therefore 
should be exposed to higher temperatures.  In this particular example the top 
thermocouple reached 68°C 47 seconds before the sprinkler operated.  The gas 
temperature 750 mm off the floor (approximate assumed escape height) never 
exceeded 30°C throughout the test. 
 
Table 7.5.1 contains a summary of maximum gas temperatures at selected 
thermocouple heights for each test.  This table also contains the top thermocouple 
temperature at sprinkler activation time, plus the time delay between the top 
thermocouple reaching 68°C and the sprinkler activating. 
 
In many of the tests, maximum temperatures were recorded following sprinkler 
activation due to time lags.  While the post sprinkler activation temperatures appear 
realistic, some degree of caution is required given that water from the sprinkler 
discharge was impinging directly on the thermocouples. 
 
The maximum temperatures at 750 mm above floor level ranged from 26°C to 65°C, 
with an average maximum temperature of 39°C.  These temperatures would not be 
considered life threatening to an occupant attempting to evacuate the apartment.  At 
1650 mm above floor level, the maximum temperatures recorded over the 21 tests 
ranged from 52°C to 84°C.  The average maximum at this height was 69°C.   
 
The higher end of these temperatures might cause injury depending on the moisture 
saturation level in the compartment.  It is also possible that the higher end 
temperatures may cause occupants to hesitate to enter the fire compartment.   
If an occupant is alerted by an emergency warning device and is subsequently 
confronted with smoke and elevated temperatures in the living room (even if they are 
not life threatening at the lower levels), they may be reluctant to enter that space, 
fearing the fire they naturally associate with the heat and smoke.  This would be 
particularly relevant once the FECsmoke threshold has been exceeded, and they are not 
able to directly assess the size of the fire, and hence the degree of threat it represents. 
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The maximum temperatures recorded at the top thermocouple (2.25 metres above 
floor level) ranged from 82°C to 152°C.  It should be noted that the value of 152°C 
obtained from Test 3 was significantly higher than any other test.  Test 3 was the only 
test in which both sprinkler heads activated.  The next highest maximum was 114°C.  
The average maximum temperature was exactly 100°C.  At this height an occupant is 
unlikely to come into direct contact with the gases, and none of these temperatures 
exceeds Purser’s 200°C threshold for radiated heat from a hot smoke layer. 
 
The temperature recorded at the top thermocouple at the time of sprinkler activation 
ranged from 73°C to 107°C, with an average temperature of 94°C.  The time delay 
between the top thermocouple reaching 68°C and the sprinkler activating ranged from 
5 seconds to 656 seconds.  The average delay was 83 seconds. 
 
It should be noted that the time delay of 656 seconds recorded during Test 7 was 
exceptional, though genuine.  However if this outlying value is ignored, the delay 
ranges between 5 and 151 seconds, with an average time of 42 seconds.  In no test did 
sprinkler activation occur before the top thermocouple reached 68°C. 
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Table 7.5.1: Temperature and sprinkler activation time comparisons 
 









Test 0.75 m 1.65 m 2.25 m 2.25 m (Sec) (Sec) (Sec) 
1 52 72 107 107 899 995 96 
2 54 74 114 106 3164 3315 151 
3 30 83 152 103 395 437 42 
4 27 68 108 99 238 261 23 
5 50 69 86 DNA 975 DNA N/A 
6 42 70 105 99 747 798 51 
7 51 70 92 88 677 1333 656 
8 47 66 93 DNA 911 DNA N/A 
9 30 68 104 86 469 477 8 
10 30 58 83 73 429 434 5 
11 41 63 95 93 1066 1112 46 
12 28 67 104 95 197 217 20 
13 42 69 103 94 768 794 26 
14 27 69 106 94 522 569 47 
15 65 84 92 DNA 545 DNA N/A 
16 26 62 107 94 504 578 14 
17 62 79 87 DNA 859 DNA N/A 
18 27 65 99 99 492 528 36 
19 - - - - - - - 
20 46 63 82 DNA 1008 DNA N/A 
21 26 52 83 82 401 427 26 
DNA : Did Not Activate    - : No measurements taken due to TV failing to ignite 
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7.6. Heat Release Rate 
The heat release rate (HRR) was calculated using the mass loss rate of the burning TV 
set (see Equation 4.4.1).  Mass loss curves for all but two of the tests are contained in 
Appendix K.  The effective heat of combustion ∆hc was assumed to be 30 MJ/kg.  
This figure was taken from Babrauskas [19], and was based on the assumption that in 
all cases where ignition occurred, the television set casing must be non-fire retarded 
(i.e. HB rated).  It should be recognised that while most TV casings would be made 
from high impact polystyrene [16,19,25], the effective heat of combustion might in 
reality vary from one set to the next.  Therefore the assumption of 30 MJ/kg as the 
effective heat of combustion may not necessarily accurately portray the burning 
characteristics of each television set tested.  It should also be noted that the mass loss 
information recorded during the tests required some manipulation in order to be 
usable (see Section 6.4), which in turn may have introduced an element of uncertainty 
into the data.  For these reasons the HRR results contained in this report should be 
treated with some caution. 
 
Mass loss measurements allowed the HRR to be calculated for 18 of the 20 tests in 
which ignition was successful.  In the other two tests the outputs did not provide a 
clear mass loss curve, and therefore HRR calculations could not be obtained.  Graphs 
showing the heat release rates for each test are contained in Appendix I, and a 
representative graph is shown below in Figure 7.6.1.  The peak heat release rate 
ranged from 55 kW to 195 kW, with an average peak HRR of 133 kW.  Table 7.6.1 
shows a summary of the peak heat release rates for each test.  It is interesting to note 
that for the three identical pairs of sets the variation in peak HRR is not substantial 
(3 kW for two pairs, and 31 kW for the third).  This gives some confidence in the use 
of the mass loss technique, however it does not provide any more certainty regarding 
the chosen effective heat of combustion. 
 
Due to the fact that sprinkler discharge spray hitting the weighing assembly affected 
the mass loss measurements, the HRR curves are only provided up until the point of 
sprinkler activation.  On some occasions the results appear to be affected prior to the 
indicated activation time.  This is most likely caused by the averaging process used on 
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the raw mass loss data.  In the tests where the sprinkler did not activate HRR data is 
shown for as long as possible, however given the output rate of 13.84 weigh values 
per second, limitations on the amount of data Excel is capable of displaying in a graph 





















Figure 7.6.1: Heat release rate curve (Test 14) 
 
It is worth noting that in the tests where the sprinkler did not activate, the peak HRR 
tended towards the lower end of the range (between 73 kW and 120 kW).  In only one 
of these cases (Test 20) did the peak HRR exceed 100 kW.  Test 20 is also one of the 
two identical sets which had the greatest variance in peak HRR.  The HRR curve for 
Test 20 is contained in Figure 7.6.2 and from this it can be seen that the peak occurs at 
a sharp spike.  This may be a function of the mass loss processing method, and if 
further smoothing were to occur, the peak would likely occur at around 100 kW.  
100 kW is the type of value that would satisfy both the HRR comparison with the 
same model set (Test 8), and the non-activation of the sprinkler.  It should also be 
noted however that the sprinkler did activate in tests with lower peak HRRs, 
Chapter 7    Results 106 
i.e. 55 kW and 78 kW.  These results may in turn indicate that the effective heat of 




















Figure 7.6.2: Heat release rate curve (Test 20) 
 
The peak heat release rates recorded in these tests are markedly lower than those 
contained in the literature review for non-fire retarded sets (see Section 2.3), which 
were typically in the range of 230 - 250 kW, and as high as 570 kW.  While this could 
be a result of the methodology (including the possibility of pieces of TV continuing to 
burn after falling off the weighing assembly), it could also be explained by the fact 
that fire growth was limited by sprinkler activation.  It should be noted that in Test 3 
the ceiling gas temperature was sufficiently high to activate both sprinklers in the 
compartment.  It would be expected that this test would have an exceptionally high 
HRR as well, however the peak HRR was only 138 kW, which was just above the 
average for the tests.  This appears to reinforce the fact that selecting an accurate heat 
of combustion is critical. 
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Table 7.6.1: Comparison of peak heat release rates 
 
Test Peak HRR (kW) Sprinkler Activation Comments 
1 190 Yes  
2 ? Yes Error in mass loss data 
3 138 Yes Both sprinklers operated 
4 174 Yes Same set as Test 16 
5 88 No  
6 170 Yes  
7 ? Yes Error in mass loss data 
8 89 No Same set as Test 20 
9 191 Yes  
10 139 Yes  
11 78 Yes  
12 195 Yes  
13 55 Yes  
14 138 Yes Same set as Test 18 
15 96 No  
16 171 Yes Same set as Test 4 
17 73 No  
18 135 Yes Same set as Test 14 
19 - - No ignition 
20 120 No Same set as Test 8 
21 150 Yes  
? : Error in mass loss data    - : No measurements taken due to TV failing to ignite 
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7.7. Fractional Effective Dose (Asphyxiant) 
7.7.1. FED Results over Duration of Test  
The fractional effective dose of asphyxiant gases was calculated using the method 
described by Purser (see Equation 4.1.2).  Graphs representing the cumulative FED 
over the duration of each test are contained in Appendix J.  A typical graph is 
provided below in Figure 7.7.1 showing the incapacitation threshold of 0.1, along 















Figure 7.7.1: FED Asphyxiants (Test 6) 
 
The FED results for all the tests are summarised in Table 7.7.1.  It is important to note 
that the sampling height for Tests 14 - 16 was 1600 mm above floor level.  This 
sampling height is a lot closer to ceiling level and therefore to the hot gas layer 
containing the majority of the toxic combustion products.  It would be expected that 
exposure to higher concentrations of asphyxiant gases would occur at this level, and 
that exposure would occur earlier in the test. 
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The FED values attained in each test varied considerably with the maximum FED 
ranging from 0.0024 to 4.56.  Of the 20 tests in which ignition occurred, the FED 
threshold was exceeded in 13 cases prior to the end of the test.   
 
In tests where sprinkler activation occurred, the end of the test was taken as the time 
at which the sprinkler was shut off.  However in one further test (Test 12) the FED 
was exceeded only 22 seconds after the sprinkler was shut off.  Shutting off the 
sprinkler would definitely have had an affect on conditions within the compartment, 
and therefore possibly affected the FED calculations as well.  However the results for 
this test (see Figure 7.7.2) show that the FED values after sprinkler shut off are a 
continuation of a clear trend line established well before the sprinkler was shut off.  













Sprinkler activation Sprinkler shut off
 
Figure 7.7.2: FED Asphyxiants (Test 12)  
 
In the 14 tests where the FED limit was exceeded, the time to reach the threshold 
ranged from 359 seconds to 2255 seconds (37 min 35 sec). 
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Of these 14 tests, sprinkler activation occurred 9 times.  In 4 tests the FED threshold 
was exceeded prior to sprinkler activation.  Surprisingly, this did not include any of 
the tests sampled at 1600 mm.  The difference between reaching the FED threshold 
and sprinkler activation ranged from 43 seconds to 1060 seconds (17 min 40 sec). 
 
In the 5 tests where the sprinkler activated before the FED threshold was exceeded, 
the difference was much less.  In these tests the difference ranged between 43 seconds 
and 142 seconds. This means that had sprinkler activation been relied on to warn the 
occupants of fire, the available escape time following sprinkler activation would have 
been limited.  It is likely that sprinkler activation contributed to reduced tenability at 
the sampling height by disrupting the thermal layer, causing a greater concentration of 
toxic products to enter the lower portion of the compartment.  It should be noted that 
this group included two tests sampled at 1600 mm.  In all 5 tests where the sprinkler 
did not activate (including one sampled at 1600 mm), the FED threshold was 
exceeded. 
 
It should be noted that the FED graphs do not always commence at zero.  This is 
probably due to residual elevated levels of CO and CO2, and/or lowered O2 levels 
from proceeding tests.  The compartment was aired at the end of each test using a 
positive pressure ventilation fan, however this may not always have returned the 
compartment to ambient conditions.  These initial FED readings were so far below the 
threshold of 0.1 that their effect would have been negligible by the time the FED 
threshold was actually exceeded, and therefore no attempt has been made to adjust the 
values. 
 
7.7.2. Comparison of Sampling Heights 
In two of the tests in which gas was sampled at 1600 mm (Tests 14 and 16), the 
television sets were the same model as those used in tests sampling at 800 mm.  This 
provided an opportunity to examine the effect of varying the sampling height on the 
FED results.  Test 14 used the same model of Transonic television as Test 18, and 
Test 16 used the same Philips model as Test 4. 
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There are a number of similarities between Tests 14 and 18 that make the comparison 
worthwhile.  Both sets were ignited using the same method (Method 1), and sprinkler 
activation times were only 41 seconds apart (at 569 and 528 seconds respectively).  
Normalised mass loss curves for each test are provided in Figure 7.7.3 and give an 
indication of the fire growth characteristics of the two tests.  The mass loss curves 
have been normalised because although these are the same model televisions, the 
initial mass differed by approximately 0.5 kg.  This is possibly due to internal 
componentry that had been removed during servicing, and not replaced when it was 
apparent that the set could not be repaired.  It is unlikely that this would have a 
significant effect on the burning characteristics of the set.  Despite absolute 
differences in mass, the mass loss during the fire follows a similar pattern in both 


















Figure 7.7.3: Normalised mass loss curves for same model television set            
(Tests 14 and 18) 
 
Figure 7.7.4 shows the comparative FED values for the two tests.  At a sampling 
height of 1600 mm, the FED threshold is exceeded in 684 seconds, which is 115 
seconds after sprinkler activation.  At a sampling height of 800 mm, the FED was not 
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exceeded, even after sprinkler activation.  Examination of the graph for Test 14 (1600 
mm sampling height) reveals that the FED was only just exceeded.  It is possible that 
there were not sufficient levels of toxic products in the compartment to achieve the 













Test 14 - sampled at 1600 mm







Figure 7.7.4: FED for same model television sets sampled at different heights 
(Tests 14 and 18) 
 
Comparing Tests 4 and 16 was not as easy since similarities between the two tests 
were not so apparent.  The sprinkler activation time for Test 4 was 261 seconds, 
whereas the sprinkler activation time for Test 16 was 518 seconds (a difference of 257 
seconds).  This result was likely to have been influenced by the fact that Test 4 
required double wicking to the rear of the set to achieve ignition (i.e. Method 2), 
which may have resulted in faster fire development leading to earlier sprinkler 
activation.  This in itself is interesting in that it seems to indicate either the ignition 
properties of the casing materials vary from batch to batch, or that the uncertainty in 
achieving sustained combustion extends beyond the timeframe allowed for the 
ignition method.  The mass loss curves for the two tests are shown in Figure 7.7.5. 




















Figure 7.7.5: Normalised mass loss curves for same model television sets       
(Tests 4 and 16) 
 
As with the previous comparison it should be noted that the initial mass differed, this 
time by a relatively substantial 1.6 kg, although possibly for the same reason as last 
time.  Once again however the mass loss of the two sets during the fire is similar, 
although mass loss occurs significantly later in Test 16.  This is in keeping with the 
later sprinkler activation time recorded in Test 16. 
 
Figure 7.7.6 shows the comparative FED values for the two tests.  Once again the 
threshold is exceeded at the 1600 mm sample height (Test 16), on this occasion in 585 
seconds, which was 67 seconds after sprinkler activation.   
 
A maximum FED of 0.13 was achieved during this test.  The same model television 
sampled at 800 mm did not exceed the threshold, with the FED measurement reaching 
only 0.0073.  This is likely to be due to the fact that the fire was faster and so both the 

















Test 4 - sampled at 800 mm






Figure 7.7.6: FED for same model television sets sampled at different heights 
(Tests 4 and 16)  
 
Examination of only two pairs of tests is insufficient to draw any firm conclusions, 
and the variability in the burning characteristics inherent in the television sets 
contributes to the uncertainty, however the results discussed reinforce the obvious 
assumption that tenability conditions will be better at a lower height within the 
compartment.  Put another way, sampling height does have an affect on the tenability 
limits imposed by FED analysis.  Therefore selecting a sampling height that 
realistically simulates the behaviour of an occupant attempting to escape through the 
room of fire origin is important in assessing whether evacuation is achieved safely. 
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Table 7.7.1: FED Results Summary 
 








(Sec) First Event 
1 0.102 1055 995 60 Sprinkler 
2 0.97 2255 3315 1060 0.1 FED 
3 0.0024 N/E 437 N/A N/A 
4 0.0073 N/E 261 N/A N/A 
5 3.01 1031 DNA N/A N/A 
6 0.39 755 798 43 0.1 FED 
7 1.83 779 1333 554 0.1 FED 
8 4.56 724 DNA N/A N/A 
9 0.014 N/E 477 N/A N/A 
10 0.054 N/E 434 N/A N/A 
11 0.19 1064 1112 48 0.1 FED 
12 0.082 359* 217 142 Sprinkler 
13 0.16 837 794 43 Sprinkler 
14 0.103 684 569 115 Sprinkler 
15 1.30 693 DNA N/A N/A 
16 0.13 585 518 67 Sprinkler 
17 0.94 638 DNA N/A N/A 
18 0.042 N/E 528 N/A N/A 
19 - - - - - 
20 1.82 912 DNA N/A N/A 
21 0.016 N/E 427 N/A N/A 
* FED threshold exceeded 22 seconds after sprinkler shut off 
DNA : Did Not Activate   N/E : FED not exceeded    N/A : Not applicable    - : No measurements taken 
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7.7.3. Grab Sample Results for HCN and HCl 
Grab samples were taken at random intervals during the tests to identify the presence 
of these two toxicants, and to examine the impact they might have on the FED.  
Because continuous sampling equipment was not available, it had already been 
decided to discount these two gases from the final FED calculation.  This meant that 
the FED results obtained from the tests could be viewed as a ‘best case’, in that the 
presence of the asphyxiant HCN, or the irritant HCl, would adversely affect the 
tenability results.  The grab samples were intended to provide a qualitative assessment 
of the likely contribution these gases might have played in the overall toxicity hazard.  
 
As it eventuated, the presence of neither gas was measured during any of the random 
sampling.  This may mean that they were not it the compartment atmosphere in 
sufficient concentrations to register on the measuring equipment, or it may mean that 
the sampling technique was not appropriate for the task.  It should be noted however 
that previous studies of TV fires did not reveal the presence of HCN or HCl in 
measurable quantities either [19,25].  The results of the grab sampling carried out 
during the tests are summarised in Table 7.7.2 below.  
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Table 7.7.2: HCN and HCl grab sampling results  
 
Test Height Time (s) Gas Sprinkler Concentration 
5 800 mm 870 HCN No < 50 ppm 
8 800 mm 945 HCN No < 50 ppm 
8 800 mm 1155 HCl No < 20 ppm 
9 800 mm 525 HCl Yes <20 ppm 
11 800 mm 900 HCl No < 20 ppm 
12 800 mm 270 HCl Yes < 20 ppm 
13 800 mm 780 HCl Yes* < 20 ppm 
15 1600 mm 690 HCl No < 20 ppm 
15 1600 mm 1380 HCN No < 50 ppm 
17 800 mm 1200 HCl No < 20 ppm 
20 800 mm 885 HCN No < 50 ppm 
20 800 mm 1155 HCl No < 20 ppm 
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7.8. Alert Time versus Available Escape Time 
The cumulative FED assessed over the entire duration of the fire does not in itself 
provide useful information for evaluating the ability of an occupant to safely evacuate, 
since the occupant’s exposure time is likely to be significantly shorter.  For analysis 
purposes the scenario assumes that an occupant is in another room (i.e. asleep in the 
bedroom) with the connecting door shut.  The occupant is alerted to the fire by one of 
the fire safety systems, at which point an attempt is made to evacuate through the 
room in which the fire has occurred.   
 
Under this scenario, exposure would commence when the occupant opened the door 
to the living room (i.e. enclosure of fire origin).  The time it would take for an 
occupant to react to the alert (pre-movement time) and open the door is difficult to 
quantify, and so for this analysis exposure is considered to commence immediately 
upon activation of the relevant fire safety system.  The success of the occupant’s 
escape attempt is dependent on the time available before the FED threshold is 
exceeded. 
 
The time at which the FED threshold is exceeded is determined by evaluating the 
cumulative FED over the duration of exposure, from the beginning of the exposure 








tecummulativ FEDFED       (7.8.1) 
where 
 
t = time (seconds) 
tstart = time at which exposure commences 
tend = time at which exposure ceases 
 
Normally, the tenability analysis is done over the entire duration of the fire, where tstart 
is the start of the fire (i.e. tstart = 0).  However to present the FED results in terms of 
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alert time versus available escape time, the FED threshold had to be found for an 
exposure that commenced at any given time t.  Ideally this should be calculated for 
each consecutive time step in the fire, i.e. tstart  = 0, 1, 2, 3, . . . , end.  This would be a 
very intensive procedure, so to simplify the process, a series of cumulative FED 
calculations were made with exposure times commencing in 30 second intervals, 
i.e. tstart  = 0, 30, 60, 90, . . . , end.   
 
The next step involved finding the time at which the FED threshold was exceeded 
(tthreshold) in each consecutive cumulative FED calculation.  This allowed the available 
escape time to be determined by subtracting the time at which the FED threshold was 
exceeded from the time at which exposure commenced.  Therefore the available 
escape time for each consecutive cumulative FED calculation could be expressed as: 
 
  Available escape time  =  tthreshold - tstart   (7.8.2) 
 
This process resulted in a series of available escape times for each test, where each 
available escape time corresponded to a particular exposure start time.  If the time at 
which exposure commenced (tstart) is considered the alert time, then graphing tstart 
against the corresponding available escape time generates an alert time versus 
available escape time graph for that particular test. 
 
The activation times of the various fire safety systems in each test is contained in 
Section 7.3.  If the activation time of each fire safety system is considered an alert 
time, then this information can be overlaid on the alert time versus available escape 
time graph to give an available escape time for each fire safety system in a particular 
test.  This information is presented in the following section for the 14 tests in which 
the FED (asphyxiants) was exceeded.  One advantage of presenting the FED 
information in terms of alert time versus escape time is that analysis is not restricted 
to just the test data.  The graphs allow the available escape time for any given alert 
time to be investigated in each test.  Conversely, if a required escape time is known, 
then the alert time threshold can be determined. 
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Inspection of the graphs reveals that as the fire develops, the time available for escape 
reduces.  This means that the longer it takes for the occupant to become aware of the 
fire, the less chance they have of being able to escape safely.  The graphs also show 
that delays in activation time become more critical towards the latter stages of the fire.  
For example in Test 2, the delay between the operation of the ionisation detector and 
optical detector in the compartment is 19 seconds, and the corresponding reduction in 
available escape time is also 19 seconds.  In this case the relationship between 
changes in the alert time and available escape time is linear and the ratio is 1 to 1.  
However the delay in response time between the ionisation detector and the sprinkler 
system is 2895 seconds, whereas the difference in available escape times is 1832 
seconds.  The ratio of available escape time to alert time has dropped to 
approximately 1 in 3.  This pattern can be observed in the majority of the tests where 
the tenability threshold is exceeded.  As the accumulation of toxic products in the 
compartment becomes more pronounced, every second of delay in alerting the 
occupant reduces the available time by significantly more than that second.  The rate 
at which this occurs increases as the fire progresses.  
 
A summary of alert time versus available escape time results for each test is also 
contained in Table 7.8.1 and Table 7.8.2.  By subtracting one value from another, the 
difference in available escape time afforded by each fire safety system can be 
determined.  This information however is better represented on the alert time versus 
escape time graphs for each test contained in the following section.  This section 
provides an overview of the alert time versus escape time analysis and highlights 
interesting points as they occur, i.e. the relationship with smoke obscuration and 
HRR.  It should be noted that tend does not represent at definitive point in the fire.  
Previously, analysis has been stopped when the sprinkler system was shut off.  This 
recognised that shutting off the sprinkler would affect the tenability conditions within 
the compartment.  However as tstart approached the sprinkler shut off time, the FED 
threshold was often not exceeded until after the sprinkler was shut off.  This meant 
that the calculation had to use data captured after the sprinkler was shut off.  As 
inspection of the graphs in the following section reveals no dramatic changes in the 
alert time versus escape time curve towards the end of the test, use of this data was 
considered acceptable. 
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7.8.1. Test 1 
The ignition method for this test was Method 3.  Sustained combustion took hold after 
about 11 minutes and the fire grew at a steady rate for approximately 3:30 minutes 
before developing rapidly until the sprinkler activated some 2 minutes later at an 





































Figure 7.8.1: Alert time versus escape time (Test 1) 
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7.8.2. Test 2 
This set proved difficult to ignite, but successful ignition was eventually achieved 
using Method 4.  Although no heat release rate information is available for this test, 
the compartment temperature profile indicates that the fire developed slowly for 
almost 50 minutes, before growing rapidly over the next five minutes prior to 





































Figure 7.8.2: Alert time versus escape time (Test 2) 
 
It is interesting to note that the CO detector in this test reacted considerably slower 
than the two smoke detectors, reaching the activation threshold almost 10 minutes 
later.  This variance was far greater than any other experienced in these tests.  It may 
have been a consequence of the slow growing fire, or a problem with the CO detector.   
 
The analogue response of the four detectors used in this test is shown below in Figure 
7.3.1.  From this graph it can be seen that the CO detector initially responded at a 
similar time to the two smoke detectors, but levelled off before reaching the activation 
threshold. 



























Figure 7.8.3: Fire safety system response (Test 2 - Compartment) 
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7.8.3. Test 5 
Although the television set in this test was easily ignited, the peak heat release was 
not particularly high (less than 90 kW).  Compartment temperatures reached a 
maximum of only 86°C, which was insufficient to cause sprinkler activation.  The fire 
peaked around 11 minutes after ignition and then steadily declined until the test was 
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7.8.4. Test 6 
Ignition in this test was achieved using Method 3.  Sustained combustion occurred 
after 6 minutes, and the fire developed steadily to a HRR of 110 kW at the 11 minute 
mark, before dying off.  Renewed fire development occurred a minute later and the 
HRR rose steeply to peak at 170 kW at an elapsed time of approximately 13 minutes.  


































Figure 7.8.5: Alert time versus escape time (Test 6) 
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7.8.5. Test 7 
Method 3 was used in this test to achieve ignition, but it should be noted that Methods 
1 and 2 were not attempted because there was no suitable position to locate the candle 
at the rear of the set.  Once again no HRR data is available for this test, but the 
temperature profile indicates a fire that developed moderately for approximately 13 
minutes before levelling off into a fairly steady state fire.  Sprinkler activation 



































Figure 7.8.6: Alert time versus escape time (Test 7) 
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7.8.6. Test 8 
The set used in this test was difficult to ignite, and Method 4 was required to achieve 
sustained combustion.  The HRR results indicate that sustained combustion occurred 
after about 10 minutes, and the fire initially developed steadily.  However after 
reaching a peak of less than 90 kW at the 20 minute mark it continued in a fairly 
steady state phase at a low HRR of between 40 - 50 kW for another 8 minutes.  It then 
climbed to a second peak of 80 kW, after which the fire started to die away.  The 

































Figure 7.8.7: Alert time versus escape time (Test 8) 
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7.8.7. Test 11 
This fire was ignited using Method 3.  After showing some initial strong growth at the 
5 minute mark, development was arrested and TV continued to burn steadily at a 
much slower growth rate.  The sprinkler activated about 19 minutes into the fire when 
the mass loss data indicated that the HRR had reached 75 kW.  No information was 
recorded from the analogue smoke and fire detectors during this test.  
 
Figure 7.8.9 shows the FECsmoke graph for this test.  The FECsmoke threshold at 800 
mm was exceeded at 611 seconds.  By sprinkler activation the reading was over 12 
(OD/m = 2.5) indicating near 100 percent obscuration.  Therefore the compartment 
would have been heavily smoke logged when the occupant was attempting to escape.  






















































Figure 7.8.9: FECsmoke (Test 11 – 800 mm sampling height) 
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7.8.8. Test 12 
No data was recorded from the analogue smoke and fire detectors during this test.  
The ignition method in this test was Method 2.  It is worth noting that the sprinkler 
activated in just 217 seconds.  This represents a particularly fast sprinkler activation 
time. Figure 7.8.11 shows the HRR curve for this fire.  The graph shows that the fire 
displays a fast growth rate commencing less than 2 minutes after ignition and 
reaching a peak HRR of 200 kW about 100 seconds later when the sprinkler activated.  
Under these circumstances early activation of a fast response sprinkler head would not 
be unexpected. 
 
Figure 7.8.12 shows the FECsmoke graph for this test.  The FECsmoke threshold is not 
exceeded until just after sprinkler activation, at which time it climbs to over 5 
(OD/m = 1), before peaking above 12 (OD/m = 2.4), indicating near 100 percent 
obscuration.  Once again an occupant attempting to escape the apartment following 
































Figure 7.8.10: Alert time versus escape time (Test 12) 
 







































Figure 7.8.12: FECsmoke (Test 12 – 800 mm sampling height) 
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7.8.9. Test 13 
The ignition method in this test was Method 3.  This fire exhibited a fairly moderate 
growth rate that commenced approximately 6 minutes after ignition.  The mass loss 
data indicates a peak HRR of only 55 kW when the sprinkler activated 13 minutes 





































Figure 7.8.13: Alert time versus escape time (Test 13) 
 
 
The FECsmoke threshold was exceeded at 645 seconds (see Figure 7.8.14).  This means 
that an occupant relying on either the thermal detector, smoke detectors in adjacent 
rooms, or the sprinkler system for warning of fire would have significant trouble 




























Figure 7.8.14: FECsmoke (Test 13 – 800 mm sampling height) 
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7.8.10. Test 14 
This TV was easily ignited using Method 1, however it remained in an incipient stage 
for the first 6 minutes following ignition.  At this point it commenced to grow at a 
very fast rate, peaking at 140 kW following sprinkler activation 9:30 minutes after 
ignition. 
 
FECsmoke at a sampling height of 1600 mm exceeded the threshold in 483 seconds.  
This means that occupants attempting to escape following activation of the thermal 
detector, two adjacent room smoke detectors, or sprinkler system would be 
significantly impaired by smoke obscuration t this height.   Figure 7.8.16 indicates 
that almost total obscuration occurred prior to sprinkler activation.  
 
In this test the optical detector in the compartment activated after the sprinkler 
operated.  This result is significantly different from the activation responses in any 
other test, and while it may be a result of the fire conditions, it is also possible that 
contamination from previous tests has effected the detector’s response.  Figure 7.8.17 



































Figure 7.8.15: Alert time versus escape time (Test 14) 
 




















































Figure 7.8.17: Fire safety system response (Test 14 – Compartment) 
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7.8.11. Test 15 
Method 1 was used to ignite the TV set in this test.  This television appeared to have a 
low HRR.  Development commenced approximately 4 minutes into the fire, however 
after initially growing strongly the fire reached a peak of 90 kW and then proceeded 




































Figure 7.8.18: Alert time versus escape time (Test 15) 
 
The FECsmoke threshold at 1600 mm is exceeded in this test after 442 seconds as the 
smoke layer descends into the compartment (see Figure 7.8.19).  As with the 
proceeding tests, the threshold is exceeded prior to activation of the thermal detector 
and the lobby smoke detectors.  Escape attempts following an alert from these devices 


























Figure 7.8.19: FECsmoke (Test 15 – 1600 mm sampling height) 
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7.8.12. Test 16 
This TV was easily ignited using Method 1.  The incipient phase continued for about 
7 minutes before the fire displayed a very fast growth rate, peaking at 175 kW upon 







































Figure 7.8.20: Alert time versus escape time (Test 16) 
 
In this test the FECsmoke threshold is exceeded in 463 seconds.  Reliance on the 
thermal detector, lobby smoke detectors and sprinkler to provide warning would result 
in an escape attempt through a heavily smoke logged compartment.   
 
It is worth noting that in this test visual impairment might also be experienced 
following an alert by the smoke detectors inside the compartment, depending on the 
pre-movement time.  Both smoke detectors inside the compartment activated less that 
100 seconds before the FECsmoke threshold was reached at the 1600 mm sample 
height.   
 
 





















Figure 7.8.21: FECsmoke (Test 16 – 1600 mm sampling height) 
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7.8.13. Test 17 
Ignition Method 3 was required to achieve sustained combustion in this test.  The fire 
started to grow rapidly at the 2 minute mark, however after peaking at about 75 kW, it 
settled into a steady state phase that fluctuated between 40 - 60 kW.  After 10 minutes 
the fire started to decay steadily.  The sprinkler did not operate, and the test was 


































Figure 7.8.22: Alert time versus escape time (Test 17) 
 
FECsmoke exceeded to threshold value of 1.0 within 330 seconds of the start of the fire.  
Almost total visual obscuration occurred within 487 seconds.  Escape attempts 
following activation of the thermal detector or either of the lobby smoke detectors 



























Figure 7.8.23: FECsmoke (Test 17 – 800 mm sampling height) 
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7.8.14. Test 20 
Method 3 was required to achieve sustained combustion in this test.  Fire development 
commenced 4 minutes after ignition, with a slow growth rate that peaked somewhere 
between 80 and 120 kW after 22 minutes.  From this point on the fire slowly decayed.  





































Figure 7.8.24: Alert time versus escape time (Test 20) 
 
 
In this test the FECsmoke threshold is exceeded after 505 seconds (see Figure 7.8.25).  
100 percent obscuration occurs at around 700 seconds.  Once again any occupants 
attempting escape following warning from the thermal detector, lobby smoke 



























Figure 7.8.25: FECsmoke (Test 20 – 800 mm sampling height) 
 
Chapter 7    Results 144 










Test Alert Escape Alert Escape Alert Escape Alert Escape 
1 510 545 412 643 565 495 907 158 
2 420 1880 439 1861 1012 1312 3170 72 
5 495 542 676 362 494 543 1006 126 
6 424 358 421 361 440 342 734 92 
7 357 425 335 446 331 450 662 149 
8 189 538 193 534 227 500 879 107 
11 - - - - - - - - 
12 - - - - - - - - 
13 264 602 538 344 293 575 765 155 
14 357 331 590* 153 390 299 543 160 
15 317 379 348 348 372 324 649 134 
16 375 274 387 318 ? ? 518 126 
17 158 483 125 516 175 467 874 102 
20 221 700 215 706 276 648 966 136 
* Reading possibly affected by contamination from previous tests 
- : No measurements made    ? : Problem with output 
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Table 7.8.2: Alert time versus available escape time summary (Table 2) 
 




Sprinkler/End    
(seconds) 
Test Alert Escape Alert Escape Alert Escape 
1 - - - - 995 84 
2 - - - - 3315 48 
5 - - - - DNA 34‡ 
6 - - - - 798 62 
7 - - - - 1333 27 
8 - - - - DNA 18‡ 
11 - - - - 1112 201 
12 - - - - 217 158 
13 703 192 689 211 794 139 
14 503 188 493 197 569 153 
15 517 187 526 180 DNA 86‡ 
16 489 179 490 178 518† 164 
17 448 241 580 181 DNA 19‡ 
20 570 386 516 427 DNA 110‡ 
       † Alert time taken as 510 due to end of data 
      ‡ Alert time taken as time test was terminated 
 
DNA : Did Not Activate    - : No measurement made 
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8. Discussion 
The objective of this study is to examine what consequences the removal of smoke 
detection from the escape route will have on the ability of an occupant to safely 
evacuate from the apartment.  Smoke detection represents the level of safety currently 
required in the escape route of a typical multi-storey apartment building under the 
deemed to satisfy provisions of the building code.  Therefore any analysis should start 
by comparing the results with the level of safety afforded by smoke detection.  It 
follows that if a fire safety system used in lieu of smoke detection provides an 
equivalent level of safety then it should also satisfy the performance requirements of 
the building code [50].  A comparison of the available escape times provided by each 
system against that provided by the smoke detectors is discussed in Section 8.1. 
 
It must be recognised however that the deemed to satisfy requirements of the building 
code are intended to be applied in a generic manner, and consequently must 
incorporate a substantial safety factor.  The question therefore remains as to whether a 
fire safety system used as part of a specific fire engineering design to replace smoke 
detection can offer a sufficient level of safety to meet the performance requirements 
of the building code, even if it does not achieve equivalency with the smoke detection 
system.  Addressing this question will require an analysis of not only the available 
escape time, but also of the required escape time.  This issue is discussed in detail in 
Section 8.2. 
 
8.1. Comparison with Deemed to Satisfy Provisions 
The available escape times provided by each fire safety system in each test are 
presented in Figure 8.1.1.  For the purposes of comparison the ionisation detector has 
been used as the base measurement, as this is representative of the level of safety 
deemed to satisfy the performance provisions of the building code and has less 
uncertainty associated with its results than the optical detector.  
 
 








































Figure 8.1.1: Available escape time at activation of fire safety system 
 
Table 8.1.1 below shows the minimum, maximum and mean available escape times 
for each system over all the tests in which the FED threshold was exceeded, and then 
presents the performance of each system as a percentage reduction in the available 
escape time compared to that provided by the ionisation detector.   
 
The results show that both the optical detector and the CO detector are capable of 
performing better than the ionisation detector, although on average they offered a 
reduction in available escape time, albeit by only 8 percent.  It is interesting to note 
that the optical detector on one occasion provided over 50 percent less available 
escape time, although in this case (Test 14), the possibility of contamination from 
previous tests should be considered. The mean response time of the CO detector was 
less than a minute slower than the ionisation detector, and the minimum available 
escape time it provided was actually greater than the minimum provided by the 
ionisation detector. 
 
Therefore based on this comparison, the performance of the CO detector is 
sufficiently close to that of the smoke detectors that it must be considered an adequate 
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substitute for traditional smoke detection, at least under the fire scenario used for 
these tests.  This in turn implies that it has demonstrated equivalency with the deemed 
to satisfy provisions of the building code.  It is important to recognise that this 
conclusion is restricted to the conditions under which the tests were conducted, and 
does not necessarily mean that the CO detector would provide satisfactory 
performance under other fire scenarios.  It is also important to recognise that this 
evaluation is restricted to a single model of CO detector, and does not allow any 
conclusions to be drawn regarding the performance of CO detectors in general.  Nor 
does it address issues such as the testing, maintenance and reliability of CO detectors. 
 
 
Table 8.1.1: Summary of reduction in available escape times in comparison to 
ionisation detector 
 
 Available escape time    
(seconds) 
Reduction in available escape 
time compared to ion detector 
System Min. Max. Mean Min. Max. Mean 
Ion 274 1880 588 - - - 
Optical 153 1861 549 -18% 54% 8% 
CO 299 1312 541 -6% 30% 8% 
Thermal 92 160 126 52% 96% 72% 
Lobby Ion 179 386 229 35% 68% 49% 
Lobby Opt 181 427 229 35% 65% 49% 
Sprinkler 18 201 93 40% 97% 81% 
 
 
In contrast to the CO detector, the thermal detector provided significantly reduced 
available escape times, on average allowing 72 percent less available escape time, and 
up to 96 percent less.  It real terms this meant the thermal detector provided less than 
3 minutes of available escape time in all tests, in comparison to the minimum of 4:30 
minutes provided by the ionisation detector.  This deviation from the performance of 
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the ionisation detector is so substantial that the thermal detector cannot be considered 
to provide an equivalent level of safety under this fire scenario. 
 
The performance of both lobby detectors is very similar to one another, and both 
provide a mean reduction in available escape time of approximately 50 percent when 
compared to the ionisation detector located in the compartment.  This is not 
unexpected as the closed door between the fire compartment and lobby space presents 
a significant impedance to smoke reaching the detectors.  It would therefore be 
unrealistic to expect an equivalent level of safety from similar systems in a physically 
separate space.  However despite this handicap, they still provided a minimum 
available escape time of around 3 minutes and out performed the thermal detector 
located in the compartment.  Although as discussed later, this may in part be the result 
of generous gaps in the door set connecting the two spaces. 
 
Not surprisingly, the sprinkler system provides the greatest reduction in available 
escape time compared to the ionisation detector.  The mean reduction is over 80 
percent, and minimum available escape time afforded by the sprinkler system is only 
18 seconds.  Therefore the sprinkler does not represent an equivalent level of safety to 
the deemed to satisfy provisions of the building code.  It should be noted that in 5 
cases the sprinkler did not activate, and so the available escape time is taken at the end 
of the test in these cases (this includes the worst case result of 18 seconds).  The tests 
were called off when static conditions were observed in most measuring equipment, 
however this still represents an arbitrary time in the fire.  
 
8.2. Comparison of Available Escape Time with Required 
Escape Time 
While this study has focused on quantifying the available escape times in the scenario 
for the various fire safety systems experimentally, previously published literature will 
have to be relied on to provide the required escape time.  Results of both the FECsmoke 
calculations and visual observations of the tests indicate that an occupant attempting 
to escape the apartment during the latter stages of the fire will be confronted by very 
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dense smoke.  Jin [14] suggests that at an OD/m of 0.2 (OD of 0.5 1/m) in irritant 
smoke, walking speed will be reduced to 0.3 ms-1.  Proulx [32] details a study by 
Jensen  indicating that at an OD/m of 0.47 (OD of 1.09 1/m), movement speed was 
around 0.2 ms-1.   
 
The FECsmoke threshold of 1.0 equates to an OD/m of 0.2, which allows an assessment 
to be made of the likely movement speed of an occupant attempting to escape through 
the fire compartment during the tests.  In the majority of tests, the smoke layer 
descended in a fairly uniform manner, leaving relatively clear visibility below.  This 
is confirmed by the FECsmoke graphs which show a rapid increase in visual 
obscuration as the smoke layer descends past the level at which the measurements 
were taken.  Therefore in order to simplify the analysis, it has been assumed that 
visibility is not significantly compromised prior to the FECsmoke threshold being 
exceeded.  A commonly accepted walking speed of 1.2 ms-1 [14] has been selected for 
movement prior to FECsmoke reaching 1.0.  This is somewhat generous because if the 
smoke layer is quite low (i.e. approaching the 800 mm sampling height), then the 
occupant may be forced to crouch or crawl to remain beneath the smoke layer.  This 
in turn may slow their movement speed even if visibility is not reduced. 
 
A worst case travel distance would involve entry and exit doors that were at opposing 
ends of the compartment.  If it is assumed that the occupant has very limited visibility 
and therefore needs to follow the wall to navigate the compartment, then the 
maximum travel distance would be about 12 metres (8 m along the side wall + 4 m 
along the end wall).  In good visibility this distance could be travelled in 10 seconds 
(12 m at 1.2 ms-1).  Of course in good visibility the occupant would not be required to 
follow the walls, however the time of 10 seconds is deemed reasonable.  In heavy 
smoke conditions at a speed of 0.3 ms-1 it would take 40 seconds to exit the room, and 
a speed of 0.2 ms-1 would require 60 seconds.  For this analysis the average of these 
values has been used, giving a required escape time of 50 seconds for FECsmoke ≥ 1.0. 
 
The activation times of each fire safety system are shown on the FECsmoke graphs in 
Section 7.8, and the activation times are compared to the time at which the FECsmoke 
threshold is exceeded for each test in Table 8.1.1 and Table 8.2.2 below.  It should be 
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noted that comparisons are only possible for those tests in which visual obscuration 
measurements were taken (Tests 11 to 20).  The alert time is subtracted from the 
FECsmoke threshold time to give the reduced visibility time (RVT) following activation 
of each system.  A positive RVT provides the amount of time available to escape in 
good visibility conditions (i.e. the required escape time is 10 seconds).  A negative 
RVT value indicates that the FECsmoke threshold has been exceeded prior to the 
activation of the system, and therefore escape would be through heavy smoke 
conditions with reduced movement speed (i.e. the required escape time is 50 seconds). 
 
It is important to note that pre-movement time plays an crucial role in determining 
what conditions face the occupant when they attempt to escape through the living 
area.  If the amount of time taken for the occupant to respond to the alert exceeds the 
RVT, then movement through the fire compartment will be impaired by smoke 
obscuration.  Pre-movement time is not easy to quantify, and will be dependant on the 
individual circumstances and characteristics of the occupant, i.e. asleep or awake, 
sober or intoxicated.  However for the purposes of this analysis a pre-movement time 
of 30 seconds has been assumed.  This is a qualitative assessment, and considers that 
an occupant would have an immediate vested interest in responding to an alert from 
within their place of residence.  If however the apartment building has been subjected 
to numerous unwanted alarm activations, the occupants may have developed an 
attitude of complacency, in which case pre-movement times could be significantly 
longer.  Nevertheless, using a pre-movement time of 30 seconds implies that for any 
RVT ≤ 30 seconds, the required escape time will be 50 seconds.  FECsmoke thresholds 
that are exceeded while evacuation is in progress have been ignored.   
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Test FECsmoke Alert RVT Alert RVT Alert RVT Alert RVT 
11 611 - - - - - - - - 
12 222 - - - - - - - - 
13 645 264 381 538 107 293 352 765 -120 
14 483 357 126 590 -107 390 93 543 -60 
15 442 317 125 348 94 372 70 649 -207 
16 463 375 88 387 76 - 463 518 -55 
17 330 158 172 125 205 175 155 874 -544 
20 505 221 284 215 290 276 229 966 -461 
- : No measurements made 
 
 
Table 8.2.2: Alert time versus FECsmoke threshold time (Table 2) 
 




Sprinkler   
(seconds) 
Test FECsmoke Alert RVT Alert RVT Alert RVT 
11 611 - - - - 1112 -501 
12 222 - - - - 217 5 
13 645 703 -58 689 -44 794 -149 
14 483 503 -20 493 -10 569 -86 
15 442 517 -75 526 -84 DNA -ve 
16 463 489 -26 490 -27 518 -55 
17 330 448 -118 580 -250 DNA -ve 
20 505 570 -65 516 -11 DNA -ve 
- : No measurements made 
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As expected, Table 8.2.1 and Table 8.2.2 reveal that escape following activation of 
the smoke detectors and CO detector within the compartment would occur in good 
visibility, and therefore take only 10 seconds.  The solitary exception is the optical 
detector activation in Test 14.  As previously discussed, this may well be an erroneous 
reading caused by contamination from earlier tests.  In contrast, the FECsmoke 
threshold is exceeded prior to the activation of the thermal detector, the two lobby 
smoke detectors and the sprinkler system, in every test.  An occupant attempting to 
escape following an alert from any of these systems would therefore require 50 
seconds to move through the living area.  
 
Once the required escape times had been determined they could be compared with the 
available escape times in each test to ascertain whether an occupant could escape 
safely following warning provided by each fire safety system (i.e. ASET - RSET).  
This comparison is shown in Table 8.2.3, Table 8.2.4 and Table 8.2.5.  Escape time 
commences upon exposure to the fire compartment, and this can be assumed to occur 
when the occupant opens the door between the adjacent space (presumably the 
bedroom) and the living area.  If the FECsmoke threshold has been exceeded at this 
point, it is likely that smoke will flow rapidly into the adjacent space, which would 
quickly become smoke logged as well.  In this scenario an occupant disorientated 
from being unexpectedly awoken is then confronted by a rapid influx of heavy, dark 
smoke upon opening the door to the living room.  Under these circumstances it is not 
difficult to imagine how disorientation and loss of visibility due to high optical smoke 
density and sensory irritation, along with respiratory distress from irritant smoke, 
might result in the occupant taking up to a minute to recover some degree of 
equilibrium and make the journey through even the familiar environment of their own 
living room.  
 
It should be noted that required escape times for Test 1 to 8 are assumed, however a 
reasonable level of confidence can be taken from the consistency of required escape 
times for each type of system attained in Tests 11 to 20 (see Table 8.1.1 and Table 
8.2.2).  It is also important to note that unlike determining the required escape time, 
no account of pre-movement time has been made in the available escape time 
calculations.  This is because the available escape time is only dependant on exposure 
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to the fire compartment, and this does not occur until movement commences (i.e. the 
occupant opens the door to the fire compartment).  It could be argued however that 
prolonged pre-movement time would decrease the available escape time, as the level 
of toxic products in the fire compartment increased.  The alert time versus available 
escape time graphs contained in Section 7.8 allow the implications of difference pre-
movement times to be evaluated. 
 
 
Table 8.2.3: ASET versus RSET (Table 1) 
 
 Ionisation           
(seconds) 
Optical                
(seconds) 
CO                     
(seconds) 
Test ASET RSET Margin ASET RSET Margin ASET RSET Margin
1 545 10 535 643 10 633 495 10 485 
2 1880 10 1870 1861 10 1851 1312 10 1302 
5 542 10 532 362 10 352 543 10 532 
6 358 10 348 361 10 351 342 10 332 
7 425 10 415 446 10 436 450 10 440 
8 538 10 528 534 10 524 500 10 490 
11 - - - - - - - - - 
12 - - - - - - - - - 
13 602 10 592 344 10 334 575 10 565 
14 331 10 321 153 10 143 299 10 289 
15 379 10 369 348 10 338 324 10 314 
16 274 10 264 318 10 308 - - - 
17 483 10 473 516 10 506 467 10 457 
20 700 10 690 706 10 696 648 10 638 
- : No measurements made 
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Table 8.2.3 shows that in every case the available escape time exceeds the required 
escape time for the two compartment smoke detectors and the CO detector.  The 
narrowest margin comes from the optical detector in Test 14, with a margin of 143 
seconds.  This result has already been identified as potentially erroneous, and if 
ignored, this means the minimum margin between the available escape time and the 
required escape time is 264 seconds (4 min 24 sec).  Under these circumstances the 
three systems should be considered to meet the performance requirements of the 
building code.   
 
Once again with regard to the CO detector, it is important to note that this conclusion 
is only valid for the conditions under which the test were conducted, and only for the 
model of detector evaluated.  No substantive conclusions can be drawn about the 
suitability of CO detectors in general, however the results indicate that further study 
of their suitability as a replacement for smoke detectors is warranted.   
 
Table 8.2.4 below reveals that for the lobby smoke detectors, the available escape 
time still exceeds the required escape time, however it this case the margin is much 
narrower than in the previous results.  The minimum margin between available escape 
time and required escape time is 128 seconds.  In determining whether this represents 
a sufficient level of safety, the following factors should be taken into consideration: 
 
• The lobby used in the tests represents a best possible case in that the space was 
only 1.2 m2, and the detectors were located within 600 mm of the connecting 
door.  Both of these factors maximised the possibility of undiluted smoke entering 
the sensing chambers at the earliest possible time. 
 
• The door set connecting the fire compartment with the adjacent space was not as 
well constructed as might be expected in a real apartment, and therefore more 
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• The absolute values of both available and required escape times are small, 
therefore estimation errors of even 30 seconds could have a significant effect on 
the result.  Given the uncertainties associated with human behaviour in fire, large 
safety margins would be recommended. 
 
So while a minimum safety margin of just over 2 minutes appears reasonable, the 
concerns raised above indicate that caution is required.  It would therefore be prudent 
to carry out further experimental evaluation before determining whether smoke 
detection in an adjacent space can be relied upon to allow an occupant to escape 
safely from this fire scenario. 
 
Table 8.2.4: ASET versus RSET (Table 2) 
 
 Lobby Ionisation         
(seconds) 
Lobby Optical            
(seconds) 
Test ASET RSET Margin ASET RSET Margin
1 - - - - - - 
2 - - - - - - 
5 - - - - - - 
6 - - - - - - 
7 - - - - - - 
8 - - - - - - 
11 - - - - - - 
12 - - - - - - 
13 192 50 142 211 50 161 
14 188 50 138 197 50 147 
15 187 50 137 180 50 130 
16 179 50 129 178 50 128 
17 241 50 191 181 50 131 
20 386 50 336 427 50 377 
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Table 8.2.5: ASET versus RSET (Table 3) 
 
 Thermal             
(seconds) 
Sprinkler/End            
(seconds) 
Test ASET RSET Margin ASET RSET Margin
1 158 50 108 84 50 34 
2 72 50 22 48 50 -2 
5 126 50 76 34* 50 -16 
6 92 50 42 62 50 12 
7 149 50 99 27 50 -23 
8 107 50 57 18* 50 -32 
11 - - - 201 50 151 
12 - - - 158 50 108 
13 155 50 105 139 50 89 
14 160 50 110 153 50 103 
15 134 50 84 86* 50 36 
16 126 50 76 164 50 104 
17 102 50 52 19* 50 -31 
20 136 50 86 110* 50 60 
* End time of test used because sprinkler did not activate 
- : No measurements made 
 
 
Table 8.2.5 shows that the thermal detectors provided an available escape time that 
exceeded the required escape time in all cases, however the margins were not 
substantial.  In absolute terms the minimum difference between the available escape 
time and the required escape time was 22 seconds, and in no case did the difference 
exceed 2 minutes.  Taking into consideration the previously discussed uncertainties 
regarding human behaviour and small absolute values, it is concluded that the thermal 
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detector does not provide a sufficient level of safety to allow an occupant to escape 
the apartment under this fire scenario. 
 
Table 8.2.5 shows that for the sprinkler system, the required escape time exceeded the 
available escape time in 5 cases.  Of the remaining cases, the minimum difference 
between the available escape time and the required escape time was just 12 seconds, 
and the maximum margin was only 151 seconds.  These results clearly indicate that 
the fast response residential sprinkler system does not provide a sufficient level of 
safety to allow an occupant to escape from the apartment under this fire scenario.  
 
It should be remembered that Tests 14 - 16 involved sample heights of 1600 mm.  It is 
possible that conditions at a height of 800 mm might provide longer available escape 
times, however inspection of Table 8.2.5 reveals that Tests 14 and 16 provide two of 
the more generous available escape times anyway.  In Test 15 the sprinkler failed to 
operate, in which case it is likely that the tenability conditions would have stabilised 
in the compartment by the end of the test.  It can also be argued that requiring an 
occupant to adopt a crawling position (i.e. 800 mm head height) in order to effect an 
escape does not provide a sufficient level of safety under the performance 
requirements of the building code, regardless of whether the escape attempt is 
successful. 
 
It should also be noted that in the 5 cases where the sprinkler failed to operate, the end 
time of the test was used to calculate the available escape time.  This represents a 
somewhat arbitrary point in the fire not related to any particular alert time, however it 
can be considered indicative of the toxic hazard present in the later stages of the fire.  
It does raise an interesting point regarding what would happen in this scenario if the 
television fire burned out completely and the occupant remained unaware of the fire 
for a considerable period of time.  It is possible that sufficient toxic products could 
accumulate in the bedroom to eventually present a hazard in that space.  Alternatively 
the tenability conditions in the fire compartment could remain static and present a 
threat when the occupant eventually enters the living room.  A third option is that the 
toxic hazard in the living area is gradually diluted over time with the natural air 
change that occurs within the apartment.  Smoke could also find its way into the 
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corridor outside the apartment and may activate the smoke detection system there.  
However as the door from the apartment to the outside corridor is likely to be fire 
rated, it is uncertain how much smoke would pass into the corridor.  While potentially 
of interest, it was not within the scope of this study to investigate these possibilities. 
 
Tenability conditions were only measured for a maximum of two minutes after 
sprinkler activation.  This limit was necessary to avoid flooding the test facility, 
however it did not allow an assessment to be made of the tenability conditions during 
sustained sprinkler discharge.  While the FEDaphyxiant graphs indicate that tenability 
appears to continue decreasing following sprinkler discharge (see Section 7.7), it is 
possible that sprinkler discharge might eventually lead to improved conditions within 
the fire compartment and increase the occupants chance of successfully escaping from 
the apartment.  It should be noted that the sprinkler system as used in this study did 
not achieve the minimum specified flow rate.  While this was not critical due to the 
short time the sprinkler was operating, if the effects of sprinkler operation are going to 
be measured over a longer duration, it is important that the system operates within its 
design parameters. 
    
8.3. General Discussion 
The results of this analysis are in reality not particularly surprising.  Sprinklers and 
thermal detectors respond to heat, and therefore cannot be expected to perform well in 
a fire with a low heat release rate.  While this is a commonly known fact, what has 
probably not been so well appreciated in the past is that untenable conditions can arise 
from a fire that does not produce sufficient heat to activate even a fast response 
sprinkler system.  So while heat release rate can be considered the most significant 
predictor of fire hazard [51], this study shows that it should not be viewed in isolation.  
Likewise the effects of ‘downdrag’ following sprinkler activation are also well 
known.  However once again the assumption has generally been that with a fast 
response sprinkler there would be insufficient build up of combustion products in the 
upper layer prior to activation to present significant problems, either in terms of 
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visibility or toxicity.  The results of this study have shown that in regard to some 
plastics fires with low heat release rates, this assumption cannot be relied upon. 
 
It is important to recognise that it is not the purpose of this report to discredit the 
performance of sprinkler systems, especially fast response residential systems, which 
perform an extremely important life safety and property protection function within 
residential buildings.  The concerns addressed in this report have been raised in 
response to the removal of another fire safety system which is designed to work in a 
complementary manner with the sprinkler system to provide a comprehensive level of 
safety over a wide range of fire scenarios. 
 
Removing smoke detection from the means of escape within residential apartments, 
without providing a suitable alternative, risks placing the fast response sprinkler 
system in a role it was neither designed for, nor is necessarily suited to.  This in turn 
can lead to the possibility of the sprinkler system ‘failing’ because it has been called 
upon to perform a function that is outside of its operating parameters.  Nevertheless, it 
must be recognised that there are significant unwanted activation problems associated 
with the use of smoke detection in the living areas of small apartments, and if the 
removal of early detection is not a viable option, efforts must be made to find an 
acceptable alternative. 
 
Exploring the suitability of alternatives such as CO detectors should be given a high 
priority, along with more sophisticated smoke detectors that offer multi-criteria heads 
and false alarm defeating algorithms, multiple sensitivity levels and rapid drift 
compensation.  Reducing the build up of fumes in the apartment is also part of the 
solution, so improved ventilation, and in particular the use of non-recirculating 
kitchen rangehoods would significantly contribute to the reduction in unwanted 
activations.  The provision of mute buttons in a readily assessable position would 
mitigate the effects of any unwanted activation.  Finally care in the positioning of 
smoke detectors outside apartment doors is necessary to ensure that any fumes 
escaping the apartment when the door is opened do not trigger a corridor detector. 
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It is important to recognise that a number of factors influence the decision as to what 
constitutes an acceptable fire safety system, other than just response performance.  
This study did not take into consideration such aspects as reliability, in which 
sprinkler systems have an exemplary record.  Nor did it consider the issue of system 
maintenance.  The servicing interval for a sprinkler system is much greater than that 
for most detection systems, and this has implications both in terms of gaining access 
to individually tenanted spaces, as well as the ongoing costs associated with the 
system.   
 
It is obvious from the results in Section 8.1 that removing the smoke detection from 
the escape route and relying solely on the fast response residential sprinkler system 
does not provide an equivalent level of safety to the deemed to satisfy provisions of 
the building code.  It is also apparent from the analysis in Section 8.2 that sprinklers 
alone do not provide a sufficient level of protection to allow an occupant to safely 
escape in the event of this fire scenario.  However if a risk based approach is taken to 
the specific fire engineering solution, then the probability of the fire scenario 
occurring must also be considered, along with the consequence, when determining if 
the design meets the performance requirements of the building code.  While this study 
has attempted to quantify the consequences of this fire scenario on occupant safety, it 
was not within the scope of the research to assess the probability of this type of fire 
scenario occurring in the first place. 
 
Previous studies indicate that televisions account for a low proportion of electrical 
fires in dwellings (see Section 2.3).  New Zealand Fire Service statistics show that 
267 fires were attributed to TV sets and a further 96 to computers in the past 10 years 
[52].  This would tend to support the view that the overall risk is quite small, however 
further research into the probability of fires involving TV sets, computer monitors and 
any other scenarios that product similar results would be required before an accurate 
picture of the actual risk can be established. 
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8.4. Further Work 
Although data was collected from a total of 20 tests, circumstances meant that it was 
rarely possible to get comprehensive measurements for every test.  As it is difficult to 
draw any firm conclusions from a limited set of samples, this study would benefit 
from further tests of a similar nature that collected the full range of data for each test.  
In particular reliable confirmation on the concentration of hydrogen cyanide, and the 
contribution of irritants such as hydrogen chloride would be useful, along with lobby 
detector tests using a more tightly fitting connecting door.  It would also have been 
beneficial to explore the impact of sustained sprinkler discharge on tenability 
conditions.  For this to be effective, the system flow and pressure must be within the 
parameters specified by the manufacturer.  The importance of visual obscuration on 
the required escape time means that optical density measurements are critical to a 
comprehensive analysis. 
 
A closer examination of the performance requirements of the building code would 
also be warranted in regard to establishing experimental parameters.  For example in 
this study a sampling height of 800 mm has generally been used, as this represents the 
likely height of an occupant attempting to escape under the smoke layer where it is 
expected that the air will clearer and visibility greater.  However this in itself may 
present too great a compromise to satisfy the performance requirements of the 
building code.  If an occupant cannot walk to safety, then it is possible that the 
performance requirements have not been met.  Therefore perhaps any further 
experimental work should assume a sampling height of around 1600 mm as 
representative of an upright adult.  
 
If the conclusion of this report is that fast response residential sprinklers cannot be 
safely used in lieu of smoke detectors, then it is important to find a suitable 
replacement that is not subject to the same degree of unwanted activation as currently 
plagues smoke detection systems in small living spaces.  Although CO detectors 
appeared to offer a suitable alternative, further work would be necessary on their 
response to other fire scenarios, as well as their susceptibility to cooking fumes and 
other causes of unwanted activations.  The testing, maintenance, reliability and cost 
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issues associated with CO detectors would also need further investigation before they 
could be considered as a serious alternative. 
 
Reducing the susceptibility of tradition smoke detection to unwanted activations is 
another solution that needs urgent investigation.  The use of more sophisticated 
systems, i.e. those with fuzzy logic capable of recognising the signature of cooking 
fumes, and/or systems with combination detectors may resolve the problem. 
 
The tests raised some interesting questions regarding the risk posed by televisions sets 
in fires, and further investigation into the flammability of television sets sold in New 
Zealand would be worthwhile.  It appears from the tests that the vast majority of the 
sets used did not meet the V-0 fire retardancy classification.  This raises the argument 
over whether the contribution of fire retardants to the toxicity of a fire, and the 
environmental hazard they present, is outweighed by the increased fire risk presented 
by a non-retardant TV set. 
 
As mentioned earlier, the focus of this study was on the consequences of television 
fires in regard to fire safety systems and tenability limits within residential 
apartments.  In order to properly assess the risk associated with this scenario, a more 
comprehensive study has to be carried out into the probability of this type of fire 
occurring. 
 
This study has also revealed that there appears to be only a small amount of 
information available on human behaviour in heavy smoke conditions, particularly in 
regard to movement speed.  The majority of information in the literature proved too 
crude to be useful in assessing short travel distances under very trying conditions.  So 
while this study provided quantification of the available escape time for each of the 
tests, there is still a degree of uncertainty associated with the required escape time.  In 
order to provide a more comprehensive answer, further work on the required escape 
time under conditions that realistically simulate those found in this type of scenario 
would be beneficial.
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9.  Conclusions and Recommendations 
The following conclusions can be drawn from this analysis: 
 
• The majority of television sets in New Zealand appear to have limited fire 
retardancy and are generally easy to ignite with a low energy naked flame.  
 
• Untenable conditions can arise from a fire that does not produce sufficient heat to 
activate a fast response residential sprinkler system. 
 
• In low heat release rate fires involving burning plastics, sufficient combustion 
products can accumulate in the upper layer prior to the activation of a fast 
response residential sprinkler head such that downdrag will result in obscuration 
and toxicity thresholds being exceeded in the lower part of the compartment. 
 
• The fast response residential sprinkler system used in isolation did not achieve an 
equivalent level of safety to the deemed to satisfy provisions of the building code, 
when benchmarked against the performance of the compartment ionisation 
detector. 
 
• The carbon monoxide detector was the only alternative fire safety system to 
achieve an equivalent level of safety to the deemed to satisfy provisions of the 
building code, when benchmarked against the performance of the compartment 
ionisation detector. 
 
• The fast response residential sprinkler system did not provide a sufficient level of 
safety to allow an occupant to escape from the apartment under the fire scenario 
adopted for this study. 
 
• The thermal detector did not provide a sufficient level of safety to allow an 
occupant to escape from the apartment under this fire scenario adopted for this 
study. 
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• Further investigation is needed to determine whether smoke detection in an 
adjacent space is capable of providing a sufficient level of safety to allow an 
occupant to escape from the apartment under the fire scenario adopted for this 
study. 
 
As a result of this study, the following recommendations are offered: 
 
• Smoke detection should not be removed from the escape route of residential 
accommodation until a comprehensive analysis of the probability associated with 
fires that can produce untenable conditions prior to sprinkler activation has been 
carried out.  This is an integral part of the full probabilistic risk assessment that 
would be needed to demonstrate that reliance on the sprinkler system alone 
complies with the performance requirements of the building code.  
 
• Further work should concentrate on reducing the occurrence of unwanted 
activations of smoke detectors.  This should involve investigation into the 
suitability of CO detectors, as well as the use of more sophisticated smoke 
detectors and multi-criteria detectors.  Methods of improving ventilation and 
extraction systems within apartments should also be considered, along with the 
inclusion of wall mounted hush buttons to mitigate the affects of detector 
activation. 
 
• Smoke detection systems in multi-storey apartment buildings should use only 
local sounding (apartment of origin only) non-latching smoke detection in the 
apartments, and corridor detection should not be positioned near apartment doors 
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Acronyms 
 
ASET  Available Safe Escape Time 
CBD  Central Business District 
CO  Carbon Monoxide 
CO2  Carbon Dioxide 
COHb  Carboxyhemoglobin 
deca-BDE Decabromodiphenylether 
EIRSA  Engineering, Information, Research and Strategic Analysis  
FEC  Fractional Effective Concentration 
FED  Fractional Effective Dose 
FID  Fractional Incapacitating Dose 
FLD  Fractional Lethal Dose 
FR  Fire Retardant 
FRS  Fire Research Station 
fsd  full scale deflection 
HB  Horizontal Burning 
HBr  Hydrogen Bromide 
HCl  Hydrogen Chloride 
HCN  Hydrogen Cyanide 
HIPS  High Impact Polystyrene 
HRR  Heat Release Rate 
LC50  Lethal Concentration (causing death of 50 percent of animals exposed) 
LCD  Liquid Crystal Display 
N2  Nitrogen 
NDIR  Non-Dispersive Infrared 
NFR  Non-Fire Retardant 
O2  Oxygen 
OD  Optical Density 
PAH  Polycyclic Aromatic Hydrocarbons 
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PC  Personal Computer 
PFA  Perfluoro Alkoxy (Teflon) 
ppm  parts per million 
PPr  Polypropolyene 
RMV  Respiratory Minute Volume 
RSET  Required Safe Escape Time 
RTI  Response Time Index 
RVT  Reduced Visibility Time 
Sb2O3  Antimony Oxide 
SD  Standard Deviation 






















Io  sprinkler discharge 
C  Concentration (mg/l) 
Cs  Light Extinction Coefficient 
D  COHb concentration at incapacitation (30 percent for light activity) 
Du  Optical density per metre 
FIN  Fraction of an incapacitating dose of all asphyxiant gases 
FIco  Fraction of an incapacitating dose of CO 
FIcn  Fraction of an incapacitating dose of HCN 
FIo  Fraction of an incapacitating dose of low-oxygen hypoxia 
FLDirr  Fraction of an irritant dose contributing to hypoxia 
I  Intensity of the light through smoke 
Io  Intensity of the incident light 
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K  8.2925 x 10-4 for 25 l/min RMV (light activity) 
l  Light path length (m) 
LC  Lethal concentration (mg/l) 
m&   Fuel mass loss rate (kg/s) 
Q&   Heat release rate (kW) 
t  Exposure time (min or sec) 
tIo  Time to incapacitation due to oxygen depletion 
tstart  Time exposure commences 
tend  Time exposure ceases 
VCO2  Multiplication factor for CO2-induced hyperventilation 
W  A constant dose, specific for any effect (mg·min/l) 
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Figure B.1: UL 1626 Fire test arrangement for residential pendent sprinklers 
Reproduced from Madrzykowski and Fleming [35]
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Gas Analysers 
 
Carbon Dioxide Analyser 
Manufacturer: Autodiagnostics Limited 
Model: ADS 500 4 Gas EFI Exhaust Gas Analyser 
CO2 technology: Non-dispersive infrared 
Range: 0 – 20% 
Resolution: 0.01% 
Accuracy - 0 – 16%: 
                 - 16 – 20%: 
± 0.4% absolute 
± 1.0% absolute 
Calibration: 10% CO2 
Zero check cycle (Air): Every 30 minutes (after initial warm-up) 
Data acquisition: RS232 Link 
 
 
Carbon Monoxide Analyser 
Manufacturer: The Analytical Development Company Limited 
Model: Synchronous Series 1355 Carbon Monoxide Analyser 
Technology: Non-dispersive infrared 
Detector: JMF H 2629 
Range: 0 – 3% (by cell division) 
0 – 10% (by gain attenuation) 




2.5% CO in N2 
Electrical output signal: Linear 0 – 10 V 
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Data acquisition: Picolog software from ADC-16 Data Logger 
Supply voltage: 240 V 






Technology: Paramagnetic transducer 
Local readout:  Meter 
Operating range (% O2): 0 – 25 
Accuracy: 0.02% O2 or ± 1% of fsd, whichever is greater 
Repeatability: ± 0.005% oxygen (electrical output) 
Sample inlet temperature 
range (ºC): 
 
-10 to +50 
Response time (90% 
readout of step change at 
input): 
 
6 sec. or 3 sec. 
Flow rate – Cell:                     
                 – Bypass: 
250 ml/min max. (Air) 
0.7 to 7 l/min max. (Air) 
Inlet pressure: 1.4 kPag (0.2 psig) minimum 
140 kPag (20 psig) maximum 
 
 
Hydrogen Cyanide and Hydrogen Chloride Analyser 
Manufacturer: Gastec 
Model: Model 800 Gas Sampling Pump 
Sampling capacity: 50 ml minimum (½ pump stroke) 
100 ml (1 pump stroke) x n maximum  
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HCN Gastec Standard detector tube No. 12M 
Measuring range: 17 to 2400 ppm (50 to 800 ppm for 1 pump stroke) 
Detecting limit: 1 ppm 
Relative standard deviation: 10% (for 50 to 200 ppm) 
5% (for 200 to 800 ppm) 
  
HCl Gastec Standard detector tube No. 14M 
Measuring range: 10 to 1000 ppm (20 to 500 ppm for 1 pump stroke) 
Detecting limit: 2.5 ppm 
Relative standard deviation: 10% (for 20 to 100 ppm) 
5% (for 100 to 500 ppm) 
 
 
CO and O2 Gas Sampling System 
 
Pump 
Manufacturer: Charles Austin Pumps Limited 
Model: Capex 2D 





Model: Olympian Plus 
Specification No.: F64G – NNN – MD3 
Drying agent: 
Indicating blue silica gel crystals 
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Filter 
Manufacturer: Crossland 






Manufacturer: PICO Technology Limited 
Model: ADC-16 High Resolution Data Logger 
No of channels: 8 
Resolution: 16 bit + sign 
Input range: ± 2.5 V 
Overload protection: ± 30 V 
Sampling rate: 1 Hz 
Accuracy: 0.2% 
Input impedance: 1 MΩ 
Input connector: D25 female 
Output connector: D9 male to PC serial port 
Outputs: 2 (fixed ± 5 V references) 




Manufacturer: PICO Technology Limited 
Model: ADC-16 Terminal Block 
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No of channels used: 3 
Resistor A (Ra): 75,000 Ω 




Manufacturer: PICO Technology Limited 
Model: TC-08 Thermocouple to PC Data Logger 
No of channels: 8 
Accuracy: The sum of ± 0.3% and 0.5°C 
Overload protection: ± 10 V 
Conversion time: 200 µs for cold junction compensation + 200 µs per active 
channel 
Input connectors: Miniature thermocouple 
Max common mode voltage: ± 5 V 
Output connector:  D9 female to serial port 
Dimensions: 85 x 145 x 25 mm 





Laser Optical Density Meter 
Transmitter  
Wavelength: 650 nm 
Supply voltage: 9 V 
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Receiver  
Manufacturer: Silonex 
Model: SLD-70BG2 Infrared Rejection Filter Planar 
Photodiode 
Operating mode: Photovoltaic 
Spectral range:  400 – 700 nm 
Maximum sensitivity: 550 nm 
Electric output signal: Linear 0 – 9 V 





Electronic Scales and Indicator 
Manufacturer: Mettler Toledo 
Model: Spider SW 
Capacity: 150 kg 
Resolution: 0.005 kg 
Zero setting range: 1.2% of total load cell capacity 
Auto zero range: 0.16% of the stated scale’s weighing capacity 
Start-up zero range: -1.4% to +12.6% of the total load cell capacity 
Maximum preload: 70% of the nominal load of the stated scale weighing 
capacity 
Linearity: 0.033% of the total load cell capacity 
Data acquisition: RS-232C bi-directional (9600 8-N-1) 
Handshake: XON/XOFF 
Maximum data rate: 20 weigh values per second 
 




Manufacturer: Tyco Fire and Building Products 
Model: Series LFII Residential Pendent Sprinklers 
Model identification no.: SIN TY2234 
K-factor: 4.9 GPM/psi½ (70.6 l/min/bar½)  
Temperature rating: 68°C 
Bulb: 3 mm diameter, glass 




Maximum coverage area:  4.3 m x 4.3 m 
Maximum spacing: 4.3 m 
Minimum flow: 49.2 l/min 






Manufacturer: Apollo Fire Detectors Limited 
Model: XP95 Ionisation Detector 
Part number: 55000-500 
Radioactive isotope: Americium 241 
Sampling frequency: Continuous 
Supply voltage: 17 to 28 V dc 
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Operating temperature: -20°C to +70°C 
Clean air analogue value: 25 ±7 counts 
Alarm level analogue value: 55 (EN54 y value of 0.7) 
Sensitivity: Nominal threshold y value of 0.7 to EN54 Pt 7 1984 
Humidity: 0% to 95% relative humidity 
Wind speed: 10 m/s maximum 





Manufacturer: Apollo Fire Detectors Limited 
Model: XP95 Optical Smoke Detector 
Part number: 55000-600 
Sensor: Silicon PIN photo-diode 
Emitter: GaAs Infra-red light emitting diode 
Sampling frequency: 1 second 
Supply voltage: 17 to 28 V dc 
Operating temperature: -20°C to +60°C 
Clean air analogue value: 25 ±7 counts 
Alarm level analogue value: 55 
Sensitivity: Nominal threshold of 2.4% light grey smoke obscuration 
per metre 
Humidity: 0% to 95% relative humidity 
Wind speed: Unaffected by wind 
Data acquisition: Proprietary software using Apollo communications 
protocol 
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Thermal Detector 
Manufacturer: Apollo Fire Detectors Limited 
Model: XP95 Temperature detector (Standard) 
Part number: 55000-400 
Sensor: Single NTC thermistor 
Sampling frequency: Continuous 
Supply voltage: 17 to 28 V dc 
Operating temperature: -20°C to +70°C 
Analogue value at 25°C: 25 ±5 counts 




Sensitivity: 25°C to 90°C: 1°C/count 
-20°C returns 8 counts 
Humidity: 0% to 95% relative humidity 
Wind speed: Unaffected by wind in fixed temperature use 




Carbon Monoxide Detector 
Manufacturer: Apollo Fire Detectors Limited 
Model: Discovery Carbon Monoxide Detector 
Part number: 58000-300 
Cell life: 7 years (assuming regular checks are satisfactory) 




Connects to positive line through 4.5Ω (5mA maximum) 
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Supply voltage: 17 – 28 V dc 
Operating temperature: Continuous: 0°C to +50°C 
Transient: -40°C to +60°C 
Clean air analogue value: 25 ±2 counts 
Alarm level analogue value: 55 
Sensitivity (temperature): Less than 15% change in sensitivity over rated range 
Humidity: 15% to 90% relative humidity 
Wind speed: Unaffected by wind 
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Appendix D   Television Specifications 
 
Test 0 
Make:   Philips Nicam Digital Stereo 
Model:   25GR6771/79 R 
Power supply:  230 V ~ 50 Hz 
Output:   90 W 
Serial No.:  SV019135   101569 




Make:   Mitsubishi 
Model:   CT-25AM2(NZ) 
Power supply:  230 V ~ 50 Hz 
Output:   125 W 
Serial No.:  25AM 206889 
   775A022A7 




Make:   Panasonic  
Model:   CN218RVQ 
Power supply:  230 V ~ 50 Hz 
Output:   111 W 
Distributor:   Fisher and Paykel 




Make:   Sony Trinitron Color TV 
Model:   KV-21VX1MT 
Power supply:  ~ 110 V – 127 V – 220 V – 240 V  
   50 Hz / 60 Hz 
Output:   135 W 
Serial No.:  2004390 
Mass:   24.715 kg 
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Test 4 
Make:   Philips 
Model:   20CT636/79 R 
Power supply:  230 V ~ 50 Hz 
Output:   60 W 
Serial No.:  SV 00 8910  101536 




Make:   Toshiba Colour TV 
Model:   2132DB 
Power supply:  220 - 240 V ~ 50 Hz 
Output:   103 W 
Serial No.:  SV 40150790 




Make:   Panasonic Colour TV 
Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. Ltd 
Model:   TC-20L32 
Power supply:  230 V ~ 50 Hz 
Output:   98 W 
Serial No.:  MA3610244 
Distributor:  Fisher and Paykel 
Manufactured in: Malaysia   




Make:   Sanyo 
Model:   C25ZG51 
Service Ref. No.: C25ZG51-01 
Chassis series:  AA1-A25 
Power supply:  AC 230 V ~ 50 Hz 
Output:   105 W 
Serial No.:  27705857 
1AA6P4SO483-A   A-E8EV 
Mass:   25.97 kg 
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Test 8 
Make:   Sony Trinitron Color TV 
Model:   KV-T25SF11 
Power supply:  ~ 110 – 240 V 50/60 Hz 
Output:   148 W 
Serial No.:  1000172 
Manufactured in: Malaysia 




Make:   Goldstar Cinemaster 23 System 
Model:   CF-20A74 
Power supply:  100 – 270 V ~ 50/60 Hz 
Output:   80 W 
Serial No.:  2074050108219 
Manufactured in: Jordan 




Make:   Philips Powervision 
Model:   21GR1369/79 R 
   UHF + VHF 
Power supply:  230 V ~ 50 Hz 
Output:   60 W 
Serial No.:  SVO 39228   100252 




Make:   Toshiba Colour TV 
Model:   207R9A 
Power supply:  240 – 250 V ~ 50 Hz 
Output:   60 W 
Serial No.:  15623152 
Manufactured in: Singapore 
Mass:   17.755 kg 
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Test 12 
Make:   Sony Trinitron Colour TV 
Model:   KV-2153 8N 
Power supply:  ~ 200 – 240 V 50 Hz 
Output:   130 W 
Serial No.:  1000881 
Manufactured in: Malaysia 




Make:   Mitsubishi 
Model:   CT-2148NZM 
Power supply:  ~ 230 V 50 Hz 
Output:   88 W 
Serial No.:  NZ214802849 




Make:   Transonic 20” Color Television 
Model:   CTV-5144 
Power supply:  240 V ~ 50 Hz 
Output:   75 W 
Serial No.:  93101934 
Manufactured in: China 
   08 10 




Make:   Sanyo 
Model:   CZP2141TXA-00 
Chassis series:  A3-B21 
Power supply:  AC 220 - 240 ~ 50 Hz 
Output:   76 W 
Serial No.:  27203410 
Manufactured in: Singapore 
Mass:   21.220 kg 
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Test 16 
Make:   Philips 
Model:   20GR1250/79 R 
Power supply:  230 V ~ 50 Hz 
Output:   55 W 
Serial No.:  SV 00 9023   103577 




Make:   Sanyo 
Model:   C29ZK80TX-51 
Chassis series:  AA1-A29 
Power supply:  AC 220 - 240 ~ 50 Hz 
Output:   125 W 
Manufactured in: Indonesia 




Make:   Transonic 20” (51 cm) Color Television 
Model:   CTV-5144 
Power supply:  240 V ~ 50 Hz 
Output:   75 W 
Serial No.:  93101442 
Manufactured in: China 
   08 10 




Make:   Samsung 
Model:   CB-681 3WT 
Power supply:  AC 230 V ~ 50 Hz 
Output:   125 W 
Serial No.:  323732BB200109 
Manufactured in: Korea 
Mass:   32.33 kg 
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Test 20 
Make:   Sony Trinitron Color TV 
Model:   KV-T25SF81 
Power supply:  ~ 110 – 240 V 50/60 Hz 
Output:   148 W 
Serial No.:  1001193 
Manufactured in: Malaysia 




Make:   Transonic 29” High Resolution Color TV 
Model:   GT-8828 
Power supply:  AC ~ 240 V / 50 Hz 
Output:   120 W 





















Appendix E    Fire Safety Systems Response 193
























































Figure E.2: Test 2 - Compartment fire safety system response 


























































Figure E.4: Test 4 - Compartment fire safety system response 























































Figure E.6: Test 6 - Compartment fire safety system response 






















































Figure E.8: Test 8 - Compartment fire safety system response 




























Figure E.9: Test 9 - Compartment fire safety system response
























































Figure E.11: Test 13 - Lobby fire safety system response 
























































Figure E.13: Test 14 - Lobby fire safety system response 




















































Figure E.15: Test 15 - Lobby fire safety system response 
























































Figure E.17: Test 16 - Lobby fire safety system response 




















































Figure E.19: Test 17 - Lobby fire safety system response 
























































Figure E.21: Test 18 - Lobby fire safety system response 




















































Figure E.23: Test 20 - Lobby fire safety system response 
























































Figure E.25: Test 21 - Lobby fire safety system response 
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Appendix F   Systems Activation Distribution 
 
 




Figure F.2: Difference in activation times between CO and ionisation detectors 
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Figure F.4: Difference in activation times between lobby ion and ion detectors 
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Figure F.6: Difference in activation times between sprinkler and ion detector 
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Figure F.8: Difference in activation times between thermal and optical detectors 
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Figure F.10: Difference in activation times between lobby opt and opt detectors 
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Figure F.12: Difference in activation times between thermal and CO detectors 
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Figure F.14: Difference in activation times between lobby opt and CO detectors 
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Figure F.16: Difference in activation times lobby ion and thermal detectors 
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Figure F.18: Difference in activation times sprinkler and thermal detector 
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Figure F.19: Difference in activation times lobby opt and lobby ion detectors 
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Figure G.2: Test 10 - FECsmoke (800 mm sampling height) 




































Figure G.4: Test 12 - FECsmoke (800 mm sampling height) 
 




































Figure G.6: Test 14 - FECsmoke (1600 mm sampling height) 
 


































Figure G.8: Test 16 – FECsmoke (1600 mm sampling height) 
 


































Figure G.10: Test 18 – FECsmoke (800 mm sampling height) 
 


































Figure G.12: Test 21 – FECsmoke (800 mm sampling height) 
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Figure H.2: Test 2 - Centre room temperature profile 

































































Figure H.4: Test 4 - Centre room temperature profile 
 





























































Figure H.6: Test 6 - Centre room temperature profile 
 





























































Figure H.8: Test 8 - Centre room temperature profile 
 































































Figure H.10: Test 10 - Centre room temperature profile 
 































































Figure H.12: Test 12 - Centre room temperature profile 
 































































Figure H.14: Test 14 - Centre room temperature profile 
 





























































Figure H.16: Test 16 - Centre room temperature profile 
 





























































Figure H.18: Test 18 - Centre room temperature profile 
 





























































Figure H.21: Test 21 - Centre room temperature profile 
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Figure I.2: Test 3 – Heat release rate 













































Figure I.4: Test 5 – Heat release rate 
 













































Figure I.6: Test 8 – Heat release rate 
 










































Figure I.8: Test 10 – Heat release rate 
 













































Figure I.10: Test 12 – Heat release rate 
 










































Figure I.12: Test 14 – Heat release rate 
 













































Figure I.14: Test 16 – Heat release rate 
 










































Figure I.16: Test 18 – Heat release rate 
 







































Figure I.18: Test 21 – Heat release rate 
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Figure J.2: Test 2 – FEDasphyxiant (800 mm sampling height) 































Figure J.4: Test 4 – FEDasphyxiant (800 mm sampling height) 






































Figure J.6: Test 6 – FEDasphyxiant (800 mm sampling height) 
 






































Figure J.8: Test 8 – FEDasphyxiant (800 mm sampling height) 
 































Figure J.10: Test 10 – FEDasphyxiant (800 mm sampling height) 
 



































Figure J.12: Test 12 – FEDasphyxiant (800 mm sampling height) 
 







































Figure J.14: Test 14 – FEDasphyxiant (1600 mm sampling height) 
 



































Figure J.16: Test 16 – FEDasphyxiant (1600 mm sampling height) 
 






























Figure J.18: Test 18 – FEDasphyxiant (800 mm sampling height) 
 



































Figure J.20: Test 21 – FEDasphyxiant (800 mm sampling height) 
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Figure K.2: Test 3 - Mass loss curve 








































Figure K.4: Test 5 - Mass loss curve 




































Figure K.6: Test 8 - Mass loss curve 
 











































Figure K.8: Test 10 - Mass loss curve 
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Figure K.10: Test 12 - Mass loss curve 
 











































Figure K.12: Test 14 - Mass loss curve 
 










































Figure K.14: Test 16 - Mass loss curve 
 








































Figure K.16: Test 18 - Mass loss curve 
 








































Figure K.18: Test 21 - Mass loss curve 
Appendix K    Mass Loss 262 
 
Appendix L    Alert Time versus Available Escape Time 263












































































Figure L.2: Test 2 – Alert time versus escape time 






































































Figure L.4: Test 6 – Alert time versus escape time 





































































Figure L.6: Test 8 – Alert time versus escape time 
 































































Figure L.8: Test 12 – Alert time versus escape time 
 








































































Figure L.10: Test 14 – Alert time versus escape time 
 









































































Figure L.12: Test 16 – Alert time versus escape time 
 






































































Figure L.14: Test 20 – Alert time versus escape time 
 
Appendix L    Alert Time versus Available Escape Time 270 
 
Appendix M    Event Timelines 
 
271








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































   





















































































   






























































    
 











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































   



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































   




































































































































































































0           
 
